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Abstract
The Spirit of Education: Politics and Pedagogy in Plato, Rousseau, Dewey, and Freire
Stephanie Almeida Nevin
2021
Education has long been romanticized by political thinkers for its supposed power
to shape ideal selves and societies. This dissertation examines the history of political
thought on education and contends that citizens are principally educated through
socialization by law, culture, and institutions. Revealing the limits of utilitarian visions of
education as subject formation, this dissertation ultimately argues against the excessive
idealization of education as a means of realizing individual and collective projects of
becoming. It argues for a revaluation of education as a truth-seeking activity for all ages.
In “Molding Citizens: Plato’s Question,” I offer a rereading of Plato’s body of
work through the lens of education. Against common readings, I contend that Socrates
was less a model teacher and more a model student who forced Plato to grapple with
whether good citizens are the products of good teachers and with whether education as a
truth-seeking activity is antithetical to that civic end. I show how Plato maintained that
good citizenship is not primarily the result of a teacher’s lessons, but of the law, culture,
and institutions that structure lifelong association. I further demonstrate how he
considered whether the socialization that determines becoming could be intentionally
designed and perfected.
In “Cultivating Man: Rousseau’s Experiment,” I argue that Rousseau saw a
critical problem with Plato’s model because association will only produce ideal persons
and citizens if and when a given society is already ideal. In response, Rousseau offered
his Emile as an experiment in limiting socialization at the individual level in order to
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create a new ideal who might resist the toxic effects of a non-ideal society. Against
common readings, I contend that Rousseau did not advocate molding persons toward
predetermined models. Instead, he suggested cultivating the potential of each individual
through a personalized and inimitable educational program of anti-socialization.
Rousseau also put his theory into practice by creating curated fictional worlds for his
readers, writing novels that provided ideal, private, and imagined experiences of
socialization.
In “Developing Liberal Democrats: Dewey’s Synthesis,” I reveal how Dewey
sought to harmonize the apparent tensions between Plato and Rousseau by generating a
democratic theory of education still embraced by contemporary political theorists today.
Following Hegel, Dewey maintained that educators need not choose between educating
for the individual and educating for society because each could be perfected through the
other. Analyzing his conception of education as growth, I show that although Dewey
claimed to embrace an idea of education that has no end and is lifelong, he ultimately
relied on a necessarily progressive view of education that placed excessive, undue hope
on the institution of the school. I demonstrate how in relegating all education to the
service of society, Dewey owed more to Plato than is typically realized, and that because
he did not adequately recognize the value of individuals understood as separable from
their contribution to social progress, he further foreclosed the possibility of education as a
purely private or solitary truth-seeking activity.
In “Realizing the Revolution: Freire’s Critical Pedagogy,” I introduce political
theorists to Paulo Freire, a pedagogue whose reception in the United States as a founder
of critical pedagogy made him a giant in the field of education studies but obscured his

ii

contributions to political thought. Whereas Plato, Rousseau, and Dewey each stressed the
power and importance of ongoing socialization from childhood, Freire took a different
approach, suggesting that one’s interpretation of experience is more important to
becoming than experience itself. Taking adult education as his starting point, Freire
suggested that what society needed was not a theory of learning for children, but rather a
theory of unlearning for adults that would result in concrete action against all oppression
in society. Valuing neither stability nor incremental progress, Freire redefined education
as a praxis that prompts critical consciousness and radical change. For him, education
could never and should never aspire to be neutral or separate from becoming and the
realization of ideals.
Finally, in “Living to Learn: An Alternative,” I conclude by defending education
as a truth-seeking activity separable from projects of individual and collective becoming.
Having examined how each thinker resolves or struggles with the tension between these
two “spirits” of education, usually in favor of becoming, I argue for a reassessment of
education as an intrinsically valuable practice of truth-seeking to be enjoyed by children
but most especially by adults within and outside the boundaries of the school.

iii

The Spirit of Education:
Politics and Pedagogy in Plato, Rousseau, Dewey, and Freire

A Dissertation
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of
Yale University
In Candidacy for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

by
Stephanie Almeida Nevin
Dissertation Director: Bryan Garsten
December 2021

iv

ã 2021 by Stephanie Almeida Nevin
All rights reserved

v

Table of Contents
Acknowledgements.............................................................................................................vii
Dedication............................................................................................................................x
I. What is Education for?.....................................................................................................1
1. The Promise of Education
2. Truth and Becoming
3. Summary of Chapters
II. Molding Citizens: Plato’s Question..............................................................................28
1. The Socratic Problem
2. Education as Sophistry
3. Education as Socialization
4. Molding Citizens
5. Education as Inquiry
III. Cultivating Man: Rousseau’s Experiment...................................................................72
1. Grappling with Plato
2. Cultivating Natural Man
3. Education as Self-Formation
4. Education as Imagined Socialization
5. Inquiry and Solitude
IV. Developing Liberal Democrats: Dewey’s Synthesis.................................................154
1. Plato vs. Rousseau
2. A Hegelian Synthesis
3. Education as Growth
4. The School as Panacea
5. Rejecting Solitude
V. Realizing the Revolution: Freire’s Critical Pedagogy….............................................210
1. Pedagogue and Politician
2. Against Socialization
3. Education as Mutual Humanization
4. Dialogics Toward Liberation
5. Inquiry as Politics
VI. Living to Learn: An Alternative................................................................................252
1. Rethinking Civic Education
2. Beyond Becoming
3. The Lifelong Learner
Bibliography....................................................................................................................275

vi

Acknowledgements
This dissertation began as a set of questions about the purpose of education and its
relationship to politics. They were questions I kept coming back to well after college and
usually in the quiet moments—waiting for the bus to work, enjoying a coffee break, or
traveling home after a long day. Eventually these questions drove me back to the
university, to that special place where I might find the freedom to seriously pursue them.
Yale gave me the luxury of solitude and turned those quiet moments into long hours of
secluded study.
Yale also gave me its people, and I met so many who supported, enriched, and
challenged my thinking. Above all, I am most at a loss to express the extent of my
gratitude to Bryan Garsten. He encouraged me to follow my intuitions and pursue my
questions with breadth and depth; his trust in me helped me trust in myself; and he
always gave me the courage I needed to write through my doubts. I learned so much not
only from the content of our conversations about education, but from actually engaging in
the activity of education with him, both as his student and co-teacher, and as co-founders
of Yale’s Citizens Thinkers Writers program.
I am also very grateful to Steven B. Smith and Giulia Oskian. Their comments
and probing questions helped me focus my arguments, strengthen my voice, and better
appreciate the assumptions and implications of my ideas. Other faculty at Yale further
enabled me to pursue the themes of my dissertation in more depth, through new lenses,
and with different methods. This dissertation benefited from courses taught by Seyla
Benhabib, Daniela Cammack, Jill Campbell, Hélène Landemore, Karuna Mantena, Ian

vii

Shapiro, Steven Skowrownek, Susan Stokes, Vesla Weaver, and Elisabeth Wood. I also
benefitted immensely from the mentorship of Kathryn Slanski.
I would next like to acknowledge the great debt I owe to the many teachers and
mentors I found at Pomona College, especially Susan McWilliams Barndt, John Seery,
and Oona Eisenstadt. Susan first introduced me to political philosophy and to the idea of
a liberal arts education when she met me as a high school student. For that and so much
more, I am forever thankful.
Many peers at Yale offered feedback and friendship that made this dissertation
possible: I thank my cohort and classmates, especially Anna Feuer, David Froomkin,
Darren Nah, and Nica Siegal, for many countless hours of conversation and comradery;
the current and former members of the Yale Political Theory Women’s Writing Group,
especially Leila Ben Abdallah, Carmen Dege, Amy Gais, Lisa Gilson, Mie Inoyue,
Isabelle Laurenzi, Anne Mishkind, Demi Moore, Naomi Scheinerman, and Joy Wang; the
2020-21 attendees of Theory Thursdays, especially Armando Perez-Gea, Owen Phillips,
Loren Reinoso, Alexander Trubowitz, and Amanda Weiss; and others, including Matt
Graham, Alexander Kolokotronis, Vatsal Naresh, Hari Ramesh, and Ariel Tang.
I would also like to acknowledge my students, especially the participants in
Yale’s Citizens Thinkers Writers program from 2016-21, the undergraduates in my
Spring 2020 course “What is Education For?”, and my mentees in the Teagle Humanities
Fellowship program in both 2020 and 2021.
Parts of the dissertation further benefited from the feedback of co-panelists and
attendees at the 2020 conferences of the New England Political Science Association and

viii

the Philosophy of Education Society as well as the 2019 “Education for What”
conference organized at Yale by Mordechai Levy-Eichel, to whom I also owe thanks.
Financial support for the dissertation and my graduate education was provided by
Yale in part through its Dissertation Fellowship, the David A. Gimbel Fellowship Fund,
the Robert A. and Ann S. Dahl Endowed Fellowship in Political Science, and the Charles
Deere Wiman (Ph.B. 1914) Memorial Fellowship. I was also financially supported by
PALCUS, the Portuguese-American Leadership Council of the United States.
Many friends and family beyond Yale sustained me. I am particularly grateful to
the Nevins and the Mullaneys; and to Lauren Rosenfield for her ever-constant friendship,
insight, and encouragement. Special thanks are also due to Dr. Pramod Srivastava for his
wisdom, whiskey, and conversation, and also for his faith in pure science.
I am forever grateful to my parents, Noémia and Américo Almeida, and I owe so
much to their infinite love, support, and wisdom. Their sacrifices allowed me to have the
opportunities they lacked, and they are in some sense both the beginning and the end of
this dissertation. They are my heroes, and they also gave me a wonderful brother. James
Almeida never ceases to inspire and encourage his older sister, and I am so thankful for
his unrelenting belief in me.
Finally, I thank my husband, James Nevin. One July 4th, we exhausted ourselves
swimming out to a rock in the middle of the ocean, only to find it was covered with
barnacles. We climbed atop together anyway, and that was the moment I decided and
proclaimed, my knee bleeding, “I’m going to do it. I’m going to apply.” James has been
with me every step of the way, and I have learned so much from him. He fills each day
with love, patience, kindness, humor, and wonder. I have been very lucky.

ix

To those who wonder in the quiet,
and to James Timothy Nevin,
who wonders with me.

I
What is Education for?
Education bears the weight of all dreams. This seems especially true in
democratic societies that reject in principle the importance of birth and blood for deciding
fortunes, relying instead on education as the primary means and requirement for realizing
individual and collective desires. Wealth, status, and power; beauty, truth, and goodness;
liberty, humanity, and wisdom—all these and more are promised fulfillment through
education. Education is exalted not only for what it can give to students, but because of
how it promises to make students into the very thing it offers. Through and with
education, children might become whatever they desire, or at least what others desire for
them.
There is no shortage of pronouncements on what education is for, or rather what
individuals and societies should desire for themselves. Sometimes, these declarations
appear in the form of exhortations or polemics that reveal the extent to which while
having education is thought to be an essential good, a lack of education—or the wrong
kind—is a scapegoat for countless harms. That is, political, social, and economic
problems are frequently cast as miseducation problems, and everything from poor
political judgment, to social division, to economic disadvantage is thought fixable
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through more and better education.1 Schools are expected to do everything from training
workers and creating leaders to improving morals and perpetuating culture. 2
As a private and public good with so many perceived social, political, and
economic benefits, it is no wonder that education is the site of so much debate, dismay,
and above all, hope. Even when critiqued, it is often treated as a panacea, as a solution to
itself.3 But why is education thought to explain and solve so many problems? What
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As historian Lawrence Cremin noted, education has been deemed “a leading weapon in
everything from the fight against race discrimination to the war on poverty to the drive
for political and economic competitiveness.” Lawrence Cremin, Popular Education and
Its Discontents, 1st edition (New York: Harper & Row, 1990), 93. Optimism about
education has a long history in the United States, where the spread and rise of public
schooling was driven by 19th century reformers like Horace Mann who believed in the
“perfectibility of human life and institutions.” Lawrence Cremin, The Transformation of
the School: Progressivism in American Education, 1876-1957, 1st edition (New York:
Vintage, 1964), 8.
2

By the Progressive Era, schools were increasingly seen as the instruments of social
progress, and their reach was expanded to “include directed concern for health, vocation,
and the quality of family and community life.” Lawrence Cremin, The Transformation of
the School, viii. According to Hannah Arendt, the United States is especially disposed to
have a utopian view of education because, on her reading, Americans have a distinct love
of the new and an affinity for youth. Hannah Arendt, “The Crisis in Education,” in
Between Past and Future (Penguin, 2006), 170–93.
3

The main exception to this pattern of optimism is found at the level of higher education,
where skeptics tend to question the supposed benefits of a college education against the
investment required. For a recent example, see Bryan Caplan, The Case against
Education: Why the Education System Is a Waste of Time and Money, (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2018). Even in this case, the author advocates more and better
(vocational) education. It is exceedingly rare for education critics to argue against
education altogether. Rather, across the political spectrum, they essentially make a case
for reform. See, for example, William F. Buckley, God and Man at Yale: The
Superstitions of “Academic Freedom” (Simon and Schuster, 2012); Allan Bloom, The
Closing of the American Mind (Simon and Schuster, 2008); William Deresiewicz,
Excellent Sheep: The Miseducation of the American Elite and the Way to a Meaningful
Life (Simon and Schuster, 2014); Michael M. Crow and William B. Dabars, The Fifth
Wave: The Evolution of American Higher Education (JHU Press, 2020); Anthony T.
Kronman, The Assault on American Excellence (Simon and Schuster, 2020).
2

accounts for such persistent faith in both the private and public utility of education? And
what if that impulse to point to education not only obscures better solutions, but cloaks
something important about the nature of education itself?
In this dissertation, I argue that the answers to these questions begin with the
realization that education is too often conflated with the art of becoming. What is so
attractive about education is that it not only offers to produce problem-solving goods like
knowledge, technology, and wealth, but to also form and improve the people who will
use and develop those tools. It promises to generate problem solving tools and create
problem solvers. Understood as the art of becoming, education is that which transforms
human potential, that which makes children into adult, citizens, leaders, and workers.
Children receive an education so that they can emerge fully formed and ready to
participate in all aspects of society. When seen in this light, the answer to the question
“What is education for?” is simple: It is the means by which ideal selves and societies are
realized.
In other words, much of the power attributed to education is rooted in its
supposed ability to shape and develop selves and societies. This raises numerous
questions, all with political implications: Who should be shaped? How should they be
shaped? What should they be shaped for? Can one be shaped by another into a free and
autonomous being, or is this an inherent contradiction? Who has the power to shape, and
what is the proper balance of authority between students, teachers, families, and the state?
These questions are critical, but they all rely on the assumption that education can and
should seek to form and “create” subjects and societies; that education is fundamentally
the art of individual and collective becoming.
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This assumption is not new. As I will demonstrate, education for becoming has a
long history that includes the Greek idea of paideia as well as the German Bildung
tradition, and education has long been romanticized by political thinkers for its supposed
power to realize ideal selves and societies. Plato, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, John Dewey,
and Paulo Freire all made education central to their political visions. For them, education
was more than a means of generating or at least approximating the ideal agents
presupposed by their political theories; each understood education to be absolutely
critical to political conservation, development, and transformation.
I turn to these specific figures not only because they exemplify some of the
highest dreams for and deepest fears around education and politics, but because they are
self-consciously in conversation with one another, and to my knowledge all four have
never been studied together. Although education has undeniably undergone momentous
changes since Plato, each thinker listens and speaks to the last, building on, tearing down,
and adapting what was already said in light of their own time, place, and needs. Among
their numerous influences, they count one another: Rousseau read and responded directly
to Plato, Dewey read and responded directly to Plato and Rousseau, and Freire read and
responded directly to Dewey, Plato, and—if his personal library records are any
indication—Rousseau as well.
This dissertation is attentive to the historical context of these thinkers at the same
time that it is committed to examining their ideas in relation to one other. Ultimately, I
am most interested in what is ceded both in their conversation and in contemporary
discourse, namely, education as an activity for itself. I argue that in stressing education as
becoming and in subordinating education to political needs and dreams, these thinkers

4

both overstated the power of education and demanded its constraint. Focused on
education for managing individual and collective projects of becoming, they suppressed
or neglected education as an intrinsically valuable activity that springs from the human
desire to know why and how and what if, even when that knowledge serves no purpose.
Admittedly, the idea that education is socially, politically, and economically
useful because it can shape ideal selves and societies has been critical to generating and
maintaining support for education, resulting not only in its spread but in remarkable
achievements at the individual, national, and global level. And yet, I suggest, education is
widely oversold as the art of becoming, as a way of realizing ideal selves and societies.
Too often, education is pushed to the front lines of social, political, and economic
problems because it is easier to gesture at schools than it is to implement direct and
immediate solutions.4
In the remainder of this introduction, I review the contemporary scholarship on
the civic, moral, and vocational promises of education. I demonstrate how much of the
literature continues to be informed by the assumption that education is for and
synonymous with shaping ideal selves and societies. Next, I argue for the necessity of
distinguishing between what I term education for becoming and education for truth
seeking, and I theorize three modes through which the activity of education occurs.
Finally, I provide a summary of the remainder of the dissertation.

4

As education historians David Tyack and Larry Cuban argued in Tinkering Toward
Utopia, “The utopian tradition of social reform through schooling has often diverted
attention from more costly, politically controversial, and difficult to file reforms.” David
B. Tyack, Larry Cuban, and David B. Tyack, Tinkering toward Utopia: A Century of
Public School Reform (Harvard University Press, 2009), 3.
5

The Promise of Education
For most political thinkers, the promise of education is predictably civic. As it is
commonly understood, civic education is instruction primarily aimed at children with the
goal of creating fully formed adult citizens. In the United States, a “true” civic education
is thought to be liberalizing and democratizing. It is rightly seen as distinct from the
outright indoctrination of citizens found in illiberal, authoritarian contexts.5 But while the
methods and ends between them may vary significantly, all forms of government have
been invested in using education to develop and shape youth toward a model adult image,
be it a subject, citizen, or ruler. As Aristotle observed long ago, the nature and amount of
preparation children are thought to require for political life varies by regime type and is
informed by competing notions of what makes an ideal citizen. 6 But, I argue, while their
aims and emphases may differ, all proponents of political education are united in their
belief that education should be used to intentionally shape persons and communities
toward ideals. Moreover, this same logic underpins the arguments of those who stress the
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As J. Peter Euben and Elizabeth Kiss argue, there is a distinction between “political”
and “politicized” education. The latter “regards the ‘objects’ of instruction as passive
recipients of knowledge which molds them according to some blueprint of the good
society,” but the former “seeks to cultivate the capacity for independent judgment,
including consider judgment the challenge the beliefs and assumptions of the educator.“
Elizabeth Kiss and J. Peter Euben, “Aim High: A Response to Stanley Fish,” in Debating
Moral Education: Rethinking the Role of the Modern University, ed. Elizabeth Kiss and J.
Peter Euben (Duke University Press Books, 2010), 65. See also J. Peter Euben,
Corrupting Youth: Political Education, Democratic Culture, and Political Theory
(Princeton University Press, 1997).
6

Aristotle, Politics, trans. C. D. C. Reeve (Hackett Publishing, 1997), III.4, 1276b20-35.
6

liberal and vocational promise of education, either with or against proponents of civic
education.
Formal civic education almost always has two goals, and scholars tend to stress
one or the other: fostering civic bonds and teaching civic skills. To seek to foster civic
bonds is to acknowledge that a group of citizens is first and foremost a community and
that the mutual respect, love, and loyalty of its members ensure not only peace and
cooperation within the community, but a willingness to defend it against external threats.
Feelings of attachment and unity depend on something shared, be it an understanding of
governing principles, values, and ideals or of a common territory, origin, and culture.
Civic education offers a means of teaching what is shared in order to intentionally create
those bonds, and their basis, intensity, and exclusiveness determine whether they
comprise an “enlightened patriotism” or blind nationalism.7
The spread of mass education coincided with, among other forces, the need to
ensure that youth would grow into loyal citizens who identify with their nation. As
Benedict Anderson argued in Imagined Communities, when faced with the growth of
popular movements that threatened the legitimacy of the dynastic order, European
monarchies sought to foster nationalism in order to validate and defend themselves.
According to Anderson, this “official” nationalism was deliberately and strategically
established in Europe and elsewhere after organically emerging in the Americas with the
timely development of print capitalism. Among the mechanisms used to foster
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For more on the distinction between patriotism and nationalism, see Steven B. Smith,
Reclaiming Patriotism in an Age of Extremes (Yale University Press, 2021).
7

nationalism, public education systems played a large role alongside the media and
administrative regulations.
There are countless historical and contemporary case studies of state-sponsored
attempts to exploit literacy campaigns, schooling, and curriculum in order to foster
nationalism. In Peasants into Frenchmen, the historian Eugen Weber argued that
instituting public education in France was, in addition to military service, the critical
mechanism for teaching French national identity, a concept that had not existed amongst
the peasantry before those late 19th century reforms. One could also point to extreme
examples of nationalist mass education in Nazi Germany as well as efforts to
Americanize and assimilate immigrant and indigenous children in the United States or
efforts to foster a national identity in post-colonial Africa.8 From Greece to Nicaragua,
studies have shown how education has been purposefully designed in order to foster a
shared identity and build national unity.9
But as Steven B. Smith argues, the forging of common culture among citizens
does not have to be nationalistic or even at odds with pluralism.10 In Democracy and
Distrust, Stephen Macedo insists that “all political regimes, even pluralistic liberal ones”

8

Redie Bereketeab, “Education as an Instrument of Nation-Building in Postcolonial
Africa,” Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism 20, no. 1 (2020): 71–90.
9

Luciano Baracco, “The Nicaraguan Literacy Crusade Revisited: The Teaching of
Literacy as a Nation-Building Project,” Bulletin of Latin American Research 23, no. 3
(2004): 339–54; Leda Glyptis, “Love, Truth and National Identity Prescriptions:
Recounting the 1919-1922 War in Greek School Textbooks,” Internationale
Schulbuchforschung 29, no. 1 (2007): 103–19.
10

Smith, Reclaiming Patriotism in an Age of Extremes.
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necessitate “a considerable measure of convergence on basic political values.11 But
regardless of whether civic education aims at a culture that is tolerant of freedom and
diversity or not, an underlying assumption remains: Education is understood as the means
by which individuals become or at least approximate an ideal people and community,
generation after generation.
The second goal of civic education is to teach children the knowledge and skills
required for full participation in the political community, be it as virtuous rulers, leaders,
or citizens. Rather than focus exclusively on creating civic bonds, this goal stresses the
development of civic capacities, and it is given particular prominence in the literature on
democratic education because in democratic societies citizens must learn to rule
themselves and others in turn. In Teachers of the People, Dana Villa describes the
historical emergence of this idea through the political thought of Rousseau, Hegel,
Tocqueville, and Mill. These thinkers, he argues, realized that the private education
typically associated with the rulers and elites of non-democratic society had to be
transformed, democratized, and made public.12 As Benjamin Barber put it, “Democratic
education mediates the ancient quarrel between the rule of opinion and the rule of
excellence by informing opinion and, through universal education in excellence, creating

11

Stephen Macedo, Diversity and Distrust: Civic Education in a Multicultural
Democracy (Harvard University Press, 2003).
12

Dana Villa, Teachers of the People: Political Education in Rousseau, Hegel,
Tocqueville, and Mill (University of Chicago Press, 2017).

9

an aristocracy of everyone.”13 Democratic education is, in other words, the art of
becoming excellent rulers.
Thinkers in this category include participatory democrats like Benjamin Barber as
well as deliberative democrats like Amy Guttmann who insist that education must be
crafted to enable democratic citizens to collectively deliberate the future of their
society.14 In emphasizing skills, these thinkers distinguish themselves from those who
would seek to inculcate specific values or beliefs in citizens, including a common culture.
Some scholars, however, do stress both aims. William Galston, for example, rejects
Gutmann’s ideal as “a piece—but only a piece” of the civic education that is needed,
insisting instead on the promotion of “both a core of civic commitments” as well as
democratic “competences” that must include the ability to evaluate and choose
representatives.15
Skill-based civic education appeals to liberal thinkers in particular because it
stresses developing the capacities of individuals who can weigh and choose their own
conception of the good. It is important to note, however, that these thinkers also continue
to rely on a notion of education as becoming. Their end remains one of “producing” ideal

13

Benjamin Barber, Aristocracy of Everyone (Random House Publishing Group, 2012),
5. Compare this to Leo Strauss who thought that the “necessary” task of (liberal)
education was to “found an aristocracy within mass democratic society.” Leo Strauss,
“What Is Liberal Education?,” in Liberalism Ancient and Modern, (Chicago, I.L.:
University of Chicago Press, 1995), 5.
14

Amy Gutmann, Democratic Education, Revised edition (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1999).
15

William A. Galston, “Civic Education in the Liberal State,” in Liberalism and the
Moral Life, ed. Nancy L. Rosenblum (Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press,
1989), 93.
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individuals, albeit self-shaping ones with the freedom to determine their own ends and
beliefs.16 Political theorists of education tend not to question civic formation as a central
goal of education, but rather what vision of democratic citizenship is most desirable and
therefore what virtues should be stressed. For the Rawlsian-inspired Eamonn Callan, for
instance, the vision is one that requires “creating citizens” who will be “liberal
patriots.”17 For the cosmopolitan Martha Nussbaum, education must “cultivate humanity”
and “create citizens of the world.”18
Nussbaum’s aspiration to cultivate global citizens is a politicized version of a
different promise of education: that it can cultivate character, creating a self with dignity,
purpose, and value. Whereas some thinkers stress education as that which makes possible
the democratic political participation necessary for human flourishing, for others,
education is what enables human flourishing to occur in spite of or in addition to politics.
As Anthony Kronman notes, it used to be taken for granted that reading great books,
examining history, and studying philosophy were essential to building character and to
cultivating the moral and intellectual habits required for living a good life.19

16

As Geoffrey Vaughan notes, “Contemporary theorizing in political education […] is
caught between producing autonomous individuals, on the one hand, and deeply
committed democratic citizens, on the other.” Vaughan, “The Overreach of Political
Education and Liberalism’s Philosopher-Democrat,” 389 (emphasis added).
17

Eamonn Callan, Creating Citizens: Political Education and Liberal Democracy
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
18

Martha C. Nussbaum, Cultivating Humanity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1998).
19

Anthony T. Kronman, Education’s End: Why Our Colleges and Universities Have
Given Up on the Meaning of Life (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008).
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Often taking a very narrow scope of the range of disciplines that have this effect,
contemporary thinkers in this group tend to idealize the humanities and the ages between
eighteen and twenty-two. Focusing on higher education and describing a very small
sector of elite institutions, they stress how colleges and universities can and should
morally guide and transform students. For Andrew Delbanco, college “should be a place
where young people find help for navigating the territory between adolescence and
adulthood” and where they not only “develop certain qualities of mind and heart requisite
for reflective citizenship,” but also find guidance “on their way toward selfknowledge.”20
Whether they stress civic or liberal education, most of these thinkers tend to reject
the view that education ought to only or primarily serve economic ends. This is
unsurprising given that the disciplines most believed to contribute to the cultivation of
humanity and good citizenship are also the ones that raise the most skepticism regarding
their financial practicality. And so, against those who would, for example, eliminate
humanities education in the name of economic efficiency, defenders of liberal and
democratic education tend to maintain that the true value of education is not in its ability
to create future employers and employees, but rather better citizens and humans. They
therefore seek to redirect attention away from economic justifications of education and
toward its civic, democratic, moral, and liberal potential.
But from the beginning, American schools have been asked to be both civic
educators and to provide professional training, in part because democratization coincided

20

Andrew Delbanco’s College: What It Was, Is, and Should Be (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2013), 3.
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with industrialization. Early American thinkers like Noah Webster and Benjamin Rush
insisted not only on the importance of educating toward a national, democratic identity,
but of adapting traditional liberal arts curriculums to suit the needs of the new
commercial republic.21 For them, to make education more practical was to make it more
distinctly American, but today’s advocates of vocational training tend to stress the
development of marketable skills without reference to a distinctly American identity. Not
unlike the skills-based advocates of civic education, those thinkers driven by the
economic promise of education see it as an instrument for becoming. Their assumption is
that education is the means by which ideal worker-selves and capitalist societies can be
realized.
In her attempt to reconcile the divide between advocates of liberal and vocational
education, Danielle Allen maintains that both justifications for education are correct, but
at different levels. Whereas those who argue that education is for “securing a job”
identify the compelling state interest in supporting education, those who argue that
education is for “enriching the life of the mind” offer justification at the level of the
individual. Allen insists that education must always keep in mind the perspective of the
individual student and the goal of maximizing individual flourishing because excessive
focus on social utility leads to the instrumentalization of the student in service of the state
and economy. At the same time, any theory that advocates individual human flourishing,
she suggests, must also include material wellbeing.22 In making this argument, Allen
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follows in the footsteps of John Dewey who insisted that in a democracy one could
educate individuals toward a collective, civic ideal that includes material well-being
while encouraging individual autonomy. While she stresses individual flourishing, her
conception of it is both economic and political. Ultimately, she is most interested in
education as a tool for achieving justice and equality.23 That is, for Allen, education is the
means by which societies become more just and equal.
As Allen herself notes, all of the seemingly contradictory justifications of
education—whether they emphasize vocational training, civic education, or individual
flourishing—share a fundamental desire to “direct the development of human
capacities.”24 That is, they seek to use education to guide human development toward an
ideal. As Allan Bloom put it, “every educational system” seeks to “produce a certain kind
of human being.”25 Most disagreements are not about whether education is formation, but
about the proper ends of shaping, the best curriculum for achieving them, and how much
students should be permitted to shape themselves.
As I have shown, the language of becoming is everywhere in education. Even
those who defend the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake tend to speak of education as
a means for becoming. John Henry Newman, for example, drew on Cicero to speak of the
pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, but his main point was that liberal education
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“makes” the gentleman while only religion can produce morally virtuous individuals.26
Michael Oakeshott, another advocate of the intrinsic value of learning, still insists on
linking learning to becoming.27 The promise of education is not really in understanding
itself, but in becoming. Students are required to attend school to become educated. There,
they are developed, formed, trained, equipped, and made into better citizens, workers,
and humans.

Truth and Becoming
As I have already suggested, political thinkers and philosophers have long turned
to the supposed power of education to shape ideal selves and societies. But how exactly
does education shape? What does the activity of education entail? And does it always
take shaping or becoming as its end? In this dissertation, I theorize three modes through
which learning occurs: (1) formal instruction from others (“transmission”), (2)
association with others (“socialization”), and (3) inquiry conducted alone or with others
(“inquiry”). In the paragraphs that follow, I define these terms in more depth and offer an
overview of how Plato, Rousseau, Dewey, and Freire saw each mode as helping or
hindering education as becoming. I show how while all thinkers agreed that socialization
and not transmissions is the more effective mode of education for shaping individuals and
societies, they disagreed on the role that inquiry should play in part because of the three
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modes, inquiry is most suggestive of a kind of education that does not aim at individual
or collective projects of becoming.
(1) Transmission: What I term transmission is learning through formal teachings.
Transmission is learning that occurs through the intentional, direct transfer of knowledge
and skills to a student. Typically, these teachings are understood as lessons that can be
received, bought, sold and kept. When applied to subject formation, transmission is
thought to form subjects by impressing students with knowledge and habits. Those who
turn to education as transmission for subject formation tend to assume that children are
malleable or even to some extent programmable. On this view, children are molded
through the lessons of parents and teachers who are then credited or blamed according to
whether the child becomes for fails to become what is hoped or expected. Ignoring the
fact that while students may certainly learn content, they can just as quickly forget it,
proponents of this mode of education tend to view frequent testing as a common-sense
way of ensuring that education is “working” and that learning is being absorbed by the
student.28
(2) Socialization: What I term socialization is learning through social experience.
Socialization is learning that occurs through the laws, cultures, and institutions that guide
and structure social interactions and incentivize behaviors. By definition, education as
socialization is always ongoing. When applied to subject formation, socialization is
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thought to form subjects, often subconsciously, through association with one another. As
I will demonstrate, the thinkers studied in this dissertation all agreed that while education
is widely associated with the more easily measurable and commodifiable mode of
transmission, socialization is the most important mode of education by which individuals
and societies become ideal selves. Although their accounts speak of socializing children
into socialized adults, each thinker calls attention to the importance of ongoing education
for all ages. That is, for the most part, they understand socialization to be a process that
never fully ends.
Put another way, far from conflating civic education with schooling, Plato,
Rousseau, Dewey, and Freire emphasize the importance of social relationships and
associations in civic formation.29 As Tocquevillian thinkers insist, rather than view
teachers as agents who can simply make children into good citizens by instructing them
through transmissible lessons, one must instead look to those structures that comprise
communal life, including culture in all its forms as well as law and the economy.30
Today, it is taken for granted that schools should perform many of the functions
previously assumed to be the responsibility of families, religious organizations, and
29
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community life.31 But as contemporary skeptics of civic education in schools such as
James Bernard Murphy argue, there is a gap between civic knowledge and civic virtue,
and civic skills are “mainly acquired not by children in schools but by adults in churches,
unions, civic organizations, and workplaces.”32
The idea of education as socialization does not suggest that schooling does not
matter at all for civic education, but that what matters most is less the precise content of
the curriculum than the “hidden curriculum” of informal and often unconscious education
that happens around in and around the classroom.33 How content is taught, the culture
between and among teachers and students, the rules and manner of their enforcement, the
available extracurricular activities, and even the architecture and design of schools are all
important factors. One must look not simply to the influence of teachers, but to the
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influence of peers.34 These local, on-the-ground realities are just as if not more important
than the tangible content of a formal lesson plan. 35
At the same time, socialization is not all-powerful, and it is important to moderate
hopes both about the possibilities for directing socialization as well as the malleability of
subjects. As Ruth W. Grant argues with reference to humanistic education in particular,
while it can “make people more ethical,” some students, are not “shaped by their
education,” but “appropriate it and mold it to fit their characteristic dispositions,” and not
necessarily for the better.36 Subjects are also agents. This means, for example, that while
one can insist on any number of rules or purposes for a school, ultimately, they are places
to be filled by people who will make of them what they will.
(3) Inquiry: Finally, what I term inquiry is learning through questioning. Inquiry
is the education that occurs by asking questions one does not yet have answers to or by
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re-asking questions for which the answers are assumed: It is a never-ending succession of
“whys” that generate insights as often as frustrations; it is a never-ending succession of
“hows” that lead to endless studies of the invisibly small and incomprehensibly large
phenomena that make up the universe; and it is a never-ending succession of “what ifs”
that lead to the most beautiful and sublime combinations of color, movement, and sound.
Education as inquiry is not the province of any one field—it is neither the exclusive
domain of philosophy nor of the scientific method. Unlike transmission which presumes
a knower who can transmit information to one who does not know, inquiry is often selfdirected and can occur in solitude as well as with others.
To be clear, the distinction I am making between transmission and inquiry is not
between education as teaching and learning and education as research. First, like all
education, research is teaching and learning, albeit among colleagues instead of between
teachers and students. Second, classroom spaces are not limited to transmission and
socialization; they often have all three modes of education occurring at once. Although I
have presented each mode as distinct, all three of the modes can easily coincide in any
given moment of education. To speak of education in modes is to stress that education is
above all an activity that occurs at a particular moment. It is not a quality that one either
possesses or does not possess.
As I will demonstrate, of all the modes of education, inquiry occupies a unique
place in the history of political thought on education. Not only is it the most selfreferential mode for the political philosophers, it is also the subject of the most
disagreement. As the figures studied in this dissertation well know, inquiry can either
serve, threaten, or be useless to the socio-politico-economic order. Whereas transmission
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is directed by a teacher and socialization can be somewhat managed through laws and
institutions, inquiry is more difficult to control and its results are usually unpredictable: It
can create miraculous new medicines as well as Frankensteinian monsters. When turned
toward social life, it can threaten—for better or worse—the order and justice of social,
political, and economic life.
More than any other mode of education, inquiry suggests an alternative
compelling conception of education; one that is not about shaping selves or societies, but
rather about the pleasure of the pursuit of truth and understanding. As I will demonstrate,
for different reasons, not one of the thinkers studied in this dissertation makes room for
this kind of unrestricted inquiry. Whereas Plato prefers to limit when inquiry is practiced
and by whom, Rousseau insists on banishing it from public life both for its own good as
well as the good of society. By contrast, Dewey and Freire cannot separate inquiry from
sociopolitical utility at all, respectively insisting it is not a threat or embracing it precisely
because it threatens. That is, both Dewey and Freire find inquiry to be integral to
democratic subject formation and so make the inquiring citizen synonymous with the
virtuous one. They further seek to meld the modes of inquiry and socialization to the
point where education is no longer conceivable apart from becoming.
Taken together, much of the contemporary and historical political thought on
education leaves one with the impression that education is for shaping and mastering
future selves at the convenience of, for, and in the interest of politics, society, and
economics. The belief that education is the art of becoming is a seductive and
understandable one. It is a definition that plays into a very human love of origin stories
and coming-of-age stories, as well as the view that a self is a fundamentally progressive
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and perfectible being. It is a conception of education that inspires; allowing people to
imagine better futures for themselves and their children.37 But it is also an idea with
mixed results, motivating noble journeys of personal growth and development as well as
state-sponsored indoctrination camps. It has given the world everything from “reform”
schools for boys and “finishing” schools for girls to “civilizing” schools for indigenous
populations. Schools and businesses continue to profit enormously from the idea that
education is the key to realizing a more perfect future self, as they promise to “make”
students and clients into whatever they wish to become.
I maintain that to conflate education with the production of selves is to risk
forgetting that people are both always unfinished and always more than what they learn.
No one is ever really “educated” in that final sense of the term, although one might be
described as cultured, knowledgeable, socialized, qualified, certified, or schooled. When
learning is thought of as worthwhile only because of what it promises to create in the
future, one loses sight of its intrinsic value as an activity for itself, as a universal and
accessible activity for all ages. Instead, education comes to be seen as the privilege of the
young who are yet to be shaped. But to focus the vast majority of educational energies on
youth simply because of their “unshaped” quality is to prioritize those who have the least
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amount of say and control over their education at the expense of adults who, if given the
opportunity, might more readily and voluntarily appreciate it.
Moreover, to limit education to the production of selves or goods with political,
social, and economic utility is to miss that transmission, socialization, and inquiry are all
inevitable, necessary, and worthwhile modes of education that need no justification.
Asking questions, socializing with others, and deliberately sharing knowledge, skills,
behaviors, and beliefs are educational activities that need not be intentionally directed at
individual and collective projects of becoming or socio-politico-economic systems in
order to have value.
To limit education to the art of becoming is to lose sight of education for the
pursuit of truth and understanding as an end in itself for everyone.38 Already, too many
insist that it is not even possible: Why understand if not to use? Why know if not to
master? Nevertheless, in this dissertation I defend education for the pursuit of
understanding at all ages and affirm the intrinsic value of inquiry for all people, whether
they are in schools or not. Education is not merely for becoming, but tied to something
more: to satisfying the human desire to question, even when the answer is useless,
impossible, or dangerous.

Summary of Chapters
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I have argued that contemporary political theory is primarily interested in
education as a tool for realizing individual and collective projects of becoming. The
remainder of this dissertation will examine how this idea has roots in the history of
political thought on education. I will show how together, Plato, Rousseau, Dewey, and
Freire persuasively demonstrate why it is a mistake to think that citizens are “made”
through formal instruction in childhood. Rather, a true civic education is only found in
ongoing and lifelong association with others. I will further argue that to reduce education
to a tool for realizing individual and collective projects of becoming is to neglect the true
spirit of education: seeking moments of understanding. Rather than value education for
what it can promise—that is, for its socio-politico-economic utility—education should be
valued as a worthwhile activity in its own right for all.
In the chapter that follows, “Molding Citizens: Plato’s Question,” I offer a
rereading of Plato’s body of work through the lens of education. Against common
readings, I argue that Socrates was less a model teacher and more a model student who
embodies truth-seeking inquiry. I also show how Socrates posed a problem for Plato and
forced him to grapple with the extent to which good citizens are the products of good
teachers. In the end, Plato maintained that good citizenship is not the result of a teacher’s
lessons (transmission), but of the laws, cultures, and institutions that structure lifelong
association (socialization). I further demonstrate how he considered whether the
socialization that determines becoming could be intentionally designed and perfected.
Can and should truth-seeking inquiry be restricted to serve social interests?
In chapter three, “Cultivating Man: Rousseau’s Experiment,” I demonstrate how
Rousseau faced a critical problem with Plato’s model of civic education: Socialization
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will only produce good men and good citizens if and when a given society is already
good. In Emile, Rousseau experimented with limiting socialization at the individual level
in order to create an ideal man who might resist the toxic effects of a non-ideal society.
Against common readings, I show that Rousseau did not advocate molding men toward
predetermined models. Instead, he suggested cultivating the potential of each individual
through a personalized and inimitable program of education. Putting his theory into
practice, Rousseau also created curated fictional worlds for his readers, writing novels
that provided ideal, private, and imagined experiences of socialization. As for education
for truth seeking, Rousseau determined that it is best pursued in solitude or exile. Of all
the thinkers, he is the only one who reserves some space for education apart from
politics.
In chapter four, “Developing Liberal Democrats: Dewey’s Synthesis,” I reveal
how Dewey sought to harmonize the apparent tensions between both Plato and Rousseau
and between an education for truth and for becoming by generating a democratic theory
of education still embraced by contemporary political theorists today. Following Hegel,
Dewey maintained that educators need not choose between educating for the individual
and educating for society because each could be perfected through the other. Analyzing
his conception of education as growth, I show that although Dewey claimed to embrace
an idea of education that has no end and is lifelong, he ultimately relied on a necessarily
progressive view of education that places excessive, undue hope on the institution of the
school. I note that in relegating all education to the service of society, Dewey owed more
to Plato than is typically realized. Because he did not adequately recognize the value of
individuals understood as separable from their contribution to social progress, he
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foreclosed the possibility of any education as a purely private or solitary truth-seeking
activity.
In chapter five, “Realizing the Revolution: Freire’s Critical Pedagogy,” I
introduce political theorists to Paulo Freire, a pedagogue whose reception in the United
States as a founder of critical pedagogy made him a giant in the field of education studies
but obscured his contributions to political thought. Whereas Plato, Rousseau, and Dewey
each stressed the power and importance of ongoing socialization from childhood, Freire
took a different approach, suggesting that one’s interpretation of experience is more
important to becoming than the experience itself. Taking adult education as his starting
point, Freire suggested that what society needed was not a theory of learning for children,
but rather a theory of unlearning for adults that would result in concrete action against all
oppression in society. Valuing neither stability nor incremental progress, he sought to
redefine education as a praxis that prompts critical consciousness and radical change. For
Freire, education could never and should never aspire to be neutral. More fervently than
even Dewey, he insisted that it is neither possible nor desirable to separate education
from socio-politico-economic utility.
My readings of Plato, Rousseau, Dewey, and Freire reveal and critique the
foundations of contemporary debates regarding the purpose of education, debates which
assume that education is for individual and collective becoming. Against these accounts, I
resist dominant conceptions of the self as a product to be made by education. I challenge
the conceit that the basic, human desire to learn must be justified in terms of sociopolitico-economic utility. In “Living to Learn: An Alternative,” I conclude by defending
education for truth seeking apart from projects of individual and collective becoming. I
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instead insist on education as an intrinsically valuable practice, to be enjoyed by children
but most especially by adults within and outside the boundaries of the school.
To rethink education in this way is to rethink the basic assumptions of political
theories that rely on the idea of subjects as fixed entities to be made by education. If
political subjects are not the products of a curriculum, but unstable beings who progress
and regress, learn and unlearn, then education as it is traditionally conceived cannot be
counted on to produce desired outcomes. Instead of focusing on how ideal citizens can be
“made,” I argue, political theory should stress how good citizenship is a continuous
practice in need of encouragement at all stages of life. Instead of idealizing how
education can be reformed and perfected to facilitate political life, theorists should view
education itself as a goal of political life.
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II
Molding Citizens: Plato’s Question
The Greeks had a word for education understood as an individual’s becoming. As
John M. Cooper defines it, paideia is “the ability that is of service to the soul,” and so it
is a comprehensive and holistic idea that goes beyond one’s upbringing alone.39 In this
chapter, I offer a rereading of Plato’s body of work through the lens of education and
show how Plato grappled with the relationship between what I have termed education for
truth seeking and education for becoming. 40 Against common readings, I argue that
Plato’s Socrates should not be read primarily as a model teacher but rather as a model
student who embodies truth-seeking inquiry. In a time when private teachers claimed to
hold the key to forming ideal men and citizens, Plato redirected attention to the decisive
role of a city’s culture and constitution in shaping youth. That is, he suggested that
socialization—not transmission or sophistry—is the key mode by which selves and
societies become excellent or corrupt.41 I further demonstrate how Plato considered
whether the socialization that determines becoming could be intentionally designed and
perfected by the kind of inquiry Socrates models. Can and should truth-seeking inquiry
be restricted to serve social interests?
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The chapter proceeds as follows: First, I confront the main interpretive difficulties
of reading Plato and clarify my approach to his work and to the Socratic problem. I
contend that although the lines between Plato, Plato’s Socrates and the historical Socrates
are impossibly blurry, these figures cannot be conflated. While the historical Socrates
influenced and motivated Plato’s project, in the dialogues he is less a vehicle for Plato’s
views than he is a symbol through which education as truth-seeking inquiry or, in Plato’s
words “true” philosophy, can be explored and revealed as distinguishable from education
as transmission, or sophistry.
I then draw on a range of dialogues to argue that Socrates is not really a teacher
but rather a special kind of student whose claims of ignorance should not be dismissed
outright. I maintain that Socrates’ critical symbolic function throughout Plato’s work is
missed when readers insist on viewing him primarily as a teacher or as a figure who is
comparable to other sophists. As a student who seeks truth and virtue, he is distinct from
the sophists who claim to teach truth and virtue. Whereas sophists embrace a distorted
form of inquiry which is not truth-seeking but instead self-serving, Socrates exemplifies a
kind of “true” philosophy.
Next, I contextualize Plato’s emphasis on the free and public nature of Socrates’
truth-seeking activities by examining the educational practices and ideals of classical
Athens. I argue that Plato’s dialogues suggest that a more traditional emphasis on public
education results in more virtue than the newer practice of paying private teachers. Plato
maintained that the culture and constitution of a society is more educative than teachers
and their lessons. Although he deserves to be criticized, the sophist is less the
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fundamental cause of corruption than he is a symptom of a larger problem in the culture
and constitution of his society.
In the next section, I turn to Plato’s Republic as both his illustration of this
argument and as an inquiry into whether true philosophy or truth-seeking inquiry might
be made to guide individual and collective becoming. This is achieved both symbolically
at the level of the characters in the dialogue as well as in the content of the dialogue
itself. Posing a radically new relationship between philosophy and society, Plato reveals a
system where power and truth-seeking inquiry transform one another to the point where
each is no longer recognizable.
Finally, I note the ambiguity in Plato’s work and life on the desirability of a
wholly political vision of education and a wholly educational view of politics. Does the
Republic suggest that Plato believed that all education, even truth-seeking inquiry, should
ultimately serve becoming? What are the costs of this belief? I consider how Plato’s
founding of the academy and alleged political ambitions only further adds to this puzzle.

The Socratic Problem
Reading Plato on education presents an especially complicated puzzle. Not only
do readers face the familiar interpretive challenges that accompany any reading of his
work, but the fact that the writings are themselves modeling education means that what is
said about education must also be considered in light of how it is being carried out for
both the characters and the reader. Plato was born in 428/7 BCE to a wealthy, political
family whose members, like him, studied with Socrates.42 To read Plato on education is
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to read a student who became a teacher depicting his former teacher (who himself refused
the name teacher) “teaching” other students, often about education. In this section, I
clarify and defend my reading of Plato as a thinker who grappled with the problem of
politics and education throughout his life’s work and who used Socrates as a symbolic
figure in that exploration.
Many twentieth-century scholars followed Paul Shorey in reading Plato as a
figure with settled views who used Socrates to convey his ideas.43 Reconstructing a
historical Socrates with his own separate philosophy seemed impossible to these scholars,
both because Socrates never wrote and because those who wrote about him, including
Plato, Xenophon, Aristophanes, and Aristotle, were inconsistent in their accounts.
Moreover, even within Plato’s dialogues, conflicting portraits of Socrates emerge: He
appears as a gadfly, a midwife, and (perhaps) a sophist. He appears as political and loyal
to his city, as political and critical of the city’s leadership, and as anti-political and above
politics.
In other words, even on Plato’s account, Socrates is an enigmatic figure open to
interpretation: Is he a man who truly knows nothing, earnestly curious and hoping to
learn from others? Is he on a divine mission? Or is he only interested in mocking others,
especially those of higher status who believe that they are wise? If he is mocking, what
are his motives? Is he simply (perhaps even naively) providing a spectacle for the
entertainment of the youth who associate with him? Is Socrates primarily interested in
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interrogating arguments and definitions, or in examining people? Is he an arrogant, ironic
man interested in persuading reputable citizens (and always failing)? Or is he a humble
conversationalist, devoted to the pursuit of understanding and the testing of ideas? And
where, among all these possibilities, is Plato?
For some readers, these apparent inconsistencies were simply too numerous to
ignore. In 1971, this led analytic philosopher Gregory Vlastos to conclude that Plato’s
thought had not only developed over time, but that the change was so dramatic that it
must represent a break between the views of a historical Socrates and his own.44 Vlastos
promoted the idea that a Socratic Socrates in the early dialogues gave way to a Platonic
Socrates in the later ones. This argument renewed scholarly hope in the possibility of
discovering a historical Socrates as a philosopher in his own right, but the notion of a
developmental rather than unitarian Plato was not without its problems, and scholars such
as Charles H. Kahn continued to defend a more unitarian understanding of Plato.45 As
John M. Cooper notes, the chronological ordering and division of Plato’s dialogues is a
largely interpretive and speculative enterprise.46 And although scholars can point to some
limited evidence and some stylistic and thematic similarities in order to infer some

44

Gregory Vlastos, The Philosophy of Socrates: A Collection of Critical Essays (Anchor
Books, 1980); Gregory Vlastos, Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher, 1 edition
(Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1991).
45

See Charles H. Kahn’s Plato and the Post-Socratic Dialogue: The Return to the
Philosophy of Nature, Reprint edition (Cambridge University Press, 2016). Kahn then
moderated his claim somewhat in the later Plato and the Post-Socratic Dialogue
(Cambridge University Press, 2013).
46

John M. Cooper, “Introduction,” in Plato: Complete Works, ed. D. S. Hutchinson and
John M. Cooper, (Hackett Publishing, 1997), xii–xiv.
32

groupings between the dialogues, there is simply no way to conclusively determine in
what order Plato wrote.
Rejecting both a unitarian, doctrinal Plato who spoke through Socrates and a
developmental, doctrinal Plato who increasingly separated himself from Socrates,
scholars have increasingly insisted on a third way. As Gerald A. Press notes, an evergrowing consensus has emerged around the idea that Plato is not at all a doctrinal thinker
but instead a dramatic one whose dialogues demand a more literary approach. 47 Press
places himself at the vanguard of this movement he calls the “new Platonists,” yet as he
acknowledges, Straussians have long approached Plato as a literary thinker and paid close
attention to the rhetorical aspects of his work, including the dialogue and setting.
Whereas Press and the “new Platonists” insist on taking each dialogue as a self-contained
whole that cannot be made representative of either Plato or Socrates’ thought more
generally, Straussians tend to read Plato as a more coherent thinker with discernable
views.
My Plato is neither developmental nor strictly doctrinal, but one who used his
dialogues to both model and wrestle with the limits and possibilities of education in all its
forms. As Danielle Allen notes, how we read Plato often depends on whether we think
Plato believed in “human nature’s malleability,” but rather than assume or settle on an
answer to that question, I propose that it be understood as the open question for Plato.48
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How and whether individuals and societies can be shaped toward ideals is always both a
pedagogical and a political question for Plato.
That this question was central to his thought is supported not only by the way in
which it is raised throughout the dialogues themselves, but by what we do know of
Plato’s life and world. Plato was surrounded by teachers who claimed to teach the youth
to become virtuous, and he watched Socrates be sentenced to death on the charge of
corrupting them. This question was by no means a settled question in Plato’s time, but a
live, intellectual one for students and teachers. To take one example, according to the 3rdcentury biographer Diogenes Laërtius, one of the seventeen now-lost dialogues by
Socrates’ friend Crito was titled, “That men are not made good by instruction.”49
If we understand Plato’s dialogues as occasions for raising and exploring this
question, then it would be misguided to read them as though they are attempts to merely
preserve and transmit what he and/or Socrates thought. The fact that Socrates makes a
statement does not in and of itself necessitate that it was his or Plato’s view, and in this
dissertation, unless specifically noted otherwise, all future references to Socrates are
references to Plato’s Socrates.
That said, consistent themes and patterns do emerge across the dialogues, and
studying Plato on education has a unique advantage: One not only has the content of the
“teachings” about education, but the example of education “in action” as well. When
taken together and considered in context, Plato’s collected works do suggest a consistent
picture of his thoughts and doubts on education. The problem with Press’ approach and
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with any approach that treats Plato’s dialogues as completely isolated and self-contained
dramas is that, as Catherine Zuckert notes, the dialogues do clearly speak to one
another.50 For Zuckert, what matters is not when Plato wrote the dialogues, but in what
order he would teach them, and this presumably has some relationship to the order of the
events depicted in the dialogues. Unlike Zuckert, my reading does not rest on an actual or
intended chronology to Plato’s works, but like her, I maintain that Plato is revealed in the
dramatic, pedagogic whole of his work.
To make sense of Plato on education, one must respect his decision to leave
himself out of the dialogues and look beyond the specific arguments of individual
characters. One must consider the whole, and no individual dialogue can be taken for the
whole. This means that although the Republic is commonly and rightly read as a
centerpiece in Plato’s thought on education, a fuller appreciation of the complexity and
ambiguity of his treatment of it requires examining his other dialogues as well.
Ultimately, like Alexander Nehamas, I maintain that Plato’s “whole
philosophical project” can be understood as “a lifelong struggle to understand Socrates’
strange personality,” but unlike many scholars, I think Plato was more interested in the
idea of Socrates than in his actual beliefs.51 Socrates serves a symbolic function for Plato
as the embodiment of the inquiring truth-seeker. In the section that follows, I detail
precisely how Socrates represents the mode of inquiry for Plato and how this clarifies
why the point of Socrates’ difference from the sophists is so frequently raised throughout
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the dialogues. I show how this supports the idea that Plato believed that socialization, not
transmission or inquiry, is the key mode of education for becoming.

Education as Sophistry
Despite the significant scholarly disagreement on who Socrates was, one
conviction is almost universally shared: that he was a teacher.52 Socrates is variously
interpreted as a teacher of moral virtue, a teacher of good citizenship, a democratic
teacher for all people, an anti-democratic teacher of elites, and a teacher of skepticism.
Even Peter J. Euben, who does note that Socrates was uniquely a “student of his
students” views Socrates as a teacher, albeit one who teaches reciprocally.53 And Socrates
was, after all, Plato’s teacher. But in what sense was Plato’s Socrates really a teacher?
And what should we make of all the evidence that shows that at least in his own view,
Socrates was not a teacher?
The evidence that Socrates was not in fact a teacher comes first and foremost
from his own words. Socrates refused to call himself a teacher, and he frequently
professed his ignorance. Perhaps his most memorable refusal of the name teacher came at
his trial, where in the Apology he explicitly states, “I have never been anyone’s teacher,”
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adding, “I cannot justly be held responsible for the good or bad conduct of these people,
as I never promised to teach them anything and have not done so” (33a-b). Of course, the
conditions under which Socrates makes this claim render it suspect. Having been accused
of corrupting the youth with his teachings, denying that he is a teacher at all could simply
be a lie in his defense.
That Socrates does not really mean what he says is a very common interpretation
of him. There is a long tradition of insisting that Socrates is really a teacher who only
asks questions for which he has answers, and many readings, seeking to explain away his
professions of ignorance, insist that Socrates is only being ironic. Such readings of
Socrates are so old, they are found in the texts themselves. In the Republic,
Thrasymachus accuses Socrates of being intentionally deceiving and of only feigning
ignorance.54 He claims that Socrates prefers to do the “easy” work of finding fault with
others rather than providing his own answers (336c). He further accuses Socrates of being
sarcastic and intentionally deceiving.
As always, Socrates protests that he makes no special claim to knowledge, but
Thrasymachus won’t accept his answers. He chides Socrates for being unwilling to teach
and yet being willing to learn from others without gratitude, which is to say payment
(337e). Socrates replies by insisting that he cannot give an answer when he neither has
one nor claims to possess one. In the dialogue Charmides, Socrates is once again taken
to be someone who only pretends to not have answers. Yet he insists in his reply to
Critias, “You are talking to me as though I professed to know the answers to my own
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questions and as though I could agree with you if I really wished. This is not the case—
rather, because of my own ignorance, I am continually investigating in your company
whatever is put forward” (164c).
Why does Plato make Socrates so insistent on his ignorance? Does he not express
views in other dialogues? At minimum, does he not have a teaching about the importance
of humility and skepticism? While many Straussian interpreters have turned to
esotericism as the answer, I offer an alternative explanation: Socrates’ professions of
ignorance, which are tied to his refusal to assume the name teacher, are meant to
highlight that he is a strange kind of student, not a teacher, and that his activities are
therefore distinguishable from sophistry. That is, if the sophists are teachers who claim to
offer a certain kind of teachable knowledge, Socrates is a student who seeks truth—a
special kind of student because the truth he seeks is its own good. Although recent
scholarship has insisted on strong affinities between Socrates and the sophists, I maintain
that Plato is deeply invested in distinguishing them.55
As Socrates describes it, one of the key points of contrast between himself and the
sophists is this refusal to treat his educational activity as a commodity that he (a
“teacher”) can or should sell to a student. In the Sophist, the sophist is described as “a
hired hunter of rich young men,” “a wholesaler of learning about the soul,” “a retailer of
the same things,” and “a seller of his own learning” (231-232). Whereas the sophists are
engaged in the “business” of education, Socrates never promises excellence in exchange
for fees. As he stresses three separate times in the Apology, he does not sell any teaching
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at all (19e, 31b, 33b). His conversation is not dependent on receiving a fee, and he is
“equally ready to question the rich and the poor” who are willing to engage him (33a-b).
Emphasizing this point was Socrates’ way of insisting that whatever education he could
be said to offer, it was a public one, not a private one.
Above all, the sophist is both “an athlete in verbal combat, distinguished by his
expertise in debating,” and one who “appears to have expert knowledge of lots of things”
(Sophist, 232). Socrates, by contrast, insists he has no expert knowledge. Rather, he
consistently affirms his position as a student, referring to himself as a “lover of inquiry”
who “must follow his beloved wherever it may lead him” (Euthyphro, 14c). In the Lesser
Hippias, he further describes his activity as follows:
It is always my custom to pay attention when someone is saying something,
especially when the speaker seems to me to be wise. And because I desire to learn
what he means, I question him thoroughly and examine and place side-by-side the
things he says, so I can learn. If the speaker seems to me to be some worthless
person, I neither ask questions nor do I care what he says. This is how you’ll
recognize whom I consider wise. You’ll find me being persistent about what’s
said by this sort of person, questioning him so that I can benefit by learning
something. (369d-e)
Whereas the sophists have nothing to learn from their clients and refutations—they are,
after all, charging a fee for wisdom they already possess, Socrates genuinely seeks to
learn and desires to find truth, having at first sought truth in the natural world and later
turned his inquiry toward human things.56
For the most cynical reader, Socrates’ words to someone like Hippias are simply
flattery: He is not really expecting to learn something, only sweetening Hippias with the
suggestion that his challenge is actually a sign of his respect for Hippias’ wisdom. And
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indeed, Socrates often does present a skeptical, quasi-mocking attitude toward his
interlocuters, at times speaking with a deference that reads as exaggerated or
disingenuous. But this manner of responding to the ego and self-certainty of his
interlocutors is only proof that Socrates is a special kind of student. He genuinely wants
to learn, but he is not the kind of student who is naively ready to absorb whatever
teachings someone has to offer.
In other words, Socrates models a discriminating student whose true belief in his
own ignorance and love of learning is accompanied by a discriminating sense of whether
he truly has something to learn from his interlocutors. In Theaetetus, Socrates likens this
ability to being able to tell whether someone is “pregnant” with some truth or untruth.
Like a midwife who is “barren of wisdom;” he teaches nothing but helps others “discover
within themselves a multitude of beautiful things, which they bring forth into the light”
(Theaetetus 150e). Unlike the sophist who will engage with anyone willing to pay and
who are often concerned with the “great clashing of argument on argument,” Socrates is
only interested in associating with those who will bring to light what is true or untrue
(Theaetetus 154e). This is why when Socrates realizes that someone is not “pregnant”
with some truth, Socrates “with the best will in the world,” will not further engage the
person and will send them to someone else (Theaetetus, 151b). While his actions may
benefit his interlocutor, Socrates’ motivation is ultimately selfish. This is one of the
reasons why he never offers a fee: The learning Socrates might gain is its own reward.
Of course, more often than not, Socratic elenchus resulted in aporia. But as a
visitor explains to Theaetetus in the Sophist, when employed correctly, the method of
refutation provides a cleansing experience that removes the roadblocks that prevent
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further learning, clearing the soul of arrogance in order to open it toward inquiry.
Whereas Socrates employs the method as someone who genuinely searches his examinee
for truth, the sophist who employs refutation is only interested in winning and appearing
wiser. That is, Socrates examines, but the sophist is only interested in refutation for the
sake of his vanity. The sophist appears to have “a kind of belief-knowledge about
everything,” but in fact does not possess a “just love of wisdom” and only sells the
appearance of truth (Sophist, 232d-233d).
When Socrates does pose arguments of his own, he does so as a fellow student
seeking truth; he seeks partners in inquiry, not youths to shape and mold with some
teaching. Whatever improvement the student shows is not “due to anything they have
learned from [him],” but to what was already inside themselves (Theaetetus, 150e). By
comparison, the sophist promises to make the child into a good person and citizen, as
though that were the same as teaching someone a skill or a trade. For the right fee,
sophists claim, young boys can become excellent, virtuous men. In other words, sophists
promise to provide an education for becoming ideal men and citizens. Their answer to
one of the central questions raised in the Apology—whether teachers can intentionally
make students virtuous or corrupt through their teachings—is yes.
But Socrates consistently denies his own ability to do this and his disinterest in it.
Socrates does not want to shape youth, but to arrive somehow closer to truth. In the
Symposium, not even his beloved Alcibiades can convince Socrates to “teach” him to be
good. When he offers himself to Socrates one night saying, “Nothing is more important
to me than becoming the best man I can be, and no one can help me more than you to
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reach that aim” (Symposium, 218d), Socrates refuses him.57 As he points out to
Alcibiades, if Socrates really does possess some great truth, then the trade he is proposing
is hardly worth his while. Socrates has no interest in money or sex, only in truth that
Alcibiades cannot offer him.
Socrates is not only determined that he does not have the expertise required to
teach virtue, he skeptical of anyone who claims to possess it. In the Meno and
Protagoras, two dialogues which deal explicitly with the question of whether virtue can
be taught, Socrates points to the number of virtuous men who have failed to teach their
own sons to be virtuous citizens like them. And, in the Gorgias, he notes how often those
who “claim to be teachers of excellence […] frequently accuse their students of doing
them wrong, depriving them of their fees and withholding other forms of thanks from
them, even though the students have been well-served by them” (519c-d). He rightly
wonders: If their students really benefited from them and were made good and just, how
can this be the case?
And yet, at times it does seem that Socrates believes that sophists really do have
significant power to shape (or at least misshape) through their teachings, helping the soul
or making it sick through what they sell. In Protagoras, Socrates offers a warning to his
friend Hippocrates about the sophists. He tells him that education is an “entrusting of the
soul,” and while the soul is nourished by learning, buying teachings is risky because the
seller will sell anything to anyone for the right price (313). Teachings are not necessarily
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good, and only “knowledgeable consumer[s] […] can buy teachings safely” (314). Here,
Socrates suggests what he practices, urging that Hippocrates be, like him, a skeptical and
discerning student. Socrates’ point was never that no one has anything to teach or that it
is wrong to learn things from others; in fact, in Theaetetus Socrates admits he often plays
“matchmaker” for students whom he thinks might profit from those who offer what he
does not (151b). The problem is that teachers will sell anything, including that which they
cannot teach, and students must buy responsibly. Students must be careful to distinguish
between rhetoric and persuasion and true education.
For this reason, when the pair meets Protagoras, a self-proclaimed sophist, they
set out to learn exactly what it is he sells. Protagoras tells Hippocrates, “The very day you
start, you will go home a better man, and the same thing will happen the day after. Every
day, day after day, you will get better and better.” (Protagoras, 318b). Pressed for details,
he adds that he will teach one “how to realize one’s maximum potential for success in
political debate and action,” or, as Socrates puts it, “the art of citizenship” (319). Socrates
expresses surprise that this would be considered teachable. Protagoras goes on to explain
that everyone is a teacher of virtue, having a share in it and teaching it to each other. At
the same time, some people (like himself) are better than others in virtue and are
therefore capable of teaching it. But when they try to determine what virtue actually is,
each ends up arguing the opposite position regarding its teachability, and the dialogue
ends unresolved, suggesting further inquiry is needed. The dialogue also sharply
juxtaposes two models of education; Protagoras prefers stories and long speeches which
allow him to simply transmit a teaching or argument, and Socrates prefers his usual
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method of question and answer. Only the latter uncovers the inadequacy of the truth
supposedly revealed through teachings.
One of the suggestions made in Protagoras, and a point Socrates insists on in the
Apology, is that becoming a virtuous citizen is determined by socialization, not
transmission. Moreover, everyone has a responsibility, at all ages, to seek virtue. It is not
something only children need to learn. This becomes clear in Laches, where Socrates is
invited to weigh in on whether Lysimachus should pay for his son to be trained in
courage. He notes that he himself longed for such an education in virtue since youth, but
he could not afford to pay any sophists, “who were the only ones who professed to be
able to make a cultivated man of me” (186c). He proposes that they see if any among
them possess the expertise they hope to instill in the boys. His interlocuters, Laches and
Nicias, are reputable generals, and yet it becomes clear that they can neither point to
where they learned courage from and that they do not actually have any knowledge of it.
Rather than end the dialogue with the conclusion that it simply cannot be learned,
Socrates exhorts them all (including himself) to continue inquiring into courage by
finding others to learn from, even though they are no longer boys.
For Socrates, forming good citizens is something the entire community should be
invested in doing together for free, and at all ages. In the Apology, Socrates makes the
case that only the city, not any one individual, may be held responsible for the excellence
or corruption of its youth. His defense suggests that youth are more powerfully
(mis)shaped and influenced by Athenian society, not teachers. Moreover, he thinks it
ludicrous that students would seek (and pay) professional teachers to learn about virtue
when a free education is readily available from interacting with their fellow citizens. He
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laments that sophists “persuade the young, who can keep company with anyone of their
own fellow citizens they want without paying, to leave the company of these, to join with
themselves, pay them a fee, and be grateful to them besides” (20). Becoming a virtuous
citizen occurs through interaction with other virtuous citizens: If the youth lack virtue, the
citizens should examine themselves, their culture, and their constitution.
That said, if people are formed by socialization, then can it not be concluded that
teachers do shape after all via their interactions with students? While Socrates did not
intentionally teach anything or corrupt the youth, he admits in the Apology and Euthyphro
that some did take it upon themselves to imitate him, albeit incorrectly. This phenomenon
of young people misusing philosophy and “treating it as a kind of game of contradiction”
is raised in the Republic (538d-539c) and is perhaps the clearest concession of Socrates’
unintentional guilt. But should he be held responsible for another’s choice to imitate him?
Can he be blamed for who his associates became? Who can justly be held responsible for
the state of the youth?

Education as Socialization
Although Plato is often read as the enemy of tradition, it is important to note that
his emphasis on the free and public nature of Socrates’ truth-seeking activities is
consistent with the more traditional emphasis on public education that characterized
classical Athens alongside the elite practice of paying private teachers. Sophists claimed
to “make” their students better for a price, but Athenians already had a complex system in
place for making their children into ideal adults. This was accomplished through a system
of law, culture, and institutions that guided children through demarcated stages. Plato’s
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dialogues reflect the belief that this is in fact how good citizens are made: not by teachers
and their lessons, but by the culture and constitution that mediates their relations with
others.
Greek children underwent a phased and gradual transition from birth to adult
citizenship, and these were not private, individual affairs but marked by increasingly
public initiations experienced together with those in one’s age class. 58 The first of these
stages occurred when the new baby had to first be accepted into the family by his father.
At around the age of three, boys participated in the Choes or “Pitchers” feast which
occurred during the Anthesteria festival.59 This involved having the child receive a small
jug and sample of wine, and it served as a first step outside the household for the infant
now transitioning to childhood.
Then, at around six, privileged children were introduced to a new male figure: a
paidagogos or “child-leader” who would serve as a combination of “nurse, footman,
chaperon, and tutor” for the child.60 This person, a slave, would accompany the child to
primary school, which would usually begin the following year. For the wealthy,
schooling began earlier and ended later, and at school children encountered a continued
stress on discipline, order, and good behavior.61
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Children also went on to engage in new forms of controlled socialization as they
grew. The choruses, for example, were divided by tribe (a militaristic rather than
geographic entity) and provided children with the opportunity to meet fellow tribesmen
from across the polis. 62 Other activities, such as sports, granted a space for competitive
outlets through which children might begin to distinguish themselves as individuals
capable of impressing others. In general, the stage of adolescence, from the onset of
puberty until about eighteen, was a time of further growth and sexual experiences,
including participation in relationships with older males in the supposedly educative
practice of pederasty.
When a child reached puberty, he began to attract the attention of older men who
would try to win over his affections. Sexualized and idealized, adolescents were expected
to respond to these pursuits with passivity, modesty, and disinterest. When the
relationship was finally consummated, the boy was “required to yield passively to his
lover and ideally derive no sexual gratification himself."63 Boys were expected to allow
the feelings of their pursuers to be tested by time. If the eros of the erastes (man) for the
eromenos (boy) were truly pure, it would prove itself in the end. Being “caught quickly”
was therefore considered “disgraceful,” as was yielding in response to offers of money or
political influence.64 Such offers, it was believed, should be rejected outright, lest they
reduce the relationship to prostitution. The difference, though, may not have always been
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so clear: As a “habit of the upper class and of those who imitated them,” such
relationships naturally led to material and political privileges.65
At the same time, pederasty was believed to provide other kinds of benefits for
the boy: through these relationships he was given access to “an older member of the
citizen elite” who would act as a role model for “appropriate attitudes and behavior”
while also offering wisdom.66 In other words, pederasty gave boys a mentor who was
closer in age and could guide them through the last phase of childhood and into
adulthood. These relationships were not pursued in private—pederasty was a kind of
public competition that often began at the gymnasium and continued at the symposia, or
private political clubs to which boys might be invited to attend. As such, there was an
inevitable way in which a beloved “caught” boy was a kind of trophy for the man.
Childhood had a specific, supervised structure with key points of introduction to
society. It was only when the youth reached their eighteenth year that they became
eligible to join their demes as registered members, provided both of their parents were
Athenian citizens. This event, called the dokimasia, once again subjected the youth to the
judgment and acceptance of his elders, but with greater consequences at stake: access to
citizenship.67
Aristotle describes how at the dokimasia each deme would vote on one of three
options: (1) to admit the youth as a free man born “born as prescribed by the laws” and of
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age to become a citizen, (2) to determine the youth was not yet of age (but otherwise
qualified) and therefore to be “return[ed] to the ranks of the boys,” on oath, and (3) to
reject the youth on the grounds that he is not free.68 In the third case, the youth would
have the option to appeal the decision in the court in order to win admittance. If he lost
the appeal, he would face being sold as a slave. If accepted, an animal was sacrificed and
the boy’s hair was symbolically cut.69
The fact that youths could be deemed free but sent back as underage illustrates
how to be “of age” was not a status one naturally came to acquire after a certain amount
of time. Instead, it was dependent upon the judgment of others.70 The relative fluidity of
age is further supported by evidence from age classes at athletic competitions, which
were relatively subjective.71 Because age was decided by class year, all children of the
same class year were considered to be more or less the same age. The concept of age was
therefore not as objective or precisely measured as it is today. Instead, it was understood
that not every child underwent the same rate of development, and this was especially true
with respect to the body. This was significant because in determining when childhood
had ended, it was the state of one’s bodily development that took precedence over
intellectual capacity and growth.72
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Classical archeologist Lesley Beautmont has further observed that it was not only
in terms of age that boys inched forward toward full citizenship, but also in terms of
gender, or maleness.73 Boys began at “a genderless state at birth and infancy,” and
progressed “via an older childhood stage of combined male and female traits, to an
adolescent phase that gave heightened expression to his mixed gender profile.”74 True
manliness, not just full citizenship, came with adulthood, and maleness was something
that had to be judged and proven with bodily evidence.
After the scrutiny, Aristotle explains that fathers were empowered to select, by
tribe, three members over the age of forty whom they judged to be “the best and most
suitable to take charge of the cadets.”75 Of the three approved, the people of each tribe
then elected one man as their tribe’s sophronistes. The whole citizenry would also elect a
single supreme commander to head the entire class of cadets along with the other
officers. Each class was assigned to one of forty-two heroes, such that all politically
active citizens, those aged eighteen through sixty, had a hero assigned.76
The initial years of the youth’s transition to full citizenship, then, were occupied
with fulfilling the requirement to participate in military training and service known as the
epheboi. Aristotle describes how this process involved touring, performing guard duties,
and undergoing training with instructors in infantry fighting, archery, javelin-throwing
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and catapult firing.77 Cadets, supported by the state, ate with their fellow tribesmen and
eventually demonstrated what they had learned in an assembly at which the state awarded
them a spear and shield. This ceremony marked the conclusion of yet another
predetermined stage through which citizens had to pass.
Aristotle also tells us that youth were not only required to focus on military
training and service as guardsmen, but that they were deliberately relieved of all citizen
responsibilities and barred from participating in any lawsuits as either a prosecutor or
defendant. Exceptions were only made for inheritance-related cases or for those that have
inherited priesthoods. And so, while technically citizens, the recently initiated had a very
limited role in politics.
Even after fulfilling military service requirements, age limits still placed
additional restrictions on the ability of young men to participate in political life. Power
was reserved for the older generation through legal boundaries that kept men in
hierarchal, age-based divisions. In this way, set “stages” continued to dictate the status of
the younger generation. One’s development and participation in the polis increased in
phases that privileged those who were older.
Examples of restrictions for adult citizens include the fact that certain offices were
reserved for men over thirty years of age, and the fact only those men who were in the
last class year, or sixty years old, could be arbitrators. Through the fourth century, only
citizens over thirty could be “a juror in the People’s court (dikastes) or a legislator
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(nomothetes) or a magistrate (arche).”78 Since most men married at around thirty, it was
only then, after they had become fathers, were the heads of their household, and were
participating in the assembly, that they reached a mature stage of citizenship that came
with increased respect and opportunities for political participation.79
This, then, was how Athenian babies became adult citizens. But, as classical
historian Barry Strauss argues, the decade of Plato’s birth was a particularly unique
period that resulted in a clear generation gap. On his account, the emboldening power of
increased wealth combined with the rise of sophistic education in the context of the
Peloponnesian War, and this "freed the young to parade their power without inhibition or
modesty."80 The young hero was hailed over the "patrios politeia," or the "ancestral,
traditional, and paternal constitution.”81 Rhetoric, he adds, further gave the youth a new
way to question authority, and supported the “aggressive pursuit of a political career in
one’s twenties, which the older generation had considered to be too early an age.”82
Eventually, events such as the sacrilegious performance of the Eleusinian Mysteries and
the failed Sicilian Expedition of 415 all negatively implicated youth and began to be
interpreted as conspiratorial in nature and evidence of the "dangers of youthful excess."83
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Soon enough, these worries proved not unfounded. But after this period, Strauss argues,
the pendulum swung back against the youth in favor of the ancestral and paternal. This
swing eventually led to the trial and death of Socrates whose alleged impiety and
association with the youth was viewed as the source of their corruption.
That Plato was on the side of protecting certain ancestral and paternal ideas of
education may seem unlikely to those who view him as a champion of philosophy against
traditional religious and cultural authorities. Plato was, after all, taught by Socrates and
related to this corrupted youth who rebelled; and he did find fault with religious and
cultural authorities. But as I will demonstrate, this overlooks important complicating
evidence. To take just one example, in the dialogue Euthyphro, Socrates has been
accused of impiety when he encounters a youth doing the unthinkable—persecuting his
own father for murder. Both his actions and his father’s actions are considered impious,
but since Euthyphro seems to have some special wisdom enabling him to decide that he
must bear witness against his father, Socrates engages him. 84 Euthyphro tires of the
conversation, and they fail to discover what piety is, but it does become clear that the
source of Euthyphro’s convictions is a story about the gods, the same story Socrates
recommends censoring in constructing an ideal city in the Republic. The story in question
is one which appears to validate rebelling against paternal authority. Euthyphro tells
Socrates that the Athenians:
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[…] believe that Zeus is the best and most just of the gods, yet they agree that he
bound his father because he unjustly swallowed his sons, and that he in turn
castrated his father for similar reasons. But they are angry with me because I am
prosecuting my father for his wrongdoing. They contradict themselves in what
they say about the gods and about me. (6)
In this dialogue, Plato offers a critique of religious authority, but in service of protecting
paternal authority. He further demonstrates that the source of Euthyphro’s corruption is
not Socrates. Euthyphro’s actions—horrifying to the traditional Athenian—result because
something wrong in the culture combined with something wrong in the law to make it
possible.
Plato’s conviction that a society’s constitution and culture are the educative forces
that determine becoming is again reinforced in Crito. There, a convicted Socrates
portrays himself as a product of democratic Athens who owes his freedom to the city.
Perhaps most telling is Socrates’ impassive response to Crito’s attempt to use his children
in order to persuade him to escape. Crito argues, “I think you are betraying your sons by
going away and leaving them, when you could bring them up and educate them. [...]
Either one should not have children, or one should share with them to the end the toil of
upbringing and education” (45d). But Socrates counters that the city is what truly
educates and forms a person, not any individual parent or teacher. Socrates deems it
better to have his children be properly educated by his city, its laws, and his friends than
to have them shaped by a foreign community that did not share his values (54). Without
his community, he would not be able to raise his children as he wished because he would
not be able to socialize them in the environment he knows and deems best. Here, Plato
makes what looks like an abdication of paternal authority into the assertion that the
community is the true parent of himself and his children.

54

Plato sees the law as an educator, but he is careful to warn against an excessively
prescriptive law. In the dialogue the Statesman, laws are deemed inflexible and
insensitive to differences between people because they treat all people equally. They are
like “some self-willed and ignorant person, who allows no one to do anything contrary to
what he orders, nor to ask any questions about it, not even if, after all, something new
turns out for someone which is better, contrary to the prescription which he himself has
laid down” (294c).85 While Plato believed that people are the “products” of socialization,
he knew that evidently, the same law yields many different persons.
That is, society may shape raw material, but not all raw material is alike.
Moreover, this “raw material” is alive—people can assess and respond to their
environment, and they do so in different ways, a fact he thought could be attributed to
nature. Nonetheless, the good legislator will ensure the law provides the basic structure
and direction for education, leaving the details to the educators. The ideal statesman will
“lay down prescriptions for the educators and direct them, in the same way that weaving
follows along with the carders, and those who prepare the other things it needs for its
own work, prescribing for and directing them, giving indications to each group to finish
their products in whatever way it thinks suitable for its own interweaving” (308d-e). Law
should direct education toward its needs and ends by carefully sorting people into groups
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and balancing them, ensuring that all groups are harmoniously interwoven with the right
social bonds.
In other words, Plato continues to reinforce the idea that it is not any one person
that determines becoming—not even an individual father—but rather, socialization.
Therefore, becoming ideal selves and societies hinges on understanding law and culture
in educative terms. The true art of education is not found among professional teachers,
but in politics, and more specifically, among political founders and legislators. This leads
to a central question for Plato: What if, designed to account for differences in nature,
education as socialization could be regulated and controlled to produce a desired
outcome—to make ideal citizens?

Molding the Citizen
Plato attempts to answer this question in the Republic, and in order to fully
appreciate the richness of his answer, one must look to both the characters in the dialogue
and its dramatic elements as well as the content of the arguments presented. The dialogue
begins with Socrates being coerced by Polemarchus and his friends to keep company
with them after a festival. They go to the house of Cephalus, Polemarchus’ father, and a
conversation ensues. Socrates asks Cephalus about how he is finding his old age, and
Cephalus offers a response that leads to the topic of justice.
According to Leo Strauss’ reading, Cephalus is introduced in order to be
dismissed. He represents a “radically deficient” idea of justice and “the origin of the
present disorder,” and he must be replaced by Socrates so that philosophy can take the
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place of the paternal and ancestral.86 Peter J. Steinberger makes a similar point in his
extended treatment of the subject when he suggests that the opening is a means of
highlighting Polemarchus’ “newfound dominion” in accordance with the generational
conflict of the time.87 And, Jacob Howland also reads Cephalus as a failed model, harshly
arguing that “in name as well as nature, Cephalus points downward toward the lowest
cave-dwellers.”88 Cephalus is read as selfish, materialistic, and only interested in his soul
because he is close to death.
But, as I have shown, Plato’s view of paternal and ancestral authority is not so
simple. And in fact, the reason for his banishment is not so clearly tied to the content of
his beliefs. On close reading, Cephalus actually possesses a wisdom very much in line
with what Socrates goes on to argue for in the Republic. First, Cephalus says that the oftheld view that old age is the source of great suffering does not seem right to him since
some find old age to be a blessing that frees them from their baser desires. Rather, the
source of suffering in old age, as well as in youth, it seems, is failing to live well; that is,
failing to be “orderly and content” (329d). As we come to learn, this is very much
Socrates’ position.
Socrates then replies that most people must respond to Cephalus with incredulity,
thinking that the real reason he bears old age well is because he is wealthy. And while
Cephalus does not deny that being wealthy is an advantage (it is easier to be rich and just
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than it is to be poor and just), he maintains that this view is incorrect. When he looks
back on his life, it is not the goods he was able to attain with his wealth that matter to
him, but whether he was good and how he will be judged. Wealth is only really a good
thing, he asserts, for those who are good and orderly, as they will use it well. That is, it
will help them both in doing just actions like paying back their friends and avoiding
unjust actions like lying and cheating out of necessity.
It is not Cephalus who suggests that justice is simply speaking the truth and
paying one’s debts; in fact, Cephalus agrees with Socrates that it is not when asked.
These are actions related to justice, but they are not justice itself. It is Polemarchus who
suddenly bursts into the conversation wrongly asserting that justice is a matter of
following simple rules like telling the truth and paying one’s debts. The opening problem
of the Republic is not Cephalus’ wrong conception of justice and the authority he
represents, but rather Polemarchus, the son who has failed to grasp the wisdom of his
father. And so, when Plato removes Cephalus from the dialogue it is not because he is
wrong about justice, but because he has failed to educate his son. The extent of his
miseducation is further revealed by Socrates’ questioning, and by then Plato has already
made two points: that neither fathers nor poets can be trusted to educate the youth.
The next to enter the conversation is Thrasymachus, the professional teacher who
represents the third and final educator to be dismissed. In his conversation with the
sophist, there are two critical moments. The first occurs when Socrates insists on a
distinction between any given craft and wage-earning in order to show that when one
removes the incentives of honor and wealth, ruling is really about the benefit of the ruled.
The second occurs when Socrates insists that “the man who is both good and wise will
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not want to get the better of the like, but of the unlike and the opposite,” whereas “the bad
and unlearned will want to get the better of both the like and the opposite” (350b).
Shortly thereafter, Thrasymachus blushes, and the tone of the conversation shifts.
Why does Thrasymachus blush? Because Socrates has called him out: First, as
one who is not a true teacher, and second, as one who is unlearned and unjust. For, if
Thrasymachus was a true teacher, he would teach for the true good of the students, and
not so that he and they could obtain wealth and honor. And, if he were truly wise and
knew what justice was, he would not be trying to outdo Socrates but cooperating with
him. After their exchange is finished, Thrasymachus is chastened and no longer Socrates’
enemy. Note that as with Cephalus and the poets, Thrasymachus also had something right
in his answer when he turned the conversation toward the idea of law and rule. And yet,
each would-be teacher failed, and just as the truth-loving philosopher king is forced to
rule, Socrates is forced to teach lest teaching be left in the hands of fathers, poets, and
sophists.
The sacrifice that truth-seeking education must make in service of education for
becoming is evident in the way that in the remainder of the dialogue Socrates becomes
more didactic and less inquiring. Socrates the special kind of student is coerced into the
role of a new kind of teacher. Although it is no longer the same kind of dialogue as the
others, the form remains. Notably, rather than simply present it to the reader, Plato makes
Socrates a narrator, further stressing his new role. The dialogue form creates an
experience of socialization carefully structured by Plato, the rational, truth-loving
philosopher. Like the drama, it mimics the socialization of real life for the reader and
allows for the experience of all three modes of education. The reader can be a student
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receiving the teachings of others (including sophists), she can be part of a number of
social spaces—from a courtroom to a drinking party—and she can be prompted to
inquiry and self-examination through careful study of the text. The key difference, Plato
would likely argue, is that his dialogues are ruled by philosophy and written in the
interest of genuine truth.
Turning to Socrates’ arguments in the dialogue, familiar claims repeat
themselves: Both the ideal city and the ideal man are the result of right education, and
right education comes through proper socialization guided by reason. Education is a
powerful political tool because it is the means by which “a single newly finished person,
who is either good or the opposite” can be created (425c). Beginning with a fresh
generation of children, Socrates posits that like clay which hardens with age, children are
moldable and shapeable at first, but eventually become fixed: “The young can’t
distinguish what is allegorical from what isn’t, and the opinions they absorb at that age
are hard to erase and apt to become unalterable” (378d). Young children are the most
vulnerable to the effects of socialization, which is why we must “supervise the
storytellers” (53). Their souls are like sponges that will absorb what they hear, and they
hold on to whatever they were exposed to in youth. Much of that absorption happens
through imitation: “Imitations practiced from youth become part of nature and settle into
habits of gesture, voice, and thought,” and so children must be given proper examples to
mimic and model themselves after (395d). Guardians “must imitate from childhood what
is appropriate for them, namely, people who are courageous, self-controlled, pious, and
free, and their actions” (395c). Naturally, the more beautiful the stories, the more
beautiful the souls are likely to become.
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Moreover, the body and soul must be properly shaped through physical training
and the arts. Music and poetry play a particularly important role in moral development by
encouraging an instinctual, positive response to harmony, order, and moderation. Ideally,
there should be a balance: If he who works hard at physical training “does nothing else
and never associates with the Muse […] whatever love of learning he might have had in
his soul soon become[s] enfeebled, deaf, and blind, because he never tastes any learning
or investigation or partakes of any discussion or any of the rest of music and poetry, to
nurture or arouse it” (411d). Conversely, “the person who achieves the finest blend of
music and physical training and impresses it on his soul in the most measured way is the
one we’d most correctly call completely harmonious and trained in music, much more so
than the one who merely harmonizes the strings of his instrument” (412). The result of
this balance is a fully formed and harmonized class of citizens ready to serve its purpose
in the city.
Education is not “putting sight into blind eyes,” rather, Socrates states that “the
sight is already there;” it just “isn’t turned the right way or looking where it ought to
look” (518c). As Allan Bloom put it, the goal is not to transmit knowledge but “to change
their desires, thereby turning them around from the pursuit of what they falsely believe to
be happiness to the pursuit of true happiness” (528b-519d). It is this turn that eventually
results in the virtuous citizen and philosopher-king. In the Kallipolis, the only way to
achieve this state is through a lifetime of being socialized in the right environment.
Socializing youth into ideal citizens involves the preservation and practice of a
common culture, which demands that the Kallipolis be non-neutral toward family,
religion, the arts, and culture. It also involves the sorting and training of individuals into
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social, political, and economic functions. Different students are best suited to different
disciplines and career paths because they are suited to different functions by nature and
respond differently to the same curriculum. The “better” students with “better” natures
merit a “better” education, as they are the ones who will be chosen to rule. This will
ensure steady progress, since “Good education and upbringing, when they are preserved,
produce good natures, and useful natures, who are in turn well educated, grow up even
better than their predecessors, both in their offspring and in other respects, just like other
animals” (424b). The entire system is bolstered by a belief that resulting inequities in
power are justified by nature and merit.89
And yet, “best” is not simply aptitude for learning, but self-control and dedication
to the city. More education is given to those who have been tested and determined least
likely to misuse it. The most elite enjoy a kind of education as inquiry for the sake of
truth and understanding, but they are given this privilege because they have proven to be
most loyal to the city and it is safest in their hands. In this way, education—and
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especially education as inquiry—is chastened; it serves the city. Education in all its forms
is designed and exists for the sake and good of the city.
Identifying the best—those who will ultimately be selected to rule—requires
constant testing and monitoring as students are molded and forged. Soldiers are selected
for their ability to absorb and keep their lessons in a process that is likened to dying wool
purple (429d-430b). This selects for intellectual ability, but those who are deemed the
most successful products of their education are those who “upon examination, seem most
of all to believe throughout their lives that they must eagerly pursue what is advantageous
to the city and be wholly unwilling to do the opposite” (412e). Recognizing the
unpredictability of socialization and the distinction between this and education as
teaching and learning, Socrates notes that the belief in putting the community before
oneself is not like a skill that can be taught and never forgotten. This belief may be
abandoned “voluntarily” or “involuntary”—they “may be persuaded to minds or […]
forget,” perhaps due to having experienced “pain or suffering” (413b). They may also
“change their mind because they are under the spell of pleasure or fear” (413c). In order
to discover whether or not the student has truly and permanently internalized this belief,
he must be constantly and actively enticed to abandon his conviction throughout his
development; he must be tested “more thoroughly than gold is tested by fire”:
If someone is hard to put under a spell, is apparently gracious in everything, is a
good guardian of himself and the music and poetry he has learned, and if he
always shows himself to be rhythmical and harmonious, then he is the best person
for both himself and for the city. Anyone who is tested in this way as a child,
youth, and adult, and always comes out of it untainted, is to be made a ruler as
well as a guardian. (413d-414)

63

Only those who have proven true in their loyalty and commitment to public service can
be trusted with power and with philosophy because only they will use it selflessly and in
the interest of the city.90
Justice demands that truth-seeking inquiry sacrifice itself in the interest of society.
The ideal city only has room for Socrates the truth-seeking student in so far as he is also
Socrates the compelled teacher whose truth seeking serves others. In the Republic, Plato
creates a system where power and truth-seeking inquiry transform one another to the
point that each is no longer recognizable. The life of the ruler resembles anything but the
conventional vision of it: self-sacrificing to the point of having none of the luxuries and
advantages traditionally associated with it. And the life of the philosopher is no longer
one of useless or potentially dangerous truth-seeking for its own sake, but of inquiry in
service of the city and its people. We know this by virtue of who is permitted to practice
it: Only those who do not waver in their loyalty to the city and their willingness to put it
above all else.
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Another necessary check Plato seems to endorse on the study of philosophy is age. In
the Republic, Socrates claims that the dedicated study of dialectic should come later in
life: “As youths and children, they should put their minds to youthful education and
philosophy and take care of their bodies at a time when they are growing into manhood,
so as to acquire a helper for philosophy. As they grow older and their souls begin to reach
maturity, they should increase their mental exercises. Then, when their strength begins to
fail and they have retired from politics and military service, they should graze freely in
the pastures of philosophy and do nothing else—I mean the ones who are to live happily
and, in death, add a fitting destiny in that other place to the life they have lived” (498c).
In the Symposium, Socrates suggests that Alcibiades’ youth is an obstacle to his study:
“The mind’s sight becomes sharp only when the body’s eyes go past their prime—and
you are still a good long time away from that” (219). This response not only sets him
apart from sophists who jump at any opportunity to shape the youth, it suggests that his
activities are best-suited to adults with matured minds. This conflict, however, with the
earlier image of Socrates the student who examines “young and old, citizen and stranger”
in the Apology (30).
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Education as Inquiry
While many dismiss the seriousness of the Republic’s proposals, taking those in
the Laws more seriously, it is evident that the basic ideas and assumptions that animate
the underlying conception of education remain consistent. 91 The Kallipolis takes children
with no ties to a previous regime and gives them an educational program that will
develop, socialize, and test them. In the Laws, Plato continues to think of children as
shapeable entities to be properly developed, socialized, and tested. Education as
socialization remains the primary and most effective way of cultivating virtuous citizens.
A prime example is in the discussion of the importance of drinking parties. While
it may seem strange at first—Clinias remarks in surprise, “it looks to us, my friend, as if
you mean to imply that passing the time with friends over a drink—provided we behave
ourselves—is a considerable contribution to education”—it is fully consistent with
Plato’s other reflections on the relationship between socialization and education and how
it is that the youth are actually formed and developed (612d). Under the influence of
alcohol, “drinkers get hot and, like iron in a fire, grow younger and softer, so that anyone
who has the ability and skill to mold and educate them [the lawgiver] finds them as easy
to handle as when they were young” (671). A properly-run drinking party not only
educates through pleasure and socialization, it also offers a kind of “test” that “for
cheapness, safety and speed is absolutely unrivaled” (650B). Like the pleasures of
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children, it is carefully regulated by law so that exposure to wine only occurs in the
approved ways and as a means of cultivating moderation.
As in the Republic, in the Laws children are best educated by impressing “the
greatest possible liking” for what they are to become, and this is best achieved through
play and pleasure in the arts (643d). The pleasures must be approved and supported by
“men who have high moral standards and are full of years and experience” (659d). An
ideally-formed citizen is one who has mastered his desires: curating and controlling
sources of pleasures like games, dance, poetry, and music is thought to ensure that
children develop into adults who find pleasure in the right things and in moderation.92
This leads the Athenian to not only suggest censoring the arts, but to avoid introducing
any novelty into society which could have uncontrolled effects. He determines that
sanctifying dance and music can guard against change, as well as ensuring that new
material produced is reviewed and approved before release (798c-801d). Restricting
travel and taking steps to guard against corruption from abroad are also deemed sound
measures (950d-951c).
The primacy and power of education as socialization is further underlined in the
Laws when the Athenian makes clear that the production of ideal citizens is not a matter
of mastering content. He rejects sophistry, and is careful to stress that teaching and
learning the ideal curriculum (mathematics) must be supported by “further laws and
customs [that] can expel the spirt of pettiness and greed from the souls of those who are
to master them and profit from them” (747c). If this social education fails, he warns,
“you’ll find that without noticing it you’ve produced a ‘twister’ instead of a man of
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learning—[…] one whose approach to wealth and life in general shows a narrowminded
outlook” (747c). The written and especially unwritten laws of society are critical to
education; teaching and learning the right academic curriculum is necessary but
insufficient.
Children belong to the state first and only second to their families; education is to
be compulsory for all, boys as well as girls (804c-805d). The person best suited to
oversee education—“by far the most important of all the supreme offices in the state”—is
the “best all-round citizen in the state” (765e-766b). The future face and security of the
polity depends on its careful regulation of the development of all of its children. The
Athenian explains:
Any living creature that flourishes in its first stages of growth gets a tremendous
impetus towards its natural perfection and the final development appropriate to it,
and this is true of both plants and animals (tame and wild), and men too. Man is a
‘tame’ animal, as we put it, and of course if he enjoys a good education and
happens to have the right natural disposition, he’s apt to be a most heavenly and
gentle creature; but his upbringing has only to be inadequate or misguided and
he’ll become the wildest animal on the face of the earth. (765e-b)
The utopic idea presented in both the Republic and the Laws is that when all modes of
education are correctly harnessed and applied to the raw material of childhood, an ideal
final product can be formed, limited only by its inherent potential. Proper development is
such an important, fragile process, that even the circumstances of conception should be
considered (775c-e). “Children must not be left without teachers [...] any more than
flocks and herds must be allowed to live without attendants” (808d).
Much of what is discussed with respect to the upbringing of children refers to
unwritten rules: The perfect citizen is not one who follows the written law to the letter,
but one who “has given a lifetime of unswerving obedience to the written words of the
legislator, whether they took the form of a law, or simply expressed approval or
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disapproval” (823). In other words, the perfect citizen is loyal to the standards, culture,
and traditions of the polity; the spirit of the law, and not merely its letters.
Judging by Plato’s (unfinished) work, it would appear that he did in fact believe
that ideally, a polity can and should use education to serve the community first, not the
individual who in any case will ultimately benefit from the whole. The legislator should
first think, “I’ve organized the state as a whole” and only then “what sort of citizen do I
want to produce?” (830). The standard for the ideally educated individual is, in other
words, determined by the nature and goals of the polity.
Plato knew that a true civic education must pervade all aspects of life and touch
all sites of influence in order to have a desired shaping effect. In the Laws, the Athenian
argues that more properly educated citizens are better than one precisely because they
will continue to educate one another by informal association (641b). This suggests that
one lesson of Plato’s Republic is a reminder that anyone serious about cultivating
citizenship must look far beyond schools to the practices and everyday experiences that
socialize. If anything, forces like law, culture, and society are really the most powerful
and effective means of education.
Today, this insight is often forgotten by those who embark on projects of public
and private schooling and by those who take teachers to be the primary source of a
child’s education. Both consistently overestimate the extent to which as well as the means
by which schooling can and should do the work of civic socialization and leadership
development. When individuals reflect on how schools have shaped them, they are
usually reflecting on how schools have socialized them, often through the non-academic
experiences they encountered there. For many, school is not only the primary path to a
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comfortable wage, it is their primary source of community, and it is this experience of
community that has the most impact in “shaping” them. Good citizenship is not a
question of providing the proper academic curriculum in the classroom.
If one is truly interested in the work of cultivating citizens, one should focus on
developing habits, practices, and communities that regularly affect and socialize all
citizens rather than programs of education that assume youth can be shaped into a stable
ideal. As Plato wrote in the Laws, “The best way to educate the younger generation (as
well as yourself) is not to rebuke them but patently to practice all your life what you
preach to others” (728c). The “socialized adult,” the “formed citizen”—these are not the
products of direct instruction but identities lived and affirmed through socialization and
through everyday practices of citizenship. Every society needs institutions to socialize
and assimilate youth, but it is mistake to think of virtuous citizens as “products” to be
made and that education’s value is only in the work of shaping and development.
Moreover, when education is narrowly defined as a kind of “mass shaping” that
results in “finished products” in the form of adult citizens, it has little to do with the kind
of learning that comes from genuine curiosity or the organic desire to exercise innate
capacities for reason and creativity. It obscures an alternative—what I have termed truthseeking education—which is not a formal, teleological, and controllable process with a
definitive end. Rather than seek to develop and “achieve” a new and improved person,
truth-seeking inquiry is an activity motivated by a genuine curiosity about the world and
others.
Whether Plato ever settled the question of the desirability of a wholly political
vision of education and a wholly educational view of politics remains somewhat
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ambiguous, but what we do know of his life confirms his aspirations were as political as
they were educational. Although he is only as reliable as his sources, according to
Diogenes, Plato began as a painter and poet, but his encounter with Socrates at twenty led
him to burn his work, and like Socrates he came to be mocked by the poets.93 Born to a
political family, Plato aspired to found his own republic but was ultimately turned away
from politics. Citing Pamphila’s now-lost Memorabilia, Diogenes recounts how
Arcadians and Thebians called on Plato to make laws for their new Megalopolis, but that
he rejected their request when he learned they would not support the “equality of
possessions.”94 Corroborating the political Plato found in Diogenes, Plato’s Seventh
Letter, the authenticity of which remains debated, also describes Plato’s political
aspirations and his belief in the need to educate philosopher kings.95
Alongside his political work, Plato also founded the Academy, which rested
“outside the walls” of the city, “in a grove.” 96 But while its location may imply a refuge
from political life—a special place where intellectuals could gather and seek truth freely
apart from the city—the the fact that he and other members were sought after for political
advice suggests a less clear separation. For John M. Cooper, this fact itself shows that
Plato’s Academy was “not merely an institute for higher education and for research in
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mathematics, the sciences, philosophy, and ethical and political thought.”97 Showing how
his ideas in the academy appear in political speeches, Danielle Allen also remains
convinced that Plato wanted to affect political change by accumulating “social power,”
and she contends that even if Plato is not the author of the Seventh Letter, whoever did
write it spoke the truth about him.98 At the same time, Allen is careful not to suggest that
Plato believed ideas could actually translate directly into politics unchanged.
On my reading, Plato made Socrates a symbol of truth-seeking inquiry only to
sacrifice him for the greater good. That is, he suggested that achieving a true
reconciliation between education for truth and education for becoming would necessitate
a Socrates who was not engaged in truth-seeking inquiry for its own sake, but as a
contribution to society. This, I think, was Plato’s ultimate view of education—Plato the
writer, founder, and institutionalist—and not necessarily the historical Socrates’ view—
Socrates the conversationalist gadfly in the city square. For Plato, the pursuit of truth had
to be moderated to better serve the city: Socrates could only be killed, exiled, or
transformed.
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III
Cultivating Man: Rousseau’s Experiment
Although we know relatively little regarding how Plato understood his life, we
know the most intimate details about the inner life of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the
Genevan philosopher who lived from 1712 to 1778. This is due in part to the fact that he
wrote a notoriously intimate autobiography in addition to the many other works that
made him famous. Like Plato, Rousseau was deeply interested in education as both
becoming and truth-seeking, but as his authorship of an autobiography suggests, he saw
the problem of becoming in the modern world as a highly personal and individualistic
one.
Rousseau’s own becoming did not begin happily: His mother died a few days
after having him, his father had to leave him to relatives, and although he had one brother
seven years his senior, he left to embrace a libertine lifestyle. Rousseau eventually started
an apprenticeship but despised it. He ran away, sought refuge with the Catholic Church,
and found a maternal figure, a woman thirteen years his senior who was separated from
her husband. Rousseau idolized her; he called her mammon, and he also fell in love with
her. When he turned twenty, they became lovers, and as she was already involved with
another who worked for her, he shared her. Rousseau spent his twenties learning a great
deal from this woman and from studying philosophy, math, and music on his own.
Mostly self-educated, he took on various jobs, including a failed attempt at working as a
tutor. Eventually moving to Paris to promote his new system for writing music, he found
rejection, but he also made friends in the philosophes of the French Enlightenment.
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In Paris, Rousseau met another woman. He said of Therese: “At first I wanted to
form her mind. I wasted my effort. Her mind is what nature has made it, cultivation and
effort do not take hold there. I do not blush at all to admit that she has never known how
to read very well, although she writes passably.”99 He had five children with her and
abandoned each one of them to a foundling hospital, citing Plato as the one behind his
thinking at the time. While Therese and Rousseau never legally married, over twenty
years after they first became involved, he did eventually declare that he considered her
his wife, and she was his sole inheritor. By then, Rousseau had already lost all of his
friends. Believing no one understood him and that everyone was conspiring against him,
the older he got the more paranoid he became. He had already also published Emile, his
opus on education, and spent time as a fugitive because of its discussion of religion.
Rousseau was deeply influenced by Plato, but as I demonstrate in this chapter, he
faced a critical problem with his model when he realized that socialization will only
produce ideal men and citizens if and when a given society is already ideal. In Emile, he
therefore experimented with limiting socialization at the individual level in order to
create an ideal man or “anti-citizen” who might resist the toxic effects of a non-ideal
society. Against common readings, I argue in this chapter that Rousseau did not advocate
molding men toward predetermined models. Instead, he suggested cultivating the
potential of each individual through a personalized and inimitable program of education.
Putting his theory into practice, Rousseau also created curated fictional worlds for his
readers, writing novels that provided ideal, private, and imagined experiences of
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socialization. As for truth-seeking education, Rousseau determined that it is best pursued
in solitude or exile.
Whereas Plato wrote in a time that induced him to defend philosophical inquiry
against claims that it was useless or dangerous, Rousseau wrote in a time when it had
become fashionable, at least among the educated minority, to practice and espouse
philosophy. In eighteenth-century France, half of children did not survive to age ten.100
Families in cities like Paris would send their newborn children away to suburbs and
villages to be nursed. Only after staying with a nurse for one or two years or more would
they be sent back to live with the family, presuming they had survived. Wealthy families
had private tutors for their children, but there were also village schools that taught a basic
education. Most children had a short adolescence, and only a small minority enjoyed a
longer childhood and studied in a college. Among the educated classes, it was a time of
great intellectual, artistic, and philosophical fervor.
Rousseau found much to critique in contemporary practice, and having found
Plato’s understanding of education as socialization persuasive, he devoted much of his
energy to critiquing and reimagining law, culture, and institutions. Like Plato, Rousseau
viewed children as raw material that could be developed and directed through education.
And like Plato, Rousseau believed that the key to shaping ideal citizens lies in the laws,
institutions, and social practices of society. But unlike Plato, Rousseau came to exemplify
a deep commitment to the singularity of the individual. In order to produce such an
individual, Rousseau theorized an individualized form of education as socialization that
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rejected transmission, the traditional mode of education between a teacher and a student.
His new education, which he termed both “natural” and “negative,” assumed that the self
is the outcome of formative experiences, and so rather than instruct the child in who he
must become and how he must behave, the teacher would instead curate those life
experiences that would form the child, guiding him through each stage of growth until he
reached adulthood. This education was deemed “natural” by Rousseau not because it
avoided care or planning, but because it would be guided at all times by the specific
nature of the individual child, thereby allowing his natural goodness to develop
undistorted.
Being more interested in criticizing existing educational practice than offering a
realistic alternative, Rousseau warned that this proposed education was neither wholly
practicable nor likely to succeed. Education could offer no guarantees, and even the best
raised child might succumb to the pressures and influences of her environment as an
adult. In practice, he thought, the best one could do was to persuade and inspire others
toward goodness and virtue by example. For Rousseau, appropriating the relatively new
genre of the novel offered one way of doing this.
In addition to providing the example of his novelistic Emile, Rousseau wrote Julie
as a way to inspire readers to become more virtuous. The new form of the novel and the
privacy of reading allowed Rousseau to create an imaginary social world devoid of the
corruption he perceived in real society. This kind of purified socialization in private, he
thought, would never cure social corruption, but it could help serve as an antidote.
Like Plato’s view of public education, Rousseau’s private and liberal education
ultimately sacrificed education as truth-seeking inquiry, even as it claimed to encourage
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the natural curiosity of children. This is because Rousseau not only believed, as Plato did,
that education as truth-seeking is dangerous for politics and society at large, but also
because he deemed it a threat to virtue and happiness. Rousseau is critical of the rise of
what, on his account, only appears to be a culture that celebrates education for truth,
arguing that because the kind of genuine love of learning for its own sake exhibited by
Socrates is so rare, very few people are suited for it. Education as truth-seeking inquiry—
that is, education pursued for its own sake as an intrinsically valuable activity driven by
human curiosity—had to be “tamed” and relegated to the margins. By contrast, “useful”
education could and should be used to form individuals for public and private life,
depending on the given social and political context.

Grappling with Plato
Rousseau’s relationship to Plato was a complicated one. As I already mentioned,
in his Confessions, Rousseau looked back on his choice to abandon all five of his children
and connected this to Plato. Attempting to justify his decision, he wrote, “I looked at
myself as a member of Plato’s Republic. More than once since then, the regrets of my
heart have taught me that I had deceived myself.”101 Later on, he again expressed regret,
recounting how writing Emile manifested his guilt. Notably, he never clarified his earlier
statement or specified the exact nature of his self-deception. Did he come to believe that
Plato’s theory of education was fundamentally wrong? Or was the error Rousseau’s in
mistaking Paris for the Kallipolis? Perhaps Rousseau meant that he regretted thinking that
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the Republic, with its “chimerical” institutions, was ever really meant to be read for
practical application at all, a mistake many of Rousseau’s own readers would come to
make about his Emile. 102 Whatever Rousseau precisely meant by his comment, his
relationship to Plato was evidently shifting, complicated, and personal.
Scholars of Rousseau have long noted his similarities and connections to Plato. In
Rousseau’s Socratic Aemilian Myths, Madeline B. Ellis argues that Emile and The Social
Contract are essentially rewritten Judeo-Christian versions of Plato’s Republic and
Symposium. In “Human Nature and the Love of Wisdom,” Laurence D. Cooper identifies
similarities between the fifth books of Emile and The Republic, particularly when Plato’s
text is read as an account of the soul rather than the city. And more recently, David Lay
Williams has, by opposing Hobbesian, positivist readings of Rousseau, provided one of
the most extensive studies of his affinity with Plato, emphasizing their shared
transcendentalism.103 As these studies show, Rousseau not only carefully read and
referenced Plato, he was deeply influenced by him, especially on the question of
education.
But while political theorists have tended toward noting Rousseau’s similarities to
Plato, philosophers of education such as John Dewey have focused almost exclusively on
their differences.104 For them, Rousseau presents a liberal vision of education in stark
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contrast to Plato’s illiberal one. On their account, Rousseau’s Emile is the antithesis of
Plato’s Republic in that it celebrates the autonomy of the child and serves as a
foundational precursor to progressive education. Whose portrait is correct? In so far as
they overdraw either Rousseau’s rebellion from Plato or his discipleship, both pictures
are misleading.
Whether imagining a wholly new society or suggesting improvements to an
existing one, Rousseau certainly followed many of Plato’s insights when he conceived of
an ideal political community. Like Plato, he thought education is “the most important
business of the state” 105 and that forming citizens is a long-term project that not only
begins from childhood but also involves careful socialization. Like Plato, he advocated
using a public system of education to route men into leadership opportunities and thereby
ensure that only the best citizens are entrusted with the responsibility of oversight.106
And, while he certainly did not endorse erasing the family, he did say that children
should be educated by the state and not “abandoned to their fathers’ lights and
prejudices.” 107 After all, he noted, the state has a greater interest in the results of an
education and, in generally outliving the father and the family, is guaranteed to see its
results.
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But Rousseau also modified Plato’s view of civic education in several ways: first,
he stressed in both The Political Economy and Considerations on the Government of
Poland that public education is for a free people. Writing in the former, “national
education is suitable only for free men; only they enjoy a common existence and are truly
bound together by Law.”108 Second, Rousseau emphasized the role of love, patriotism,
and sentiment in educating citizens, writing in Considerations on the Government of
Poland that “No constitution will ever be good and solid unless the law rules the citizens’
heart.”109 Rousseau did not think that men could be taught to love anything, but he
reasoned “it is not impossible to teach them to love one object rather than another, and to
love what is genuinely fine rather than what is malformed.”110 He went on to suggest that
children might be taught to see themselves as only a part of the “larger whole” of the
state, to “feel themselves members of the fatherland” and “love it with that exquisite
sentiment which any isolated man has only for himself.”111 Whereas Plato thought only a
subset of the citizenry could be capable of selflessly caring for the common good, the
more egalitarian Rousseau suggests that under the right circumstances the entire citizenry
might in theory prove capable.
If in his Republic Plato suggested that we each have fixed natures that can be
separated into three distinct classes according to our drives and capacities, for Rousseau,
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“good social institutions are those that best know how to denature man, to take his
absolute existence from him in order to give him a relative one and transport the I into the
common unity.”112 Every individual person is somehow singularly unique and yet each
one shares in a greater human nature marked by perfectibility. As there is no
predetermined end point for humanity—we can make ourselves in our own image by
learning from our environment and changing it to suit us—individuals were considered
by Rousseau to be potentially even more malleable than they were for Plato.
As I will argue, this does not mean that Rousseau thought there is no longer any
natural, normative standard for how individuals should fashion themselves as private
individuals, but it did mean that with the right legislator and under the right conditions,
everyone—and not simply a select subset—could theoretically rise above instincts and
appetites. While in his Republic Plato imagined a city that allows each citizen a role as
part of a class that accords with his or her nature, in The Social Contract Rousseau
imagined an ideal city that depends on all members overriding their individual natures to
achieve a profound and freeing moral transformation.113
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But Rousseau’s apparent optimism about the malleability of human nature had its
limits: He was highly aware of how history, geography, culture, and other sociological
forces create important differences between societies. Differences in constitutions and
other factors must be accounted for, and they inevitably limit the extent to which a
society is suited for the ideal he posits. There were, therefore, preconditions to his
recommendations for public education: It is only when “all are equal by the constitution
of the State,” that “all ought to be educated together and in the same fashion, and if it is
impossible to establish a completely free public education, it must at least be set at a cost
the poor can afford.”114 And so although our becoming is not set and predetermined for
Rousseau, everyone is born into a particular context and environment that cannot be
easily escaped.
Rousseau therefore defended what Plato likely took for granted: Cultivating
citizenship requires cultivating a particular orientation to one’s own society and teaching
people to love their own more than outsiders. Rousseau accepted that love and unity
within a community demands a kind of parochialism, and he readily defended this. He
criticized “those cosmopolitans who go to great length in their books to discover duties
they do not deign to fulfill around them,” insisting that “the essential thing is to be good
to the people with whom one lives.”115 He argued that loving those distant from us is
much less demanding than loving our neighbors and that loving those in one’s own
community requires taking responsibility and making sacrifices in a much more real and

114

Rousseau, “Considerations on the Government of Poland,” 190.

115

Rousseau, Emile, 1979, 39.
81

immediate way. He further reasoned that it is actually through being citizens that we are
able to imagine a common humanity at all: “We conceive of the general society in terms
of our particular societies, the establishment of small Republics leads us to think of the
large one, and we do not properly begin to become men until after having been
Citizens.”116 Citizenship teaches us to love beyond ourselves, and a true love for mankind
can only be learned by first loving one’s own.117
Rousseau’s model for the ideal, virtuous citizen was Cato who “defends the state,
freedom, and the laws against the conquerors of the world, and finally leaves the earth
when he no longer finds on it a fatherland to serve.”118 Cato found his happiness in
others, and his value was decided “by his relation to the whole, which is the social
body.”119 Unfortunately, Rousseau lamented, this kind of pure, selfless patriotism had
become increasingly impossible. Whereas ancient lawgivers such as Lycurgus were able
to build institutions that “transport the I into the common unity,” resulting in a polity
where “each individual believes himself no longer one but a part of the unity and no
longer feels except within the whole,”120 this was hardly feasible for most places in the
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modern world. Rousseau thought that Sparta and Rome had benefited from a constancy
that was no longer present in modern life where social forces and positions were in
constant flux.
According to Rousseau, modern life had fundamentally fractured our being. The
contemporary man, the bourgeois, wants to retain “the primacy of the sentiments of
nature” in the civil order, and so he is always divided between his “inclinations” and his
“duties.”121 The bourgeois does not simply care only for himself, he pretends to care for
others while caring only for himself. He is therefore in constant contradiction with
himself, always appearing other than himself and always speaking one way but acting
another. To illustrate this, Rousseau employs a sailing metaphor in Book I of Emile: He
describes modern men as ships, pulled by conflicting tides and winds, unhappily torn
between their natural selves and their social selves.
Put another way, Rousseau’s central difficulty with Plato’s model of education as
socialization was that it works best when there is little to no conflict between one’s inner
self and one’s interests and one’s outer self and one’s duties to the community. Being
educated by and for a society more preoccupied with the appearance of virtue rather than
virtue itself will only generate nonideal men and citizens. In his own time, Rousseau
argues, the gap between the two had become so great that neither is achieved: “Thus, in
conflict and floating during the whole course of our life, we end it without having been
able to put ourselves in harmony with ourselves and without having been good either for
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ourselves or for others.”122 When nature and society are not merely different but actively
opposed, we lose our natural goodness123 and inner harmony.
That is, when our natural faculties and sentiments directly oppose the habits and
opinions we learn from society and our own experience of the world, they cannot be
reconciled: “Their harmony is impossible. Forced to combat nature or the social
institutions, one must choose between making a man or a citizen, for one cannot make
both at the same time.”124 It is this tension which Judith Shklar identified at the heart of
Rousseau’s work and which rightly led her to see him as offering distinct models against
which contemporary life could be judged.125 Shklar saw two poles: “One model was a
Spartan city, the other a tranquil household, and the two were meant to stand in polar
opposition to each other.”126 Each option offered wholeness and harmony: The Social
Contract by combatting nature through institutions and effectively denaturing man, and
Emile by strengthening nature, resisting social institutions, and solidifying man. As each
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alternative takes the opposite strategy, these warring visions are ultimately incompatible
and irreconcilable.
In affirming this reading of Rousseau, I reject those interpretive trends which
have sought to challenge or outright reject Shklar’s view. One group of critics, including
Grace Roosevelt, Tracy Strong, Matthew Simpson, and Frederick Neuhouser, have
insisted that Emile does in fact offer a civic education. On their reading, what Rousseau
really means when he says we must choose between making a man and making a citizen
is that while one cannot create both a man and citizen at the same time, one “can do both
at different times.” 127 According to Strong, Emile is made to be a citizen in a just society
exactly like that of The Social Contract.128 According to Matthew Simpson, Emile the
“independent rural householder” is “also a citizen and ready to perform the duties of
citizenship if they are required of him.”129 And according to Neuhouser, Emile’s
education has two parts which taken together result in a “man-citizen,” not a man instead
of a citizen. 130
The problem with all of these interpretations is that they fail to properly
distinguish between a man made to be a citizen as Rousseau understands the term citizen
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and a man made to live in society. As Lawrence Cooper notes, there is a difference
between “sociability” and “citizenship,” and while “nature and citizenship are roads that
do not meet,” “nature and society” are more compatible.131 The fact that Emile is raised
to live in society does not mean that he can rightly be called a true citizen in Rousseau’s
eyes. As John M. Warner puts it, “though Emile and Sophie must inhabit a political
society, the one that best suits them is not Rousseau’s own, which requires a passionate
civic commitment that they decidedly lack, but rather one which gives them the space to
realize their collective good in the privacy of their own home” and which “requires [a]
profoundly different moral orientation than does the public world.”132 Warner correctly
argues that Emile’s political education is incompatible with Rousseau’s ideal concept of
citizenship.133
Ignoring this distinction and the specificity of Rousseau’s image of the virtuous
citizen, many scholars persist in arguing that Emile’s education is a civic one, sometimes
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granting that Rousseau is offering “an alternative form of citizenship, rather than an
alternative to citizenship.”134 But as Geraint Parry argues, “citizen education has to be
continuing education,” 135 and this is simply not the education of Emile. Emile’s
education is not aimed at citizenship, but at forming an individual who will do good and
live a mostly private life.
A second, related strand of Shklarian critics grant the distinction between “man”
and “citizen” but insist that these are not opposed to one another. That is, while Emile
does make a man only and The Social Contract does make a citizen only, these are
“neither rival enterprises nor competing alternatives.”136 According to these
interpretations, Emile’s private education lays the groundwork for the civic education
completed in The Social Contract and by the Legislator. In other words, The Social
Contract is compatible with Emile in that it serves as a kind of sequel.137 Rather than read
Rousseau’s works as offering incompatible alternatives,138 these scholars seek to
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harmonize the apparently contradictory collectivist and individualist impulses in
Rousseau.139
But Rousseau’s coherence and consistency does not depend on reconciling the
division between man and citizen, and, even if Rousseau did intend The Social Contract
as a kind of appendix to Emile, this neither proves that Rousseau imagined his Emile as a
private education program that precedes the public education of The Social Contract, nor
does it discount that they were meant to be read as contrasting alternatives supported by a
consistent critique. Rousseau never says The Social Contract depicts the completion of
Emile’s education, and I would argue that Emile’s fate in Les Solitaires suggests he is
more likely to fit the description of a potential lawgiver than that of a citizen of an ideal
social contract. Moreover, like the previous group of critics, these interpretations give
undue primacy to political relationships in Rousseau’s thought and ultimately miss the
central tension between man and society at the heart of his philosophy.
Finally, a third group of scholars accepts “man” and “citizen” as both distinct
ends and irreconcilable alternatives, but they unnecessarily expand and complicate the
ideal types that Rousseau offers beyond Shklar’s two poles. Writing just a year before
Shklar, Roger Masters had already added the “philosopher or solitary dreamer” as a third
choice.140 Also extending the man vs. citizen paradigm, Tzvetan Todorov identified three
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other Rousseauian types in pursuit of wholeness and happiness.141 Increasing the number
to five, Lawrence Cooper insisted each represents distinct alternative ways of life.142
Scholars invested in outlining all the available “types” in Rousseau’s work differ on their
number, character, desirability, and realizability according to the extent to which they
view Rousseau as a realist or idealist, extremist or moderate, pessimist or utopian.
But in looking to Rousseau for concrete solutions about which way of being is
best, readers risk missing one of Shklar’s most important insights: When she calls
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Rousseau “the last of the classical utopists,” she means that Rousseau’s “models” never
sought to “set up a perfect community, but simply to bring moral judgment to bear on the
social misery to which men have so unnecessarily reduced themselves.”143 Rousseau’s
“types” are tools for critique and persuasion, not necessarily typologies for the best and
worst ways of life or templates for who we should or should not be. While more
pessimistic and tragic readings of Rousseau tend toward this view, there is an equally
problematic tendency to forget that Rousseau does not want his readers to despair but, as
I will argue, to be inspired toward goodness and virtue to the extent that it is possible,
given the particularities and possibilities of their individual person and community.144
Schemas of Rousseau’s multiple character types are almost always made without
reference to the characters in works like Julie or to the possibilities Rousseau outlines for
women. Moreover, while it can be useful, focusing on types detracts from the basic
distinction Rousseau clearly articulated between the man who is natural and private and
the citizen who is denatured and public. For Rousseau, goodness and virtue is defined
differently for the man and the citizen, which is why it remains the most fundamental and
the most helpful distinction to draw in understanding his thought.
On my reading, whereas Rousseau’s The Social Contract exemplified an ideal
polity with appropriate institutions for public education and socialization, Emile offered
an ideal portrait of individual development through private education. Both sought to
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address the same contradiction between the natural and civic self: Whereas The Social
Contract attempted to do so by combatting nature through institutions and effectively
denaturing man, Emile sought to achieve this by strengthening nature, resisting social
institutions, and solidifying man. Emile is educated in accordance with who and what he
is away from societal pressures and expectations, and it is only when he is already formed
that he goes on to join and engage with society. While participants in The Social Contract
will live first and foremost for others, even as they remain individual men, Emile will live
first and foremost for himself and his family, even as he remains a member of a political
community. He will read only parts of The Social Contract. The end product Rousseau
has in mind for Emile is not (by necessity) wholly apolitical, but he is not a model citizen
either. He will do his duty, but he is always a man first.
In seeking to know and form the cultivated natural man exemplified by Emile,
Rousseau turned to private education. As Master’s put it, “What Plato attempted for the
city, Rousseau does for the individual.”145 In so doing, Rousseau embarked on precisely
the project Plato so often appeared to doubt in his dialogues: Teaching a pupil to become
virtuous through private education. But his method would not be like that of the sophist,
but a new kind that understood socialization as the key determinant of becoming. His
new education would not involve directly imparting lessons and principles, but would
instead attempt to shield the child and guide his experience of the world so that he might
become the best version of himself.
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Cultivating Natural Man
The assumption in both Plato and Rousseau is that when education is correctly
harnessed and applied to the raw material of childhood, an ideal final product can be
formed, limited only by its inherent potential. Education is the key to becoming, and
properly wielded, it can create ideal selves and societies. In Emile, Rousseau sought to
educate an ideal “natural” man who does not develop according to the opinions and
expectations of others, but according to his authentic self. If the civil man could only be a
fraction, a numerator dependent on a denominator, the natural man would be a whole
number who finds his happiness within himself and for himself. 146
And so, whereas the system of public education in The Republic sought to prepare
each citizen for the role in society that suited him, Rousseau made clear that he is not
educating Emile for any particular function; his goal is not the ideal society, but the ideal
man. In nature, “since men are all equal, their common calling is man's estate and
whoever is well raised for that calling cannot fail to fulfill those callings related to it.”147
As such, the tutor is not interested in whether his pupil is destined for “the sword, the
church, [or] the bar,” because “prior to the calling of his parents is nature’s call to human
life,” and “living is the job” he wants to teach him.148 He will be, first and foremost, a
man, not a position, and this will align with the realities of modern society where no
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generation can take its rank and role for granted and no one can be sure they will do what
their parents did.
In order for Emile to become an ideal and free being, he must comprehend and
come to terms with necessity—not the opinion of others. This is why Rousseau cited
Robinson Crusoe as a model for Emile who will help him to “know real value, which is
the inverse of the value given things by the vanity of social men” and to “respect the
producers of real value and despise the producers of value founded on vanity.” 149 As
Allan Bloom argues in his introduction to Emile, a key feature of Robinson Crusoe,
which Rousseau called “the most felicitous treatise on natural education,” is its ability to
inspire in Emile a love of wholeness that repels the “modern division of labor which
produces superfluity and makes men partial.”150 The novel’s central focus on preservation
and necessity correctly directs and prioritizes the maturation of Emile’s senses such that
they remain intimately connected to nature and necessity.
Rousseau wanted his Emile to, like Robinson Crusoe, concern himself only with
his own development, according to his own standards and needs without worrying about
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what others do or have in comparison. As James Delaney put it, “Proper education, for
Rousseau, seeks to eliminate the conflict between what we are by our nature, and what
society tells us we ought to be.”151 Rousseau sought to form a man who would be an
antidote to what he describes in the First Discourse as the “herd that is called society,”
where “a vile and deceiving uniformity prevails in morals, and all minds seem to have
been cast in the same mold,” where “constantly one follows custom, never one's own
genius,” and where “one no longer dares to appear what one is.”152 He wanted to create a
man with a strong and independent sense of self who could resist the negative influences
of a society obsessed with luxury and rank and who remains attuned to what is really
essential in life.
The becoming of such a man is a fragile process, and in order to ensure he would
develop properly, Rousseau posited that every aspect of the child’s education had to be
considered from birth. He theorized that there are three factors that influence who we
become: what we are given (“nature”), what we are taught by others (“men”), and what
we are taught by our experience with the world (“things”). Nature is responsible for the
development of our physical and internal capacities. Others must teach us how to use
what we are given by nature, but in order for one to become “well-raised,” to achieve the
kind of stable and consistent wholeness and harmony Rousseau thought ideal, the lessons
of each of these “masters” must agree.153
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Rousseau likened the self to a plant: Nature provides the seedling and determines
the potential of the plant. In Emile he wrote, “Plants are shaped by cultivation, and men
by education. If man were born big and strong, his size and strength would be useless to
him until he had learned to make use of them.”154 Unlike animals, “We are born weak,
we need strength; we are born totally unprovided, we need aid; we are born stupid, we
need judgment. Everything we do not have at our birth and which we need when we are
grown is given us by education.” 155 Like plants, humans require cultivation to achieve
the potential determined by their nature. The proper environment for growth must be
ensured.
Adults cannot control what nature gives their children; they cannot control their
children’s experience of the world or every circumstance they will face, but they can, to
some extent, control what they teach children through their words and example. This
control is limited by the fact that even if one could regulate who sees a child, one would
never be able to control how another behaves or speaks toward that child and the lessons
that would follow. Education as socialization therefore leaves much to chance, but
education as intentional teaching and learning seems to offer a measure of control over a
child’s development, which is why Rousseau turns to it.
Given the level of attention and detail the tutor gives to Emile’s education, much
has been made of how the child’s “natural” education is not really natural but artificial
and contrived. Dana Villa, for example, claims that what seems like “like the natural
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education of a ‘civilized savage’ is, in fact, the extremely careful and highly artificial
isolation of an aristocratic child for a very special kind of tutorial relationship.”156 This
skepticism regarding Rousseau’s claim that Emile’s education is “natural” is linked to a
broader debate in the literature regarding the role of nature in Rousseau’s political
philosophy.
What does Rousseau mean by “natural”? Does it have any normative force? In
what sense can Emile’s education rightly be called “natural”? With regard to the first
question, readers of Rousseau have generally taken one of four main approaches to
interpreting Rousseau’s sense of the word natural.157 Drawing mainly on The Social
Contract and the Discourse on Inequality, one strand associates Rousseau’s use of the
word “natural” with the characteristics of an original, pre-societal state.158 In this view,
while the cultivated natural man represented by Emile is distinct from the noble savage
ideal of the Second Discourse, Emile’s education is natural because he too is raised away
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On this account, while the cultivated natural man represented by Emile is distinct from
the noble savage ideal of the Second Discourse, his education is supposedly natural
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argues, natural goodness “refers to two different types, who stand at the opposite poles of
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challenged by those who point out the sociability and interdependence of Emile,
particularly with respect to Sophie.
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from society and toward self-sufficiency.159 The fact that Emile’s education is not aimed
at civil society but at preserving the characteristics of man in the state of nature makes it
natural. These interpretations often assume that Rousseau does not take nature to be a
guide for political life,160 and they tend to minimize the fact that while Emile is taught to
be self-sufficient in many respects, he is also raised to be interdependent with Sophie.
Against readings that diminish the political and normative importance of nature
for Rousseau, Laurence D. Cooper has argued that nature is not merely a pre-political
starting point, but a guide that carries over into civil society.161 For him, nature remains
as conscience when we move out of the state of nature, even as its presence becomes less
meaningful. The idea that Rousseau’s nature has an inward quality is echoed by Jeffrey
Smith who notes that in Emile, “Rousseau construes ‘nature’ predominantly in terms of a
principle immanent within man’s given material.”162 More recently, Jonathan Marks has
turned away from nature as origins altogether, claiming that Rousseau’s conception of
nature is teleological. On his account, the natural in Rousseau is that which inevitably
results as humans progress out of the state of nature. Calling Rousseau’s work “a
reflection on the natural perfection of the naturally disharmonious being,” he argues that
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true nature is achieved only after the state of nature.163 Nature is not what is given, but
the result of human development, and the capacities and characteristics that come after
the state of nature are themselves natural.
Across both approaches, scholars have come to doubt whether nature has any real
content for Rousseau, and many have come to think of nature in Rousseau a mere
substitute for what he believes is good or useful.164 Penny Weiss, for example, has
consistently argued that Rousseau’s apparent deference to nature on the question of
gender is merely a rhetorical appeal.165 This position is tempting when, in trying to make
sense of the myriad ways Rousseau seems use the term natural, a stable definition seems
impossible. But the content of Rousseau’s nature becomes clearer when it is understood
that for him nature is not only what is shared, but also what is given to each individual.
I argue that for Rousseau, the “natural” can refer to an inner potential that is
neither incompatible with the idea of cultivation nor reducible to a broader idea of human
nature. While all do share in a (gendered) human nature, Rousseau also believes that all
are born with an inherent “natural” self that is particular to each person. In Emile,
Rousseau seeks to cultivate a “natural” man who does not develop according to the
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opinions and expectations of others, but according to his authentic self. If the civil man is
only a fraction, a numerator dependent on a denominator, the natural man is a whole
number who finds his happiness within himself and for himself. 166
Being fundamentally good in its potential, Emile’s natural self must be protected
from distortion as he develops. To use Rousseau’s imagery from botany: Emile is like a
seed with his own unique potential; under the right conditions, he will grow and bloom
with a wild, authentic, and natural beauty that should not be confused with that of a
manicured garden, a “beauty” Rousseau rejects as too neat, false, and artificial. 167 As I
will demonstrate, to dismiss Rousseau’s natural education on the grounds that it actually
involves a great deal of contrivance on the part of the tutor is to miss the point of what
Rousseau means by a “natural” or “negative” education. This becomes clear when two
corrections are made to existing interpretations of Rousseau.
First, readers of Emile tend to think of the title character as a template that can be
applied to others, ignoring Rousseau’s assertions of Emile’s specificity and uniqueness.
While Emile is indeed a model in some sense, one must be careful not to misplace the
level of his universality. It is not the precise content of Emile’s education that Rousseau
wants imitated, but the fact that it is suited to his unique nature. Rousseau stresses this
when he writes:
My examples, good perhaps for one pupil, will be bad for countless others. If one
catches the spirit of these examples, one will surely know how to vary them
according to need. The choice depends on the genius peculiar to each pupil, and
the study of that genius depends on the occasions one offers each to reveal
himself.168
166

Rousseau, Emile, 1979, 39-40.

167

Ibid., 38.

99

To “catch the spirit” of Rousseau’s examples is to realize that he advocates a method
wherein each individual child is taken on his own terms and is carefully studied by the
teacher. As the child’s nature is revealed, the content of the education is created
accordingly. Again, Rousseau is explicit about this in Emile:
One must know well the particular genius of the child in order to know what
moral diet suits him. Each mind has its own form, according to which it needs to
be governed; the success of one's care depends on governing it by this form and
not by another. Prudent man, spy out nature for a long time; observe your pupil
well before saying the first word to him. To start with, let the germ of his
character reveal itself freely; constrain it in no way whatsoever in order better to
see the whole of it.169
Rousseau advocates acting less, not more, in early childhood education because the
natural character of the specific child needs time and space to develop. The teacher must
wait to be guided by the child’s nature.
Each individual requires a tailored curriculum and a unique and dedicated teacher.
This is why Rousseau asserts that “the same man can only give one education” and why
he emphasizes the importance of mothers and fathers educating their own children.170
The closest one could get to a truly individuated, private education where each child has
his or her own dedicated tutor is through the immediate family. But this does not mean
Rousseau really intended Emile as a handbook for parents; to the extent that Emile’s
education is meant to be a model, it is only so in principle.171
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Rousseau needed to create Emile because his education aims at an ideal, but
specific and authentic individual, not a generic model. Creating Emile allowed Rousseau
to avoid talking in abstractions and to illustrate in a concrete sense what it would mean to
put into practice the type of natural education he suggests. At the beginning of the work,
Rousseau barely references Emile at all; by the end, he has completely overtaken the
work and it becomes increasingly novelistic. The older the child gets in Rousseau’s
theory, and the more his nature is revealed, the more Rousseau must rely on the specific
example of Emile to illustrate his education and the less he can speak in generalities.
Second, many students of Rousseau’s political thought tend to overlook the
connections between Emile and Julie, which is not only a coming-of-age story, but a text
where Rousseau explicitly lays the groundwork for Emile and develops the basic
principles of his philosophy of education. Many of the ideas elaborated in Emile,
including what is meant by “natural” education, are usefully presented in Julie as a
debate between Saint-Preux, Julie, and Wolmar, but Julie is often neglected by political
theorists interested in Rousseau’s theories of nature and education. Insisting on
distinctions between Rousseau’s “literary” and “philosophical” texts, scholars such as
Nicholas Dent claim to see no relationship between the two and then use this as a
justification to only study those texts written in a preferred form.172 The tendency to
artificially divide Rousseau’s works as political-philosophical and literaryautobiographical has created two different Roussseaus for two different disciplines, and
the imposition of modern genre distinctions and groupings on Rousseau’s work
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inevitably leads scholars to overlook important resources for fully understanding his
thought.173
In his Confessions, Rousseau explicitly groups Julie and Emile together. Referring
to the controversy surrounding the Savoyard Vicar’s views in Emile and identifying it with
Heloise’s views in Julie, he then adds, “Everything that is bold in The Social Contract was
previously in the Discourse on Inequality; everything that was bold in Emile was
previously in Julie.”174 Although Rousseau never explicitly framed Emile as a kind of
sequel to Julie, it is notable that Julie ends with Saint-Preux being charged with educating
her sons after her death and that Emile, published a year after Julie, elaborates and repeats
many of the same points on education detailed in the novel.
Specifically, there is a key scene in Julie where Saint-Preux comments on how Julie
and Wolmar are raising their children. Rousseau believes this scene to be so important that
he deliberately selects it as one of only five scenes in the entire novel for engraving. During
the conversation, Saint-Preux explicitly raises the question of educating children toward a
predetermined ideal by, among other things, “correcting nature” to achieve that ideal.175
This prompts an outburst from Wolmar who insists that nature needs no correction, as it is
the educator who should be using nature as a guide. A “natural” education does not involve,
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as some scholars have argued Rousseau intends, the “suppression or correction” of natural
tendencies.176
The authoritative Wolmar, who acts as a mentor and friend to Saint-Preux,
proceeds to instruct him: some individuals are born made are who they are irrespective of
their education and circumstance. Others, however, are more plastic, and their characters
are slower to develop. In those cases, “trying to form their mind before knowing it is to
risk spoiling the good that nature has done and doing more harm in its place.”177
Education can give us feelings and ideas that we are not innately born with, but it cannot
give us “our dispositions for acquiring them.”178 Whereas Wolmar is convinced that we
are already born with the “diversity of minds and geniuses that distinguishes individuals,”
Saint-Preux argues that this is the product of nurture, not nature, and so one should seek
to harness the power of nurture to direct and determine the child’s character according to
our ideals.179
Wolmar then continues in an extraordinary passage where he asserts that one’s
character ultimately depends on one’s temperament and that each individual has an
authentic core that can be coerced but never truly changed. 180 Cultivating that core—
which is not the same as molding that core—requires patience and careful study: “Once
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again the question is not to change the character and bend the natural disposition, but on
the contrary to push it as far as it can go, to cultivate it and keep it from degenerating; for
it is thus that a man becomes all he can be, and that nature’s work is culminated in him by
education.”181 Character is not made but revealed, and once it is revealed, the teacher
must act according to the specific, individual needs of the child.
Wolmar goes on, reiterating that “every man brings with him at birth a character,
a genius, and talents that are peculiar to him.”182 Those who will live in “country
simplicity” are best left uninstructed, as they will be happier and it is unnecessary for the
public good, but those who are in the “civil state,” where their minds will be needed more
than their physical labor, “it is important to learn to extract from men everything that
nature has given them, to steer them in the direction where they can go farthest, and
above all to foster their inclinations with everything that can make them useful.” 183
Those in the first category have no need for an individuated education: “Only the species
matters, each individual does what all the others do, example is the only rule, habit is the
only talent, and each one makes use only of that part of his soul which is common to
all.”184 In contrast, those in the second category do need individual nurturing, and for
each child, “you follow him as far as nature leads him, and you will make of him the
greatest of men if he has what it takes to become that.”185 As we can infer from
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Rousseau’s other work, whereas the first method is appropriate for forming citizens, the
second is best for forming men.
Saint-Preux counters that such a hands-off approach to early education will result
in stubborn and rebellious children with faults and bad habits, but Julie counters that she
has avoided this problem by using the “yoke of necessity” so often referred to in Emile.
And, following nature does not mean indulging every one of the child’s impulses:
appropriate limits must be set. There should never be bargaining or reasoning; what is
granted is granted immediately without condition and all refusals are final. At the same
time, Julie focuses on giving her children a happy childhood and refuses to sacrifice their
early years for the sake of adulthood. Given the extent to which “nature” already subjects
children, she makes them feel as free as possible while avoiding giving them a false sense
of their own power. Julie’s child is never made to believe “he is served more out of duty
than pity;” he is made to feel his dependency as a kind of “humiliation” so that he
“ardently aspire[s] to the time when he will be big and strong enough to have the honor
of serving himself.”186 Feeling his dependency, he will know his place.187 He will know
he has “no authority but that of benevolence,” and this will make him want to be
loveable, which will in turn teach him to love, and “this reciprocal affection, born of
equality” leads to “good qualities.”188
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From this scene, one can draw several conclusions about what cultivating natural
man truly means for Rousseau. In the context of education, nature refers to a concrete set
of inherent capacities and dispositions unique to each individual which, in certain social
and political contexts—namely, modern ones—should serve as the guide for
development. Using nature as a guide does not mean giving a child complete freedom or
secretly molding him as one sees fit; it means patiently nurturing the child according to
his “natural” individual character and potential, features that Rousseau believes can be
observed with careful attention. It further means teaching him to yield to necessity, and
making him realize that the natural order and way of the world has made him weak,
dependent, and unable to fully understand things or to reason until he is grown.
In adhering to the child’s “natural” inner core, natural education entails a serious
commitment to authenticity,189 a commitment which is, contrary to Todorov’s suggestion,
not necessarily devoid of moral content.190 Although Julie expresses some skepticism
regarding Womar’s position on this particular point, in a footnote Rousseau as the editor
affirms his agreement with the idea that there are “no mistakes in nature.” 191 Womar
elaborates:
All the vices we attribute to natural disposition are the effect of the wrong shapes
it has received. There is no villain whose inclinations better channeled would not
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have yielded great virtues. There is no wronghead from whom useful talents
would not have been obtained from it by taking a certain tack with him.192
Because our natural dispositions are fundamentally good, being true to them does lead to
goodness. 193 Again, it is critical to note that Rousseau is referring to the natural goodness
of a complex constellation of distinctly individual and unique dispositions, of individual
human natures and not simply of a basic, shared, and generic human nature.
It is only when natural characters and dispositions are malformed and distorted
that they become non-ideal. In other words, children lose their inherent natural goodness
when external forces in society fail to recognize their nature and nurture them according
to it. When adults try to distort and channel children toward “unnatural” ends—that is,
ends that disagree with the child’s authentic, natural dispositions—problems arise. In
contrast to “unnatural” education, natural education does not seek to change or force the
child’s unique nature; it refuses to treat children as blank slates to be molded according to
the desires of the adults around them.194
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If there is any doubt about whether this is truly Rousseau’s view and not simply that
of Wolmar and Julie’s consider not only the consistency of this view with the ideas
advanced in Emile, but also the following passage in The Dialogues where “Rousseau”
the character describes the author of Emile as such: “He devoted his greatest and best
book to showing how the harmful passions enter our souls, how good education must be
purely negative, that it must consist not in curing the vices of the human heart— for there
are no such vices naturally—but in preventing them from being born and in keeping
tightly shut the passages through which they enter” (23). Later in The Dialogues, the
“Frenchman” character further describes Emile as “nothing but a treatise on the original
goodness of man, destined to show how vice and error, foreign to his constitution, enter it
from outside and insensibly change him” (213).
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Finally, Rousseau’s natural education is perhaps best understood in contrast to an
“artificial” education which only trains children to learn through and for the sake of their
amour propre instead of their amore de soi.195 “Artificial” education flatters children,
raises them to be vain, and leads them to think that their happiness depends on the
admiration of others. Rousseau’s goal is an adult who is himself for himself and not to
please others. He is critical of “educated” children who gain the admiration of adults for
doing and saying things they do not truly understand. These children parrot and imitate
adults to please them, becoming who others want them to be instead of becoming the best
version of themselves. Ultimately, this kind of education only exacerbates the undesired
split between the child’s nature, or authentic self, and his social self.
These premises explain why Rousseau insisted that it is up to Emile to “desire,”
“seek,” and “find” what he wants to learn. The teacher’s job is to “put it within his reach,
skillfully to give birth to this desire and to furnish him with the means of satisfying it.”196
Questions will and should come from the student, not the teacher. The teacher’s questions
should be “infrequent but well chosen.”197 While the child should decide what he wants
to learn, the tutor should guide him and channel his curiosity to what is useful for him to
know in and of itself. This is less about valuing utility in education than it is about
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rejecting learning motivated by vanity; that is, wanting to know things only for the sake
of feeling superior and showing others he knows them. Rousseau would “prefer a
hundred times over that [Emile] not learn what he would only learn out of jealousy or
vanity.”198
Those who learn according to their nature are also more likely to retain what they
learn. Rousseau notes that it is common for adults to “forget and lose” what they learn,
and this is because education is “certainly only habit,” which means it is tenuous and
always liable to revert to nature.199 Education can manipulate and distort nature, but the
effect only lasts as long as the teaching and learning continues. This idea is reinforced in
Rousseau’s exordium to the Second Discourse where he states that “education and
habits” can “deprave” but not “destroy” “the qualities [man] received.”200 It is also
illustrated in Emile through botany: when plants are made to grow in a non-vertical
direction, against their inclination, their inner nature is not altered. They can be forced to
change their natural course, but while they will at first continue according to their
acquired habit, once set free: “the sap has not as a result [of this interference] changed its
original direction; and if the plant continues to grow, its new growth resumes the vertical
direction.”201 So too, Rousseau muses, it is with men. Rousseau thinks individuals can
force certain habits against nature, and he admits those habits will stick so long as the
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person’s circumstances remain the same, but “as soon as the situation changes, habit
ceases and the natural returns.”202 Habit does not erase nature. Education can change our
behavior but not our fundamental dispositions.203
Rousseau’s education is “natural” because it does not seek to force certain habits
into Emile against his nature. Instead, the “curriculum” is designed around Emile’s
experience and perspective. It is, in short, education as socialization, but carefully
planned and customized to the individual child. It is not transmission: The child is not
told to be good and virtuous and then made to practice habits of goodness and virtue; he
is put in situations that feel completely authentic and real to him. He is given ideal
conditions for growth, that is, experiences which will draw out the best in him. Many of
these situations may be contrived by the tutor, but Emile’s reactions and responses to
them are authentic and natural, and they result in a self who is authentic and natural.
There is no disconnect between who Emile really is and who his education has made him
because the habits and behaviors he develops are grounded in his unique nature and real
experience of the world.
To be clear, Rousseau’s commitment to the existence of a fixed and singular
individual nature should not be confused with the view that individuals necessarily have a
higher claim than the community, or that the public good is the mere sum total of
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As Wolmar says in Julie, “It would be vain to pretend to remold a variety of minds on
a common model. You can coerce them and not change them: you can prevent men from
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individual desires, or that individuals lack obligations. Scholars like Robert N. Bellah
who struggle to reconcile Rousseau’s individualism with his collectivism struggle for two
reasons: first, they fail to see that Rousseau’s support for individualism is dependent on
the given social and political context. Second, they tend to root Rousseau’s commitment
to individualism in the idea that man is solitary in the state of nature, or in biographic
reasons such as his mother’s death and his father leaving him as a child, or in the
influences of the modern political philosophy tradition. There is a conflation of
individualism with independence, when in fact one can simultaneously appreciate the
unique individuality of every person while believing in interdependence and obligation.
The individuality Rousseau advocates is one which is secure in itself and its judgments,
has little use for comparison and competition, and seeks to do good.204
Achieving Rousseau’s “natural” education demands effort and artifice, to be sure,
but it’s in service of giving Emile room to grow at his own pace and according to his
needs. The potential for virtue and goodness is already inside Emile and will develop on
its own provided the right set of experiences occur at the right time. When Rousseau
writes, “What must be done is to prevent anything from being done,”205 he means that the
tutor must protect the child from experiences and influences that will corrupt and distort
his natural, inner potential. As Rousseau says in Considerations on the Government of
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Poland, “I cannot repeat often enough that good education has to be negative. Prevent
vices from arising, you will have done enough for virtue.”206 As Geraint Parry notes,
Rousseau’s “negative” education is perhaps more aptly named “defensive” or
“protective” education.207 This prevention occurs by managing Emile’s formative
experiences but not by forcing him to practice habits and behaviors for the sake of
pleasing others.
Cultivating natural man does not mean letting nature run its course with no
intervention, but it does demand a God-like insight into the inner nature and world of the
child. Although Rousseau begins Book I of the Emile lamenting how man “wants nothing
as nature made it, not even man” and how “for him, man must be trained like a school
horse [and] fashioned in keeping with his fancy like a tree in his garden,” he also writes
that no intervention would lead to worse outcomes. Humans are only partially formed
when they are born, and “in the present state of things,” it is inevitable that “prejudices,
authority, necessity, example, [and] all the social institutions in which we find ourselves
submerged would stifle nature,” leaving “nothing in its place.”208 So, “in the present state
of things a man abandoned to himself in the midst of other men from birth would be the
most disfigured of all.”209 Natural man must be educated to survive in the modern world:
he must be cultivated but not ornamented.
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Again, the goal for Rousseau was to ensure the child would develop free from
negative societal influences until he blooms into a man made for himself and no one else.
In cultivating “natural man” the tutor is not attempting to recreate a man from the state of
nature. As Rousseau cautioned, “There is a great difference between the natural man
living in the state of nature and the natural man living in the state of society. Emile is not
a savage to be relegated to the desert. He is a savage made to inhabit cities.”210 At the
same time, the tutor does not attempt to mold him according to a preconceived image.
The tutor raises the child away from the corrupting influences of society and according to
the child’s innate and singular nature.
Of course, Rousseau recognized that while the tutor can hope to shield Emile
from being made for other men and from concerning himself with their opinions of him,
certain formative experiences cannot be indefinitely delayed or controlled. Chief among
them is Emile’s experience of love and passion. Unlike Plato, who in The Republic
suggested men and women might be made indifferent to one another, Rousseau
determined that man will inevitably care about the opinion of a woman he loves and
desires. He will see himself through her eyes. Cultivating natural man will therefore
require careful guidance through this stage of development.
As his own autobiographical writings confirm, Rousseau believed that sexual
development plays a pivotal role in self-formation and that properly delaying and
channeling this development is key to his project.211 Love and passion are “the most

210

Rousseau, 205.

211

In reflecting on his life in The Confessions and The Dialogues, many of his formative
memories have to do with his sexual development. He emphasizes the extent to which he
113

difficult part of the whole of education—the crisis that serves as a passage from
childhood to man’s estate.”212 Emile is not only incomplete without a female partner, he
needs her—or at least the idea of her—to ensure his education is properly completed.
Emile must be taught to love truth, beauty, and virtue, and he does this in part through
loving an honest, beautiful and virtuous woman. It is crucial that he not only fall in love
with the right woman, but that she serves the tutor’s educational goals.
In Book V of Emile, Rousseau infamously detailed the separate education of
Sophie, Emile’s ideal woman. 213 From the beginning, readers of Rousseau have objected
to Sophie’s education as inconsistent with his commitments to freedom and equality214 or

was a “late-bloomer,” as well as his early innocence and naïveté regarding women. And,
while many scholars point to Robinson Crusoe as a model of economic self-sufficiency,
few emphasize the fact that unlike most novels or romances, it is devoid of sex and love.
As Ian Watt notes, “Love plays little part in Crusoe’s own life, and that even the
temptations of sex are excluded from the scene of his greatest triumphs, the island.” (65)
Marriage comes much later, only after financial security, and “all he tells us of this
supreme human adventure is that it was 'not either to my disadvantage or dissatisfaction'.
This, the birth of three children, and his wife's death, however, comprise only the early
part of a sentence, which ends with plans for a further voyage” (68). Rousseau’s praise of
the novel for educational purposes therefore makes all the more sense, given the desire to
carefully control and defer Emile’s sexual passions and desires. Even Watt misses this
connection, attributing Rousseau’s praise of Crusoe to its “realisation of intellectual
freedom” and the fact that Crusoe “enjoys the absolute freedom of social restrictions for
which Rousseau yearned” (86).
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Susan Okin claims Rousseau has two education models for boys—one civic and one
private—but only one model for girls, shared by both Julie and Sophie. On her reading,
only boys are raised to be “autonomous individuals,” (“Rousseau’s Natural Woman,” 15).
But as I will argue, Julie and Sophie do not share the same education and both exhibit
more strength and autonomy than Okin’s sweeping criticism suggests. Moreover, as
many have pointed out, Emile and Sophie share a mutual dependence.
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For the opposite view, see Susan Meld Shell’s “Émile: Nature and the Education of
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dismissed his view of women as pathological or explained away by historical
contextualization. While some have tried to ignore or detach his theory of female
education from the rest of his thought, others have insisted that Rousseau’s investment in
sexual differentiation and the patriarchal family is of crucial political, institutional, and
theoretical significance to his thought.215 More recently, Denise Schafer has even argued
that Sophie’s education is actually superior to that of Emile.216
Sophie and Emile’s educations are, on my reading, both aimed at private virtue
and both interdependent, although not equally so. Contra Penny Weiss, Rousseau’s
investment in sexual differentiation was not merely utilitarian but based on a belief in
natural differences between men and women.217 Rousseau believed it is possible for

consistency from his position, […] on human nature and its implications for the modern
human condition” (273).
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See, for example, Elizabeth Wingrove’s Rousseau’s Republican Romance where she
argues that “possibility of securing a stable republican community turns on the interaction
between men and women and, likewise, the proper organization of sexual desire turns on
securing a stable political rule” (5).
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Schafer argues that despite Sophie’s internal division, she is in fact “more
intellectually and morally independent than Emile” (“Reconsidering the Role of Sophie
in Rousseau’s Emile,” 610). She also challenges the idea that Rousseau is necessarily
committed to achieving “wholeness,” as it appears, on her account, that Sophie’s
dividedness is precisely what allows for Rousseau’s vision of happiness and freedom.
Schaeffer insists that wholeness was not merely intended for men and insists that feminist
accounts have oversimplified and mischaracterized Rousseau’s account of female
education. Rousseau “expects a woman to make rational and moral judgments, to see the
difference between appearance and substance, to see the big picture” and to avoid
“unreflective dependency upon public opinion” even as she takes it into account (613).
Ultimately, “the relationship of Sophie and Emile is neither a perfect whole with two
complementary parts, nor a strict hierarchy. Both formulations are too static to capture
the precarious instability—and the mobilization of that instability—that Rousseau sees as
essential to our interdependence” (624).
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In his Discourse on Political Economy, Rousseau is quite clear that biology tips the
scales of power and authority away from women and toward men. In the family, one
115

women to be more like men in the same way he thought children could be raised against
their inner nature. In both cases he thought it best to follow nature’s guidance. At the
same time, he did not think women could and should only occupy a self-sacrificial and
subordinate role so that men can attain civic virtue. The virtue Rousseau was concerned
with in Emile is a private kind of virtue tied to moderating desires; It is a kind of virtue
that Emile and Sophie both aspire to achieve, as well as Julie and Saint-Preux.
I further maintain that Rousseau’s objectionable treatment of women in Book V
reflects the tremendous and decisive power he believed they hold over men. 218 As he
wrote to women in the Epistle Dedicatory to his Second Discourse, “It will always be the
lot of your sex to govern ours.”219 Women are “that precious half of the Republic which

authority must be final, and “regardless of how slight the incapacities specific to women
may be thought to be; since they invariably impose intervals of inaction on her, this is a
sufficient reason to exclude her from this primacy: for when the balance is perfectly
equal, a straw is enough to tip it” (3). Moreover, whereas a mother has no doubt that her
children are hers, the father has no such security and must therefore “be able to review
his wife’s conduct” to ensure he is raising and supporting his own (3).
218

Much has been made of Rousseau’s treatment of women in Book V of Emile, but in
addition to reading him in his historical context, it’s important to note the extent to which
Rousseau felt threatened, influenced, and controlled by women. He admits to secretly
fantasizing about women dominating him, and his early sexual experiences were all with
older women. In Paris, he saw women as the gatekeepers of the philosophical and literary
world. They dictated the culture and landscape of the intellectual world: they ran the
salons, and it was on their favor that he depended. The extent to which he came to resent
this is evident in his falling out with Madame D’Epinay. He felt that accepting her
patronage in effect stifled him and made him obligated to her. Finally, being with his life
partner and eventual wife—tellingly, a woman he claims was inferior to him and who
was wholly dependent on him—this meant further submitting himself to the
manipulations of his mother-in-law. Kenneth Wain rightly argues in On Rousseau: An
Introduction that we should not psychologize Rousseau as wanting women to be
subjugated because of his negative personal experiences with them, but I cite these
examples not to claim that Rousseau is motivated to be vindictive against women but
only to demonstrate the extent to which he felt and believed in their existing power,
which in turn greatly influenced his views.
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causes the other's happiness, and whose gentleness and wisdom preserve its peace and
good morals.” Women are both the downfall and the potential saving grace of men.
Properly educated, they could lead men to greatness and virtue. As he noted in a footnote
to the Discourse on the Arts and Sciences:
I am far from thinking that this ascendancy of women is in itself an evil. It is a
gift bestowed upon them by nature of rite happiness of Mankind: better directed,
it might produce as much good as it nowadays does harm. We are not sufficiently
sensible to the benefits that would accrue to society if the half of Mankind which
governs the other were given a better education. Men will always be what it
pleases women that they be: so that if you want them to become great and
virtuous, teach women what greatness of soul and virtue is.220
This last sentence is key: a tutor’s influence cannot hope to compete with man’s desire to
impress a woman. For Emile, his first love will be his first passion of any kind, and it will
decide “the final form of his character,” solidifying “his way of thinking, his sentiments,
and his tastes.”221 The relationship the tutor has with Emile will never be able to form
him in the same way his first love will.
The power Rousseau believed women have over male development explains why
he argued that women’s education should be entirely oriented around their supposed
duties to men and why, from childhood, a woman should be taught “to please men, to be
useful to them, to make herself loved and honored by them, to raise them when young, to
care for them when grown, to counsel them, to console them, to make their lives
agreeable and sweet.”222 She is a woman who no longer poses a serious threat to Emile’s
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development and the goals of his education. Such a woman would be nothing like the
modern women Rousseau criticized, whose natural innocence, purity, and simplicity of
mind have been ruined by society.
In order to ensure Emile falls for the right woman, the tutor must plant the idea of
her in advance. Like Emile, this woman called Sophie must be educated according to
nature, and this will, on Rousseau’s account, stress their fundamental, sex-based
differences. Sophie will therefore be very different from Emile, but this will generate a
complimentary, interdependent partnership. By making his pupil fall in love with the
image of Sophie, the tutor hopes to ensure that Emile will settle for nothing less than the
closest he can find to the ideal woman.
In fact, both Emile and Sophie are to have their minds imbued with ideal images
of one another before ever meeting. While Emile’s tutor describes the ideal woman to
him, Sophie falls in love with the hero of her favorite book, Telemachus. Emile proceeds
to search for his ideal Sophie everywhere he travels, Sophie insists on comparing
everyone to Telemachus. When Sophie is sent to the city and introduced into society by
her aunt, she refuses to settle for a suitor who does not resemble her hero. And when
Emile and Sophie finally do meet, they recognize one another as embodiments of their
respective idealizations.
But Emile is not Telemachus and Sophie is not the Sophie of the tutor’s stories.
Both Emile and Sophie are unique individuals, and we know this because Rousseau tells
us so: In Book V it is revealed that the tutor initially planned to raise Emile and Sophie
alongside one another and for one another at the outset. He abandons this idea, however,
realizing that to do so would be to confuse “what is natural in the savage state with what
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is natural in the civil state.” Whereas in the former state all “natural” men would be
equally suited to all “natural” women and essentially interchangeable, in the civil state
“each character is developed by social institutions and each mind has received its
particular and determinate form not just from education alone but from the well-ordered
or ill-ordered conjunction of nature and education.”223 The modern natural man and the
modern natural women are individuals. The particularity of each individual in modernity
is critical. This is why Emile and Sophie cannot be destined for one another in advance,
they must meet each other after they have developed as individuals and then decide
whether they are suited to one another.
Therefore, while it may appear as though Rousseau proposes generic templates of
ideal men and women, all of whom would be equally suited to one another, this is not the
case. Sophie is Sophie not because of an educational formula that could be replicated to
create innumerable Sophies. She has a particular nature and set of experiences that
complement Emile’s, and together they complete one another’s education. Emile’s
Sophie is not a perfect and ultimately impossible being, she is a resuscitated Sophie.
The fact that the tutor changed his mind and decided not to raise Emile and
Sophie alongside one another further proves that while Rousseau certainly believed many
of the educational practices in Emile should be adopted more widely, he never intended
the work as a handbook on how to create copies of either Emile or Sophie. To read the
book in this way is to miss Rousseau’s insistence on the unique individual potential of
each person from birth. In civil society all children are not the same because no child will
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ever have the exact same nature and the exact same environment. Rousseau’s
individuated model of education as socialization does not necessarily scale up in its
particulars, only in the general idea that the child’s individual nature must be observed
and his environment curated accordingly. Emile and Sophie are ideals constructed to
critique “artificial” education and prove a point about natural goodness. They could never
be replicated through a standard program of education, and to seek to mold children into
a predetermined image would defeat the whole purpose of natural education.
By extension, Emile’s education as socialization is antithetical to the one
proposed by Plato, where institutions which teach students in groups and batches, use the
same lessons on the same students, and encourage them to compete with one another
while worrying about how they are viewed by their peers. Such institutions which claim
to be forming men or forming women en masse are really claiming to shape children
toward a predetermined template, a model that may be unnatural to the individual child.
This is not Rousseau’s project in Emile, a project which demands privacy, careful
observation, and minimal socialization—conditions that are only possible in a one-on-one
tutorship model of education.
Unfortunately, both in theory and in practice, readers of Rousseau have failed to
see that his idea of cultivating natural men and women is wholly opposed to the notion of
molding men and women according to specific, external, and pre-determined ideals.224
They have sought to apply Emile to dictate an education as transmission, when it’s
actually a theory of individualized socialization. The dire consequences of
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misinterpreting Rousseau in this way are evident in one of Rousseau’s contemporaries,
the English author and abolitionist Thomas Day (1748-1789). Having read Emile and
seeking to recreate a Sophie for himself, he infamously decided to adopt one eleven-yearold and one twelve-year-old girl for this purpose. Naming them Sabrina Sidney and
Lucretia, he hoped that at least one of them could be successfully raised according to
Rousseau’s educational principles. Letters and memoirs suggest that Day seemed “less
committed to raising real children than to acting out an ideal of physical and moral
perfection.”225 Within a few years, it became apparent that Lucretia would have to be
married to someone else. Sabrina, who was supposedly less resistant, stayed with him a
bit longer before being sent to boarding school. Day’s treatment of Sabrina was cruel: he
not only fired pistols at her, he “dropped melted sealing wax on her arms” in an attempt
“to inure her to fear and pain.”226 Although they allegedly did almost marry, Day’s
experiment with Sabrina also failed in the end. Day took the idea of education as an allpowerful means of achieving a pre-determined ideal to an extreme Rousseau never would
have supported. The idea that a woman could be raised up “for” another—even from
birth—was not a project Rousseau believed in or endorsed. Children are not blank slates
and teachers are not gods. Emile and Sophie must be raised separately, find one another,
and freely choose to be together.
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Once Emile does meet Sophie and goes on to fall in love with her, he is almost
fully formed but not yet complete. Emile is good but not yet virtuous. He is enslaved by
his desires and ruled by his heart. In contrast, the virtuous man “knows how to conquer
his affections; for then he follows his reason and his conscience; he does his duty; he
keeps himself in order, and nothing can make him deviate from it.”227 In order to
complete his education, Emile must leave Sophie, and it is this struggle that will make
him a virtuous man.
Emile must travel and conquer his passion toward Sophie in order to return
worthy of her. It is only at this stage that Emile goes on to learn about politics and
citizenship. He learns about law and civic duty not because they are the ultimate goal of
his education, but because he needs to know them. Becoming a member of the state is not
the ultimate purpose of Emile’s education; it is a duty which follows from being the head
of a family. Emile’s education ends with him not as a great citizen or a great leader, but
in the most “natural” role of all—as a husband and father-to-be.

Education as Self-Formation
Rousseau is fascinated by the question of how adults become who they are and
how critical moments and influences shape them into unique individuals. While he does
have a Platonic idea of education for citizenship, his self-proclaimed greatest work is
more preoccupied with the becoming of an individual self as opposed to that of a society.
On his account, education is both the key to an ideal society and the antidote to a corrupt
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one. But Rousseau’s optimism was limited, and Emile is not simply a proposal for how
ideal individuals might be “made” by teachers. Not only did Rousseau reject education as
transmission, he had a far more complex idea of the individual self than such a reading
would suggest.
First, Rousseau did not view of the self as a unified whole that becomes fixed and
complete upon reaching adulthood. Despite its reputation as evidence of Rousseau’s
paranoia, Rousseau’s Dialogues offer the clearest illustration of his theory of the modern
self.228 In this work, Rousseau is the author, but “Rousseau” is also a character who
judges “Jean-Jacques” alongside a Frenchman. This three-way split reveals the basic
features of the fractured self that Rousseau claims is a function of civil society: We live
and exist in the world in our own eyes, in the eyes of others, and in reality. There is an
authentic, natural self that wants to be realized, and we are more than what our outward
actions and behaviors may suggest. This “true” self exists before politics, and a proper
education which uses it as a guide can lead to a developed self who is good and whole.
Second, Rousseau is the first to admit that the likelihood of a tutor successfully
cultivating a natural, virtuous man by design is very low. In Emile he warns, “when
education becomes an art, it is almost impossible for it to succeed, since the conjunction
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Later in his life, Rousseau appears to have become increasingly narcissistic and
paranoid. He was aware of how paradoxical he seemed, and yet he insisted, more than
once in writing, that he had a coherent system, and that any true lover of the truth
demanded accepting paradox. Rousseau was incredibly frustrated at being
misunderstood. Dissatisfied with the reception of his Confessions, he wrote the Dialogues
to show how he should properly be judged. He had at this point, as Kelly and Masters
note, lost hope in the idea that if you just convey the facts and lay yourself bare, people
will see you for what you are. But Rousseau was not only dissatisfied with how his
contemporaries saw his life and his actions; he was concerned with how he would be
remembered after his death.
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of the elements necessary to its success is in no one's control.229 All that one can do by
dint of care is to come more or less close to the goal, but to reach it requires luck.”230
That is to say, no one can completely control a person’s environment and education, and
so no outcome is guaranteed by education.231
Again, this point appears to have been missed in the mistaken reception of Emile
as a work of education as transmission, and may help explain why Rousseau felt
compelled to write the unfinished sequel, Emile et Sophie, or the Solitaires.232 From
Emile’s conclusion, it appears as though the tutor successfully cultivated Emile into an
ideal man destined for a private, happy family life. His progress having been assessed at
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Masters was wrong, then, to believe that Emile cannot be realized because it is mired
in contradiction (41). It is not an irresolvable tension between “art” and “nature,” but the
need for complete knowledge and control that proves beyond human capability. Emile
cannot be realized because only a god could provide such an individually tailored and
perfectly controlled education.
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Even if one could agree that the adult self is a stable, final end product and that
education could in fact produce reliable results, it is neither clear what the end point
should be or who should define that end. Rousseau’s own definition of what makes an
ideal woman is a case in point. In describing Sophie, the ideal woman for his ideal man,
Rousseau stresses that she possesses many qualities he believes to be “natural” to women
which were disputed in his own time and still are today.?
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In his Confessions Rousseau claims that Emile’s sequel will endeavor to teach what
the “frivolous” public has not been able to see, “this great maxim of morality, perhaps the
only one of use in practice, to avoid situations that put our duties in opposition with our
interests, and which show us our good in the harm of someone else: certain that
what-ever sincere love of virtue one brings to such situations, sooner or later one
weakens without being aware of it, and one becomes unjust and bad in fact, without
having ceased to be just and good in the soul” (47). In other words, one is always
susceptible to the corruption of one’s environment: no education, not even one as welldesigned as Emile’s, could can result in a fully fixed and immovable self. The tutor is not
all powerful and the success of his project is dependent on the cooperation of Emile’s
environment and circumstances.
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each stage and deemed satisfactory, Emile reaches the final stage of his development and
appears complete. By contrast, from what exists of the unfinished Les Solitaires, it seems
as though the tutor’s education was a failure: Emile’s marriage implodes, domestic
happiness becomes impossible, and the tutor is nowhere to be found.
On my reading, a fixed and stable end point of domestic bliss could never be the
final goal of a Rousseauian education.233 The core of Emile’s education was never a
tutor’s lessons, but the set of life experiences and circumstances he encountered. As
Rousseau wrote in Emile, “He among us who best knows how to bear the goods and the
ills of this life is to my taste the best raised: from which it follows that the true education
consists less in precept than in practice. We begin to instruct ourselves when we begin to
live.”234 Living—that is, learning—does not cease with childhood. If anything, true
learning only begins after childhood, once reason has emerged and developed.
Rousseau’s resistance to the idea of an adult self as a finished product of
education is highlighted in the radical presentism Emile expresses in Les Solitaires:
I said to myself that in fact we are never doing anything but beginning, and that
there is no connection in our existence other than a succession of present
moments, the first of which is always the one that is happening. We die and we
are born every instant of our lives, and what interest can death leave us?235
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“But everything connected with man feels the effects of his transitoriness. Everything
is finite and everything is fleeting in human life; and if the state which makes us happy
lasted endlessly, the habit of enjoying it would take away our taste for it. If nothing
changes from without, the heart changes. Happiness leaves us, or we leave it” (Emile,
447).
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This statement suggests that we are neither our past nor our future plans; we are who we
are every moment of our lives. Therefore, the best education will teach us to be at peace
with our existence, a peace that will always come under threat as our environment
changes.
At the same time, we should never come to hate who we were, and this is key to
“preserving” the work of education.236 To value only what we become, to dismiss
childhood as the process of becoming someone better, is to teach a kind of rejection of
our existence. We should “always love to do what is good,” never minding when we
started doing it.”237 Education can only do so much against chance and environment;
whatever happens in spite of our education, we should never give up on striving for
goodness and virtue,
This striving is what Sophie exemplifies in Les Solitaires, which is not at all an
“undeniable testimony to the failure of the ideal female education.”238 After becoming
pregnant by another man, Sophie has the chance to hide her affair from Emile, but she
does not. That is, although she succumbs to the temptations of her environment, she does
not lie to Emile or attempt to trick him into thinking the resulting child is his, which she
would have been able to do had she accepted his advances instead of being honest.
Despite her moral lapse, she is not truly bad or immoral at heart. In a way, she remains
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honorable and good, even though the influences of her environment led her to behave
otherwise.
For Rousseau, one’s life experiences and circumstances, both of which are always
subject to accident and fortune, will always be critical to one’s becoming. This is
precisely what distinguishes his model of private education from traditional teaching and
learning methods, and this is why when fulfilling his desire to reveal himself as a
completed and coherent self in his autobiography, Rousseau chose to do so through a
complete account of the events of his life and his reflections on them. We are not the end
product of any one authority; the only true teacher is life. Emile is therefore not an
instructional template with a guaranteed finished product, but a meditation on the limits
and possibilities of education as teaching and learning toward individual virtue. He takes
the insight of education as socialization—that we are not the product of teachings but of
our external influences—and applies them to education as teaching as learning.

Education as Imaginary Socialization
As I have shown, Rousseau asserted that when it is a matter of education for
becoming, education as socialization is key to both becoming ideal citizens and ideal
individuals. In theory, creating a man like Emile who is educated toward his good inner
nature rather than external pressures and expectations demands a private education
stripped of all the corrupting influences of modern society. His socialization must be
carefully controlled by an all-powerful tutor, but this is a feat not possible in practice.
However, realistically, modern culture is both the problem and the solution, and as an
educator, Rousseau sought to make interventions accordingly. In this section, I discuss
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Rousseau’s critique of culture in more depth and his subsequent attempt to intervene in it
by creating curated fictional worlds for his readers that provided ideal, private, and
imagined experiences of socialization.
As Rousseau famously concluded in response to the Dijon Academy’s question of
whether the revival of the arts and sciences has contributed to improving morality that the
modern state of art and culture has failed to contribute to moral progress and harmed it
for two reasons. First, the arts misrepresent the truth in an entertaining way that prevents
observers from true understanding. Echoing Plato’s critique of poetry, Rousseau
denounced “all the dramatic Authors as the corrupters of the People, or of whoever,
allowing himself to be amused by their images, is not capable of considering them under
their true aspect, nor of giving these fables the corrective they need.”239 According to
Rousseau, the arts do not convey truth and enhance understanding; they indulge
audiences by showing them the image of knowledge that they already possess. Even the
artist himself, Rousseau suggested, does not understand that which he depicts. Through
the arts, people believe they are encountering reality, when in fact they are only receiving
a false imitation of the truth. This is particularly a problem for children, who are illequipped to grasp meanings hidden beneath layers of fiction.
But Rousseau also deepened Plato’s critique by linking the growing gap between
nature and culture to moral failure and a lack of authenticity. Although many of his
arguments in his 1758 Letter to D’Alembert rest on the monetary problems associated
with having a theater, such as its effect on taxes, lost labor, and increased expenses,
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Rousseau’s objections were fundamentally moral. Specifically, he accused the arts of
promoting artifice, luxury, and a lack of virtue. The problem with culture and the arts is
not merely that they can have a dangerous, persuasive effect on society or that they take
people further from the truth of the things they represent, but that they take them further
from themselves and away from virtue. That is, they encourage the corruption and
proliferation of social selves divorced from their authentic, natural selves. Although civil
man is inevitably divided between a social self and an authentic natural self, the arts
exacerbate this problem.
As he wrote in his first discourse, “Before Art had molded our manners and
taught our passions to speak an artificial language, our morals were rough-hewn but
natural, and differences in behavior immediately announced differences in character.”240
Rough, natural honesty and candor is no longer appreciated or valued, but the
development of the arts increases artifice. Now, everything must be dressed up according
to the dictates of fashion and high culture. The arts are primarily concerned with
representation, and so they encourage a world of images and surfaces where appearance
is valued over substance. As such, it no longer matters what is right or moral:
“everything, being reduced to appearances, becomes mere art and mummery.”241 The arts
corrupt the social world that the social self must inhabit by bringing both further and
further from nature.
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This critique is echoed and extended in Emile. There, he added that the arts invert
the proper relation between usefulness and worth and further suggests that they
exacerbate inequality by thriving on exclusivity: “Since the merit of these vain works [the
arts] exists only in opinion, their very price constitutes a part of that merit, and they are
esteemed in proportion to what they cost. The importance given to them does not come
from their use but from the fact that the poor cannot afford them.” The art is not desired
for its intrinsic merit, but because of the status the social self receives from its
possession.242
The general preoccupation with artifice and luxury leads to a misjudgment of
value and finally to corruption. Through the arts, people come to care more about fiction
and appearances than truth and reality. They falsely believe that art can replace real
experiences in the world. Moreover, audiences are provided with poor examples that
incite their passions, dull their sense of civic duty, and fuel divisions within society.
Children are particularly vulnerable to the negative role models they are exposed to in
their encounters with the arts: reading “bad” novels is like being influenced by bad
friends who are neither real nor desirable.
Even those characters who are not villains pose a threat. For example, in his essay
“On Theatrical Imitation,” Rousseau described how theater presents characters who
cannot command their own hearts. Encouraged to believe that “virtue is a sad thing,” the
audience is constantly presented with heroes ruled by their passions.243 Through their
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models, the arts encourage audiences to follow selfish inclinations and to become slaves
to their passions.
Moreover, while the arts may appear to bring pleasure, they ultimately cause
unhappiness, and Rousseau blamed much of his own unhappiness on the vast amount of
fiction he read as a child. A voracious reader, the young Rousseau gained romanticized
notions of life, love, and adventure. The books he read led him to be dissatisfied with
who he was and where he was, and they filled his head with ideas of what could be.
While the gap between where we are and where we think we could be—the insistence
that life must be better wherever we are not—may be an important source of motivation
and ambition for individuals, it’s also, Rousseau pointed out, a driver of needs. We begin
to think we need more than what we have, and yet are unlikely to be satisfied with any
condition.
As he argued in his second preface to Julie, novels awaken needs in individuals
that they would not otherwise have, driving them away from the provinces and toward
the corruption of cities. They incite a taste for luxury that is blind to the superiority of
natural simplicity:
By endlessly setting before their readers’ eyes the pretended charms of an estate
that is not their own, they seduce them, lead them to view their own with
contempt, and trade it in their imagination for the one they are induced to love.
Trying to be what we are not, we come to believe ourselves different from what
we are, and that is the way to go mad.244
When the “needs” produced by novels exceed the reader’s ability to meet them, there can
only be unhappiness. Put differently, novels foster an awareness of one’s station, and
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when readers see the disparity between their own lives and the world of high culture
being conveyed to them, they falsely believe they need more.
Finally, because artists are always primarily concerned with praise, art cannot be
trusted as adequate guides to moral virtue. Artists not only fail to transmit higher truths;
they are motivated by a desire to pander and please. Rousseau suggested that the fact that
artists seek renown among their contemporaries will always lead to the creation of lower
works that appeal to what is fashionable in the moment as opposed to what it is morally
desirable and true.
And yet, despite his thorough and searing critique of the arts, Rousseau
participated in their creation. Self-conscious of his apparent hypocrisy, he offered
excuses. In his preface to Narcissus, he addressed the apparent contradiction between his
words and his actions by writing that “it’s quite normal for people not to act in
accordance with their sincere beliefs” and claiming that some of his material (including
the play) was written early in life before his epiphany about the evils of the arts.245 And
yet, a few years later, he still went on to publish the novel Julie, or the New Heloise, with
the suggestion that he was merely conveying a true story told through actual letters.246
While it may be tempting to accept the discrepancy between Rousseau’s thoughts
and actions as further evidence of his paradoxical nature, or to simply dismiss or
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overlook his more artistic endeavors altogether, I argue that Julie is not only—as I have
already shown—critical to understanding Rousseau’s view of education, but also for
understanding his approach to social and political reform. Through the relatively new
form of the novel,247 Rousseau recreated society on his terms in order to effectively
socialize his readers toward virtue. Not only does Julie illuminate ideas elaborated on in
Emile, it reveals Rousseau to ultimately be more moderate, turning not to grand and
public plans for social political reform, but to persuading individuals in private.
That is, Rousseau’s own engagement with novelistic writing proves his inability
to dismiss it as only ever detrimental to society. Provided the right book, reader, and
approach to reading, Rousseau concluded that novels might educate individuals toward
ideals rather than against them, in part because the specifics of their genre make them
closer to socialization. The distinctive power of the arts to influence our passions is one
of the reasons why he believed them to be so dangerous, but that is also what makes them
such effective means of persuasion: Art influences people beyond reason and resists
rationality. As Rousseau discussed in his Essay on the Origin of Languages, music,
poetry, and art can deeply affect people through their sentiments in a way that reason and
language cannot.
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In claiming that Rousseau used his novelistic and autobiographical works as a
means of educating his readers, I align myself with scholars such as Nicole Fermon,248
Christopher Kelly,249 Joseph Reisert, 250 John T. Scott,251 Denise Schaeffer,252 and John
M. Warner.253 Rather than view these texts as utopic visions whose principal value lies in
providing a critique of society through the comparison they offer with the real world,
these scholars read them as active attempts to instruct the public. Fermon, for example,
maintains that Julie is really “an intricate and subtle program of reform.”254 Kelly argues
that Rousseau had a deep sense of authorial responsibility and strategically chose the
novel genre. And like Kelly, Reisert interprets both Emile and Julie as role models to
readers, while Schaeffer and Scott focus more exclusively on Emile. Whereas Schaeffer
is particularly attentive to the role Sophie’s education plays in educating the reader
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toward judgment, Scott focuses more on the structural and rhetorical elements of
Rousseau’s writings, as well as his use of frontispieces.
While these scholars are right to point to Rousseau’s strategic use of fiction as
means of educating readers, they tend to miss that Rousseau was not merely offering
models for comparison, examination, persuasion, or inspiration. Rather, he was using the
unique features of the novel genre to reconstruct an ideal social world that will privately
socialize readers toward virtue instead of against it. Unlike other art forms, novels give
readers direct access to the inner world of characters. These characters come to life in the
minds of readers who are immersed in a reality designed by the author. In other words,
books can transport readers into curated societies. Although they are fictional and cannot
replace real experiences with the world, they can effectively “socialize” readers through
their imagination using realistic depictions. Rousseau’s turn to novels is a direct response
to his critique of the corrupt society’s inability to socialize its members toward virtue as
well as an affirmation that culture is more powerful than instruction. Through the novel,
Rousseau gave readers the friends he wishes he had, friends that he thinks will guide
them back toward becoming more virtuous more effectively than the direct instruction of
teacher could.
Given the extent to which Rousseau thought his readership had already been
corrupted by novels,255 he saw only one way forward: using the source of corruption as
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the cure. As Saint-Preux tells Julie in Letter XXI, “Novels are perhaps the ultimate kind
of instruction remaining to be offered to a people so corrupt that any other is useless.”256
Rousseau sought to use their power for his own ends, a power Rousseau describes
experiencing first-hand in his Confessions. For Rousseau, books provided an alternative
society that was intimate and private in a way no other art is; literature fulfilled a void for
him, a “need for an intimate society and as intimate as it could be.”257 He described
reading as an activity he often did while eating, as though books equaled the company of
friends: “For to read while eating has always been my whim for lack of a tête-à-tête. It is
the compensation for the society I lack. I alternately devour a page and a bite: it is as if
my book was dining with me.”258 Rousseau experienced books as a kind of society, and
he recreated this effect in his work.
That Rousseau truly thought of himself as recreating a social world is apparent
when he speaks in personal terms about how his disillusionment with society drove him
to imagine a new one:
The impossibility of reaching real beings threw me into the country of chimeras,
and seeing nothing existing that was worthy of my delirium, I nourished it in an
ideal world which my creative imagination soon peopled with beings in
accordance with my heart. Never did this resource come more opportunely and
never was it found to be so fecund. In my continuous ecstasies I intoxicated
myself with torrents of the most delightful feelings that have ever entered into the
heart of a man. Completely forgetting the human race, I made for myself societies
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of perfect creatures as celestial by their virtues as by their beauties, reliable,
tender, faithful friends such as I never found here below.259
Writing Julie offered Rousseau an alternative reality he could escape to, and he claims to
have written it in spite of himself. While existing scholars write as though Rousseau
always planned to write fiction strategically, he claimed that it was only afterwards that
he realized, with painful self-awareness of his own apparent hypocrisy, that his fictions
could be used instructively and productively by providing moral benefits to readers
beyond himself.260
Rousseau’s characters in Julie are “perfect” not because they had always been so,
but because despite their faults and mistakes they never give up on loving and seeking
virtue. This is what makes them effective and realistic “friends” to the reader: They are
not so ideal that they seem beyond reach; they are realistic enough that readers can
believe they could be imitated. Rousseau seeks to fulfill Saint-Preux’s wish for authors
who “would not be above human frailties, who would not from the very start display
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“After the severe principles I had just established with so much uproar, after the
austere maxims I had so strongly preached, after so many mordant invectives against
effeminate books that breathed love and softness, could anything more unexpected, more
shocking be imagined, than to see myself suddenly inscribed by my own hand among the
authors of those books I had censured so harshly? I felt this inconsistency with all its
force, I reproached myself for it, I blushed about it, I was vexed about it: but all that was
not enough to bring me back to reason. Being completely subjugated, I had to submit at
all costs, and resolve to brave the ‘what will people say’; aside from deliberating
afterwards about whether I would resolve to show my work or not: for I did not yet
assume that I would publish it. This decision being made, I throw myself into my reveries
up to my neck, and as a result of turning and returning them in my head, I finally form
the sort of plan whose execution has been seen. It was certainly the best use that could be
made of my follies: love of the good, which has never left my heart, turned them to some
useful objects which morality could take advantage of” (Rousseau, Confessions, 365).
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virtue in Heaven beyond the reach of men, but induce us to love it by depicting it at first
less austere, and then from the lap of vice know the art of leading men imperceptibly
toward it.”261 Julie’s characters are imperfect heroes intended to be accessible and
realistic.
Whereas Emile is clearly described as an ideal construct, 262 Julie’s fictional status
is purposely left ambiguous, and Rousseau toyed with his readers on the question of
whether the novel’s letters were real or not in order to blur the line between fiction and
reality as much as possible.263 While the artifice of the arts takes us further away from
nature, and therefore further way from the truth, art which actively seeks to bring people
towards nature and the truth can defy the norm. This is precisely what Rousseau saw
himself doing and is one reason why he writes his autobiography, a work that attempts to
prove that one can lay bare an authentic self and reveal his true nature through writing.
Ultimately, Rousseau hoped to immerse readers in an imaginary social world with
realistically imperfect people who seek redemption. If Rousseau’s Social Contract and
Emile are two instructive, theoretical models of two opposing poles—the socialized,
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virtuous citizen and the privately educated, virtuous man—his novel, Julie or the New
Heloise, is Rousseau’s attempt to socialize and inspire readers to become more ideal
when neither their natures nor the modern world they inhabit is ordered in the interest of
their becoming ideal. Writing books that would persuade his readership toward virtue
was not for Rousseau a question of mechanics and technique,264 but of the objects he
chose to represent. Rousseau hoped that seeing the characters in Julie choose virtue in
spite of their passions will move readers to do the same.
By making the private inner world of characters legible, novels could further
model the authenticity and transparency Rousseau values. Although characters may be
fictional, readers are privy to their raw and authentic selves as they reflect on and
describe their actions and behaviors. Readers of Julie are invited to value the “true”
selves of the characters—their inner thoughts, feelings, and inclinations. The characters
are ideals he hopes readers will not only identify and sympathize with, but also be
persuaded by and inspired to imitate.
Unlike the heroes of the books Rousseau criticized, his own characters do not
neglect their duties to their country, their friends, and those in need, accusations he levels
at the bourgeois.265 While readers may (and did) “give tears to [his] fictions,” perhaps
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“thinking [they] have satisfied all the rights of humanity without having to give anything
more of [themselves],”266 he ensured they would cry over characters who devote time to
the suffering and the less fortunate. That is, his art sought to engage the natural
sympathies of his readers in order to lead them to greater virtue and morality.
Julie does not incite a taste for luxury—just the opposite; it seeks to encourage a
love of rural and natural simplicity. The novels contain no true villains for readers to live
through vicariously. Julie has no “abominable monsters and atrocious actions” which
only serve to “accustom the eyes of the people to horrors that they ought not even to
know and to crimes they ought not to suppose possible.”267 While Julie and Saint-Preux
are initially ruled by their hearts and their passions, they learn to command them with
time. Although their passions are never and can never be fully eradicated, after their
initial fall they seek redemption and resist their inclinations. Readers are not encouraged
to believe that “virtue is a sad thing,”268 but that doing one’s duty over one’s inclinations
is both honorable and admirable.
In offering this reading of Julie, I reject the nearly universal tendency of modern
scholars, including influential interpreters such as Shklar and Starobinski, to interpret
Julie as a predominantly sad and tragic novel. As a character, Julie is overwhelmingly
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read not as the inspirational figure she was intended to be, but as a tragic figure who must
sacrifice her feelings and ultimately her life.269 Feminist readers of Rousseau such as
Susan Moller Okin and Mira Morgenstern, for example, emphasize Julie’s supposed
unhappiness, as evidenced by her last confession that despite all the years that have
passed, she still loves Saint-Preux and had never really stopped. 270 Joel Schwartz deems
Julie unhappy because she “no longer finds the ideal of an empire over her acquaintances
to be an exciting or attractive one,” and so, having been “too successful at sexual
politics,” dies willingly.271 More recently, David Gauthier reads Julie’s death as a
negation of the happiness of Clarens and proof of the “failure of Wolmar’s efforts to
create an ideal community.”272
What these interpretations fail to recognize is that Julie’s ending is a happy one
on Rousseau’s terms. Wanting to see the triumph of youthful and passionate love,
scholars fail to see how Rousseau rejected it while celebrating Julie as a model of virtue.
Throughout the novel, Rousseau provided ample evidence that even if Julie had been able
to marry Saint-Preux, their happiness would not have lasted. Their love, founded on
desire and idealization, is an illusion that cannot last, and Julie knows this, which is why
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she laments the consummation that ensues. By contrast, her relationship with Wolmar is a
much more stable love founded on respect and partnership. The fact that Julie’s feelings
for Saint-Preux never truly go away is not proof of the failure of her marriage to Wolmar,
rather, it is proof of her virtue. The fact that Julie must sacrifice and struggle with her
passions is precisely what makes her virtuous for Rousseau.
As Rousseau made abundantly clear throughout his works, without struggle, there
can be no virtue, suggesting that all ideal, virtuous becoming will require some struggle.
If Julie had simply gotten over Saint-Preux completely after marrying Wolmar, there
would be nothing virtuous about her. In Emile, Rousseau repeatedly criticized the culture
of adultery he observes in society; in writing Julie, Rousseau attempted to expose the
hypocrisy of a culture that excoriates women for losing their virtue when they are single,
only to turn a blind eye to adultery after marriage. His novel made Julie’s “weakness” in
youth understandable, and then highlights her faithfulness and virtuousness as a wife.
Far from tragic, Julie’s death is a happy one on Rousseau’s terms because she dies
having redeemed herself and lived virtuously. Had she kept living, she might eventually
have succumbed to the temptations of her environment, but her death ensures that readers
can judge her life as a truly virtuous one. Moreover, although duty and virtue demand she
and Saint-Preux remain apart on earth, Rousseau suggested that virtue will also bring
them together in death when their love can take a purer form.
It is really in Julie, then, and not in Emile’s Sophie, that female readers are given
someone to imitate. Rousseau wanted his readers to relate to her and emulate her; to
admire her more than the enticing images of luxury and urban life. Through Julie and
against dominant cultural trends, Rousseau sought to show that doing one’s duty over
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one’s inclinations is both honorable and admirable and not “a sad thing.”273 He portrayed
a small community bound by love, friendship, and duty where immediate and extended
family, friends, servants, and strangers all have their place and all live together in
harmony with themselves and one another. At the center of it all is Julie, who, like
Sophie, guides her lover to virtue by embodying it herself, acting as his compass when he
risks being lost to the temptations of Paris. Despite being a “fallen woman,” her actions
do not change her inner good nature. Julie never stops loving virtue and ultimately
enriches and instructs everyone around her as a daughter, friend, lover, wife, and mother,
as well as a household manager and charitable contributor to the community.
Through Julie, Rousseau invited readers to become part of this community and to
experience a kind of socialization through their imagination. This “social” experience is
inward, private, and persuasive in a way that is both more subtle than argument and,
unlike other arts, more removed from the influence and judgment of others. When
viewing a play, for example, one is participating in a public display. The reaction of the
crowd is palpable; one is aware of the effect the performance has on others and this
factors into our own judgment of the work and its contents. In contrast, reading is more
intimate, and when done alone it invites the reader to judge the material for herself away
from the influence of others.
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In Julie, Rousseau made clear that he thinks books should be judged by the good
they lead readers to do.274 At the same time, Rousseau he did not claim that books have
one effect on all readers: the effect of any book will depend on how it is read and by
whom, and while some readers are better off absorbing books at face value, others should
adopt a more critical and philosophical approach. Relatively early on in Letter VII, SaintPreux says as much when he discusses his plans for reading with Julie. He tells her they
will read fewer, well-chosen texts to be discussed and reflected on at length, a method he
claims is the best way to “digest” texts, as “it is always better to find on one’s own the
things one would find in books.”275 Saint-Preux argues that he and Julie should be
skeptical, not deferential in their reading in part because the knowledge they expect to
learn from books is already within themselves.
But Saint-Preux does not recommend this approach for all students: “There are, I
concede, many people for whom this method would be quite harmful and who need to
read much and reflect little, because being wrong-headed, they garner nothing so bad as
what they produce by themselves.”276 For some students, its best to simply absorb the
work of others. But for students like Julie, the book is a mere starting point, and it is not
the text itself, but the discussion spurred by the text that will lead to the greatest insights.
In other words, what the reader brings to the book ultimately decides its effect.
This point is reiterated in the Dialogues when Rousseau argues with the Frenchman that
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Jean-Jacques’ books have always led him toward virtue. When the Frenchman protests,
the character Rousseau counters, “Oh, I believe it! But that is not the fault of the books;”
the reader must already bring “decency” and “impartiality” in order to profit from
them.277 Those who read Julie correctly, then, will see flawed characters who find their
way to virtue without wholly rejecting or hating who they were. They will not be
corrupted by its depiction of passion but instead persuaded toward virtue and to the
conclusion that redemption is always possible and desirable.

Inquiry and Solitude
In this chapter I have argued that while Emile reveals Rousseau’s educational
theory, Julie reveals Rousseau as an educator in practice, and that both are necessary to
understanding his thought on education. Both are the reflections of a man who wondered:
Perhaps if I had had the right teachers and read the right books, I too could have become
virtuous and not merely good. Together they suggest that education is fundamentally a
process of shaping—or at the very least persuading—through socialization. On the
surface, then, it appears that Rousseau abandons education as truth-seeking inquiry
altogether, favoring a vision of education as a means of self-becoming and not as the
pursuit of truth. In this section, I reveal how Rousseau argued that truth-seeking inquiry
was best pursued in solitude and exile.
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Whereas Plato hoped that the academy could be an ideal space for the genuine
pursuit of education in all of its forms, Rousseau was decidedly against educational
institutions. He critiqued modern colleges as “huge establishments, in which young
people are brought up at great expense to learn everything except their duties.”278 He
criticized the time when “public schools of Philosophy were first opened,” claiming that
by then “a degraded and decadent Greece had already forsaken its virtue and sold its
freedom.”279 The self-taught Rousseau saw himself as a modern-day Socrates engaged in
the exposure of the sophistry of intellectuals and their establishments. 280
Rousseau’s apparent disdain for education as truth-seeking inquiry has been
interpreted by many scholars as rooted in his concern for equality. Leo Strauss, for
example, took his “praise of ignorance” to be “inspired by a republican or democratic
impulse.”281 Michael Locke McLendon links Rousseau’s distaste for intellectual elitism
with a concern for the peasant and working classes it excludes.282 Because focusing on
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talent as the measure of merit emphasizes natural inequalities, society should instead be
judged by a standard theoretically attainable by all, such as virtue and goodness.
But while there is some truth in this, Rousseau was actually less concerned with
who philosophy excluded than with the culture it fostered among those who pursue it. He
saw colleges and academies not as places of genuine learning and inquiry, but as
“laughable” places of vain competition. 283 Having initially been attracted to teaching and
learning as a profession, he concludes that the activity is more about pride than wisdom:
I threw myself into my study willingly; and I gave it up even more
wholeheartedly when l realized into what turmoil it threw my soul without any
profit to my reason. I want nothing more to do with a deceitful profession in
which one believes one is doing much for wisdom while doing everything for
vanity.284
Once learning becomes a profession, the appearance of learnedness becomes more
important than learning itself. Science and philosophy become commodities, and those
who pursue them lose sight of their limits.
Rousseau’s critique is not unlike that of Plato’s with respect to the sophists, but
whereas Plato worried more about the political consequences of education as truthseeking inquiry, Rousseau argued that it must be carefully controlled, not only for the
sake of the state but for the happiness, harmony, and morality of the individual. If
pursued, it should be pursued mainly in private or even in solitude. So long as education
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for truth seeking is tied to status and vanity, it is unlikely to be pursued harmlessly and
for its own sake. As such, it is best to stress education for becoming, even if this narrows
the horizon of what education is and could be.
Despite his critiques, Rousseau clarified that he was not advocating for the total
destruction of higher learning and resented being read as such. He wrote, “Let us beware
of inferring from [this] that we should now burn all Libraries and destroy the Universities
and the Academies. We would only plunge Europe back into Barbarism, and morals
would gain nothing from it.”285 Again arguing that the problem may be part of the
solution, he suggested that the arts and sciences can “in some measure temper the
ferociousness of the men they have corrupted.”286 Science, art, and philosophy need not
disappear, but the attitudes and values of those who pursue them must change.
When Rousseau stated, “I have said a hundred times over that it is good that there
be Philosophers, provided the People do not pretend to be Philosophers,” the “people” he
refers to are the learned classes and cultural elites of his day. 287 Rousseau does not
ultimately reject truth-seeking inquiry as such, but he objects to the idea that it should be
widely pursued and embraced. He worries that giving truth seeking a special status in
society will only replace it with the pursuit of status. As he replies to critics, “science in
itself is very good, that is obvious.” 288 Moreover, “the Author of all things is the fountain
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of truth; to know everything is one of his divine attributes. To acquire knowledge and to
extend one's enlightenment is, then, in a way to participate in the supreme
intelligence.”289 The true problem is not seeking truth for Rousseau, but the fact that not
enough students are like Socrates, who humbly maintains his ignorance.290
For Rousseau, ignorance is a moderating force, one which helps limit curiosity “to
the scope of the faculties one has received.” 291 While man is “naturally curious” and
“inspired with the desire to learn,”292 this impulse is dangerous, leading at best to
unhappiness and at worst to vanity, immorality, and corruption. In his Confessions,
Rousseau described his own growing passion for learning as “a mania that stupefied
me.”293 Maintaining a sense of humility and ignorance is, he asserts, critical to controlling
this impulse. The ignorance Rousseau values is:
a modest ignorance, born of a lively love of virtue, and which inspires nothing but
indifference toward all that is unworthy of occupying man's heart, and does not
contribute to making him better; a gentle and precious ignorance, the treasure of a
soul pure and satisfied with itself, that finds all its felicity in retreating into itself,
in confirming itself in its innocence, and has no need to seek a false and vain
happiness in the opinion others might have of its enlightenment.294
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Because Rousseau believed that the capacity for this kind of ignorance is rare, he cannot
share Plato’s hope in institutions like the academy specifically dedicated to the politically
safe pursuit of education as inquiry.
Scholars who cannot take seriously Socrates’ humility—or Rousseau’s praise of
it, for that matter—will fail to recognize this key aspect of their affinity. 295 Rousseau’s
Socrates is genuinely interested in satisfying his own curiosity. He is not vain or disloyal
to his city, and he is more interested in studying than in teaching. As Rousseau wrote,
“My veneration for Socrates would greatly diminish if I believed that he had had the silly
vanity of wishing to be the leader of a sect.”296 Socrates did not need or want to establish
a formal school because he did not study in order to teach or impress others.
Rousseau claimed to have this quality in common with Socrates, maintaining in
his Reveries that he was not like those philosophers who “studied human nature to be
able to speak knowingly about it, but not in order to know themselves.”297 These
philosophers “toiled in order to instruct others, but not in order to enlighten themselves
within,” and they “wanted to do a book, any book, provided it was well received.”298 By
contrast, Rousseau maintained that when he “desired to learn, it was in order to know and
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not in order to teach.”299 He added that he could have easily pursued all of his studies in
solitude.
In fact, for Rousseau, education as truth-seeking inquiry is and should be a
solitary pursuit. As Christopher Kelly notes, whereas authorship is “an essentially public
and political activity,” “the pursuit of truth” is “an essentially private and personal
activity.”300 In Emile Rousseau wrote, “I see to it that he notices that the individuals who
compose the academies are always worth more alone than as part of the group. He will
draw for himself the implication about the utility of all these fine establishments.”301
Education is best pursued in private, which is no longer possible in large cities because,
“society there is so general and so mixed that there is no longer a refuge to which to
retire, and a person is in public even in his own home.”302 When pursued alone, learning
is properly divorced from questions of status and vanity.
As Ronald Grimsley put it, Rousseau sought “to take men beyond the
uncertainties of reflection, the vagaries of passion, and the ambiguities of language to the
happiness of a fully personal experience enjoyed through the contemplation of the
universal order.”303 For Rousseau, botany became the main activity by which he achieved
this experience of contemplation.
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Critically, Rousseau’s study of plants had nothing to do with medicine or utility,
which he claimed would actively prevent him from achieving a state of contemplation. If
he studied plants for their medicinal purposes, he would “never find those delights which
arise from pure and disinterested contemplation.”304 Rousseau described contemplation as
a quasi-religious, out-of-body experience. When removed from utilitarian concerns,
contemplation allowed his soul to “rise up and glide through nature” unmoored from the
“bonds” of his physical self.305
For many scholars, Rousseau’s retreat to reverie and botany appears to be a
rejection of reason and philosophy. Roger Masters, for example, dismisses Rousseau’s
contemplation of plants as “an aimless or passive reaction to the objects which most
immediately and pleasantly affect our senses,” contrasting it with “philosophical
knowledge about the whole and man’s place in it.”306 He takes this as evidence of
Rousseau’s rejection of reason as a natural ruling principle in man and proof that
“freedom is as much or more fully achieved in the solitary dreamer's idleness as in the
active quest of wisdom by rigorous philosophical study.”307 But this opposition, I argue,
is false. For Rousseau, his study of botany is everything the study of philosophy, or
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education as truth-seeking inquiry more broadly, should be because it avoids aiming at
one’s becoming and seeks only truth:
But as soon as we mingle a motive of interest or vanity with it, either in order to
obtain a position or to write books, as soon as we want to learn only in order to
instruct, as soon as we look for flowers only in order to become an author or
professor, all this sweet charm vanishes. We no longer see in plants anything but
the instruments of our passions. We no longer find any genuine pleasure in their
study. We no longer want to know, but to show what we know. And in the woods,
we are only on the world’s stage, preoccupied with making ourselves admired.308
This raises a question regarding how Rousseau would have wanted himself to be studied:
Presumably not as a doctor who “diagnoses” modernity and offers various “solutions,”
but as one who contemplated and engaged in the search for truth. But then we must
consider to what extent Rousseau was didactic and to what extent he wrote himself.
Either way, Rousseau clearly wanted to preserve and not compromise education
for truth seeking, and he certainly cautioned against affording too much power to
education, concluding that great individuals are born, not made: “Only ordinary men need
to be raised; their education ought to serve as an example only for that of their kind. The
others raise themselves in spite of what one does.”309 For the solitary Rousseau at least,
education is not an all-powerful tool for creating ideal selves and societies, and it is
important to preserve some space for that education which does not aim at anything but
truth.
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IV
Developing Liberal Democrats: Dewey’s Synthesis
In this chapter, I reveal how the American progressive and pragmatist John
Dewey (1859-1952) sought to harmonize the apparent tensions between Plato and
Rousseau as well as between education for truth-seeking and becoming by generating a
democratic theory of education still embraced by contemporary political theorists today.
Following Hegel, Dewey maintained that educators need not choose between educating
for the individual and educating for society because each could be perfected through the
other. Analyzing his conception of education as growth, I show that although Dewey
claimed to embrace an idea of education that has no end and is lifelong, he ultimately
relied on a necessarily progressive view of education that places excessive, undue hope
on the institution of the school. I note that in relegating all education to the service of
society, Dewey owed more to Plato than is typically realized. Because he did not
adequately recognize the value of individuals understood as separable from their
contribution to social progress, he foreclosed the possibility of any education as a purely
private or solitary activity.
Born in Burlington, Vermont, to a well-read but not highly educated father and a
very pious mother determined to ensure her sons would be, like the men in her family,
college-educated, Dewey went on to attend the University of Vermont in 1875. 310 It was
not until relatively late in college that Dewey’s attention was captivated by the
curriculum in moral philosophy, and after graduation he taught high school before
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deciding to apply to graduate school in philosophy at Johns Hopkins. He went on to
embark on an illustrious academic career. Dewey was prolific, but he also managed to put
his philosophical interest in education into practice through the founding of the
University of Chicago Laboratory schools. He was a highly educated academic whose
philosophy reflected a great faith in schooling.
Like Plato and Rousseau, Dewey believed in the educative power of association:
He understood that cultivating citizenship is not primarily a question of inculcating the
right knowledge or skills; rather, good citizens are formed through socialization and their
interactions with others. But while Dewey found much inspiration in both Plato and
Rousseau, he concluded that their theories offered a false choice. For Dewey, these
figures were emblematic of a dualism that needed to be overcome: a supposed conflict
between whether education ought to prioritize the individual or society. If Plato’s public
education took no account of the individual, Dewey thought, Rousseau’s private
education devalued society too much, encouraging an excessively private, independent,
and domestic existence. Neither path was acceptable to Dewey, as neither would suit the
liberal democracy he imagined for the United States. For Dewey, a third way was needed
for a new kind of politics.
Dewey’s answer to Plato and Rousseau was a vision of education that was both
inspired by Darwinian theories of evolution and fiercely committed to liberal democracy.
With its progressive emphasis on inquiry and experience, Dewey’s education as “growth”
was often associated with Rousseau, but as I will argue in this chapter, Dewey actually
owed more to Plato than scholars have realized.311 Also influenced by Hegelian idealism,
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Dewey insisted that a theory of education need not choose between prioritizing the
individual or prioritizing society. For Dewey, individuals are wholly unique entities to be
developed, but they are also part of one organism with limitless possibilities. As such, the
purportedly inevitable tension Rousseau articulated between modern man and society was
but one of many false dualisms to be dismissed, along with nature vs. society, thought vs.
action, and the mind vs. the body.
As I will demonstrate, Dewey’s denial of the many basic tensions Rousseau
embraced was only possible through a redefinition of the concepts at stake. Although
Dewey claimed to protect and value individualism while serving society, his theory
hinged on a particular understanding of what it means to be an individual, one that
refused the possibility and desirability of solitude. That is, Dewey’s conception of
selfhood left no room for education as a truly private activity. He could only maintain
that there was no need to choose between forming men and forming citizens because he
insisted the individual and society only exist in and through one another. According to
Dewey’s democratic education, to educate an individual is to educate a necessarily social
individual who contributes to society through her individuality.
For Dewey as for Plato, education must be tamed to serve society. But whereas
the Kallipolis suggested that an education for society meant total surrender to it, Dewey
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thought that an education for society would not have to mean subordination to society.
This could be accomplished by making individuals partners in the activity of their
education and by refusing to accept the status quo as final. Rather than train children to
fit into narrow, predetermined roles, one could provide a general education flexible
enough to accommodate an economy subject to rapid change. By taking a democratic
approach, society could educate children to choose for themselves how they would like to
serve society rather than dictate and justify their place in a fixed hierarchy.
In order to achieve his vision, Dewey turned not to law, as Plato did, nor to the
home, as Rousseau did, but to the school. Deeply critical of conventional schooling,
Dewey sought to reimagine the school as a special environment that would mediate
between both realms. In his ideal, the school would be more than a crucial intermediary
between public and private life. Beyond offering a gradual introduction to the
complexities of existing society, it would also determine what society should conserve,
harmonize its disparate elements, and be the key to its advancement. Dewey’s schools
would operate according to his expansive understanding of education, serving as minisocieties that would educate both children and adults. They would offer a more controlled
setting for socialization and do their most important teaching through association rather
than inculcation.
Dewey’s theory of education placed enormous pressure on the school, insisting
that it could and should be all things to all people. As such, his philosophy—still
attractive today—is ultimately premised on an undue faith in the ability of schools to
design and control ideal subjects who will shape the future; to perfect becoming. For
Dewey, truth-seeking and becoming were intimately connected, and the value of the
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individual was inseparable from his or her contribution to social progress. As such, he
foreclosed the possibility of education as a purely private or solitary truth-seeking
activity.

Rousseau vs. Plato
Political theorists are largely interested in Dewey as a pragmatist and precursor to
deliberative and participatory theories of democracy. Richard Rorty led an initial
resurgence of interest in Dewey’s democratic theory and pragmatism, and subsequent
studies have explored his views on ethics, liberalism, religion, art, and more.312 Typically,
Dewey is read and invoked as a thinker of his moment whose work remains relevant to
the challenges of modern American democracy today. His work has been especially
inspirational and relevant to political theorists of education such as Amy Gutmann,
Martha Nussbaum, and Danielle Allen, all of whom view schools as essential to the
health of democracy.313
Dewey’s investment in the history of political thought on education may therefore
come as a surprise to those who know him as a progressive and pragmatist thinker
primarily focused on the pressing issues of his day. But while Dewey was obviously
concerned with addressing his contemporaries and immediate political concerns, he also

312

Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracy; Ryan, Dewey, and Child, John
Dewey and the High Tide of American Liberalism; Honneth and Farrell, “Democracy as
Reflexive Cooperation.”; Caspary, Dewey on Democracy; Rogers, “The Undiscovered
Dewey.”; Mattern, “John Dewey, Art and Public Life.”
313

Gutmann, Democratic Education; Nussbaum, Not For Profit; Allen, Education and
Equality.
158

viewed himself as part of a larger tradition that merited study and critique. As I will
show, Dewey’s Democracy and Education (1916) is as much an intervention in debates
between “child-centered progressives,” “social efficiency progressives,” and “liberal arts
humanists,”314 as it is a conversation with Plato, Rousseau, and their legacy. Dewey
understood there to be a direct link between ideas and history, and he often employed
history and philosophy as a way of explaining how the present had come to be.
For Dewey, the past must not only be studied for its potential present use, but also
to escape its dominating influence. Studying philosophy, he wrote, is “the only way to
avoid being imposed upon” by the philosophers who have come before us:
[The philosopher’s ideas] become embodied in the educational systems and
methods, in the theological codes and dogmas, in the legal attitude and practice, in
the turns and terms of language. In dying as philosophy, the ideas come to live as
a part of the common and unconscious intellectual life of men in general. They
become the presupposed background, the unexpressed premises, the working (and
therefore controlling) tools of thought and action. Filtered to us through the media
of education, law, language, religion and science itself they take possession of us.
Unless we are to be mastered by them, we must master them. And this involves a
continual dragging of them out of their unconscious hiding places; a deliberate
and reflective overhauling of them—that is to say, the study of philosophy.315
In advancing his own theory, it was therefore imperative to Dewey that he also provide
an account of the evolution of political thought on education that would expose and
critique the ways in which past thinkers had led his contemporaries astray.
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In “Schools of Tomorrow” (1915) Dewey applauded Rousseau for advancing the
idea that students must be studied and that educators must be attentive to the natural
abilities of children. He argued that this “sounded the key-note of all modern efforts for
educational progress,” and reconceived of education as “the growth of capacities with
which human beings are endowed at birth” rather than as an external imposition.316
Dewey further praised Rousseau’s insistence on allowing a child’s growth and
development to proceed slowly,317 as well as his attention to the development of the body
as an end in itself.
But while Dewey agreed with many aspects of Rousseau’s thought, he also
rejected much of his philosophy. Deeming Emile an “exemplary prig,” Dewey was
critical of both the outcome of Rousseau’s private education and its foundations.318
Specifically, Dewey thought Rousseau’s penchant for dualistic thinking led him to
wrongly abandon his true preference of using education to create citizens. For Dewey,
Rousseau’s opposition of natural man to the social citizen was premised on a
fundamental misunderstanding of nature, man, and education. Each of these, Dewey
insisted, is fundamentally social, and so to seek to aim education at the preservation of a
natural self apart from society is inevitably a contradiction in terms.
For Dewey, the spirit of education is inherently social. Education is precisely that
which enables social life to survive and continue; it is that which enables society’s
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continuous becoming. As he explains in Democracy and Education, education exists
because the survival of humanity necessitates that it must: If humans were immortal,
there would be no need for one generation to educate the next. But birth and death are
inescapable facts, and so education “in its broadest sense” must exist to allow for the
“social continuity of life.”319 Society depends on education in part because it allows the
past, present, and future to communicate.
Therefore, to aim education at the preservation of a child’s supposedly inner,
natural, and independent goodness, as Rousseau would have it, is to work against the
basic function of education. This is not simply because, as Nel Noddings has noted,
Dewey was not as child-centered as he is typically thought to be, but because for Dewey
the “inner” is “simply that which does not connect with others—which is not capable of
free and full communication.” 320 Moreover, the desire to “perfect an ‘inner’ personality”
is a symptom of undesirable social division.321 According to Dewey, the tendency to
locate the self in that which is purely inner and separate from others was a relatively
recent and misguided development in Western history.322 Before the influence of
Protestantism, he argued, the individual was understood as a conduit for a larger force, as
“a channel through which a universal and divine intelligence operated.”323 It is this notion
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of the self that Dewey wished to recover and adapt into a new idea of democratic
education. He insisted that “what one is as a person is what one is as associated with
others, in a free give and take of intercourse.”324 Contra Rousseau, the self is social, and
the social is natural.325
For Dewey, Rousseau’s vision of natural education was both wrongheaded and
impossible because it denied the naturalness of the social self. Rousseau’s natural
education might claim to cultivate a “natural” individual apart from society, but what it
really did, Dewey insisted, was to substitute a larger human society in place of a
bounded, political one. That is, Rousseau’s natural education does not escape society and
could never do so. Rather, it is ultimately cosmopolitan, calling to humanity over
citizenship. When Rousseau promises to free men from society by bringing them
independence from it, he merely widens the net of society to encompass all of humanity.
On Dewey’s reading, Rousseau did not really posit the education of an individual for
himself and apart from society, but rather for and toward the broadest society of all:
Humanity.326

324

Ibid., 67.

325

For Dewey’s new and critical understanding of individualism, see Kadlec, Dewey’s
Critical Pragmatism.
326

Dewey describes how in practice, Rousseau’s idea of natural education ultimately
worked against the liberation of the individual. In the German tradition, he writes, “The
‘state’ was substituted for humanity,” and “cosmopolitanism gave way to nationalism” as
“education became a civic function and the civic function was identified with the
realization of the ideal of the national state.” In seeking to realize this social aim,
education came to be associated with subordination and discipline even as an idea of
“culture as complete development of personality” persisted (Dewey, Democracy and
Education, 53).
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Dewey’s problem with Rousseau’s private education was therefore actually more
complicated than it may seem at first glance. It was not simply that Rousseau was too
focused on the individual, but that his model also aimed too broadly at humanity, making
effective societal organization toward the achievement of concrete goals difficult. Neither
nature nor humanity, Dewey reasoned, could offer a clear agent to direct and administer
education. While Dewey granted that nature provides “the initiating and limiting forces in
all education,” he rejected that nature also provides the “ends or aims” of education as
Rousseau and the Romantics thought.327 It’s not “spontaneous development” that children
need, but “an environment which shall organize them.”328 And, while Dewey accepted
that “evil institutions and customs work almost automatically to give a wrong education
which the most careful schooling cannot offset,” he maintained that the answer is not to
try to educate the individual away from society, but to “provide an environment in which
native powers will be put to better uses.”329 That is—toward concrete social ends.
Dewey’s critique—perhaps more appropriately aimed at Rousseau’s followers
than Rousseau himself—neglects the fact that Rousseau did in fact provide an
administrative agent for his education and also sought to provide a curated environment:
the family and the home. He even offered a second choice of administrator—a tutor
devoted to the child. The state is not the necessary administrator of Rousseau’s natural
education, and it never could be for the same reason that his theory resists
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institutionalization: Rousseau’s model of private education is not scalable, as the “same
man can only give one education.”330 Properly understood, Rousseau’s natural, individual
education is so individuated that it simply cannot be administered en masse by a state or
even a school. On Rousseau’s account, only a child’s parents or an ideal, devoted tutor
could provide the kind of individual attention and care required by his education.
Whereas Rousseau urged parents and tutors to embrace rural life and curate an
ideal, private environment at home, Dewey sought to reform public schools into ideal
social environments. Dewey fundamentally objected to the private education Rousseau
advocated because it was at odds with social action, coordination, and, in Dewey’s view,
true self-realization. Dewey rejected the premise and the critique that an education aimed
at what he termed “social efficiency” is essentially about the “subordination of natural
powers to social rules” and that the required correction is an education aimed at nature.331
To hold Rousseau’s view is to accept a false conception of the self as separable from
society and to demand a false choice between the man “sacrificing himself to doing
useful things for others, or sacrificing them to the pursuit of his own exclusive ends,
whether the saving of his own soul or the building of an inner spiritual life and
personality.”332 The task of democratic education, Dewey insisted, is to reject this
dichotomy.
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For Dewey, any understanding of education which allows individuals to become
separate or, as he puts it, “isolated” should be avoided at all costs. The strong society is
one in which everyone is interdependent, and Dewey worried in pieces like “Education
from a Social Perspective” (1913) and “American Education Past and Future” (1931) that
American society had become too focused on valuing self-reliance and self-sufficiency.
At first, he argued, education in America was understood to be “a patriotic necessity” and
“the salvation of the republic” because it would ensure enlightened citizens.333 Then, as
attention shifted to the frontier, “there was much talk about self-help and success, and
very little about public or social duties.”334 Education became a tool for enterprising
individuals to achieve wealth and status.
It was not merely a shift toward emphasizing education’s economic utility over its
political utility that bothered Dewey, but the glorification of independence that
underwrote this shift. As he asserted it in Democracy and Education, to venerate the selfmade man is to “decrease the social capacity of an individual,” to invite “aloofness and
indifference,” and to render the individual “so insensitive to his relations to others as to
develop an illusion of being really able to stand and act alone.”335 Dewey went so far as
to call this kind of thinking a “form of insanity which is responsible for a large part of the
remediable suffering of the world.”336 While he maintained that the cultivation of
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individuality was important, Dewey insisted that this must be done with the
understanding that the individual is a fundamentally social and interdependent being with
a duty to society.
Dewey urged that especially with the closing of the frontier, a new understanding
of education in America was needed; one that “would be democratic in the social sense of
the word” and therefore “neither nationalistic nor individualistic.”337 This new approach
would center cooperation with others rather than encourage a code of every man for
himself. It would be fundamentally social, even as it preserved individualism “in respect
to methods of thought and judgment.”338 At the same time, it would not devolve into
nationalism. That is, Dewey wanted an education system that would value individual
thought while ultimately prioritizing social ends and needs.
Dewey believed that Rousseau, the Romantics, and the self-made ethos of the
American frontier culture had strayed too far from the proper relationship between
politics and education. Like Plato—whom he once cited as his “favorite philosophic
reading”339—Dewey fully accepted that education should be made to serve socio-political
ends. He applauded Plato for recognizing education as the foundational and organizing
principle of politics and for revealing education to be the means by which persons are
shaped to assume their role in society.
Dewey even agreed with Plato’s basic approach to education in The Republic in
so far as it used education to sort children in order to help them find their place in the
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polis. In Democracy and Education he wrote that “society is stably organized when each
individual is doing that for which he has aptitude by nature in such a way as to be useful
to others.”340 It is not only best for society when each individual is serving others in the
best way her talent allows, it is also best for the individual because to “find out what one
is fitted to do and to secure an opportunity to do it is the key to happiness.”341 Since the
ideal contribution is based on talents not determined by one’s family or wealth, it is “the
business of education to discover these aptitudes and progressively to train them for
social use.”342 What Dewey described is like a vocation, an idea Joel Winkelman has
recently used to frame Dewey’s democratic theory and understanding of the role of
education.343 Winkelman does not make any mention of Plato, but Dewey openly credited
him with this insight, adding that Plato “laid down the fundamental principle of a
philosophy of education when he asserted that it was the business of education to
discover what each person is good for, and to train him to mastery of that mode of
excellence, because such development would also secure the fulfillment of social needs
in the most harmonious way.”344
For Dewey, Plato’s mistake was not “in qualitative principle, but in his limited
conception of the scope of vocations socially needed; a limitation of vision which reacted
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to obscure his perception of the infinite variety of capacities found in different
individuals.”345 That is, Plato erred not in his basic idea, but in failing to realize that the
number social functions and range of individual capacities are far greater than he
imagined. He was too illiberal, grouping individuals into three broad classes according to
their proven natures and capacities. Where Plato saw only producers, guardians, and
philosopher-kings, Dewey saw each individual as a class unto himself who could
constantly grow and contribute his unique talents. 346 As historian Robert B. Westbrook
noted, “for Dewey, the relationship between individual capacities and environments was
one of mutual adjustment, not a matter of the one-sided accommodation of individual
needs and powers to a fixed environment.”347 Instead of being trained to specialize in a
predetermined function, the child must be treated as “an organic whole, intellectually,
socially, and morally, as well as physically.”348 Each child must be taken on her own
terms and never viewed as fixed.
Dewey thought that if every individual is appreciated as a growing, unique, and
valuable contributor to society, the anti-democratic and hierarchical elements in Plato’s
Republic could be avoided. Unlike Rousseau, who pointed to comparison and
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competition as inevitable features of society, Dewey suggested that these ideas are taught
by adults to children who would not otherwise form such ideas of better and worse on
their own. Schools exacerbate the problem when they use tests to not only rank students
as individuals but also to class them by ability, encouraging a fixed hierarchy where one
group is viewed as inherently smarter, better, and more valuable than the other. Dewey
believed that by rooting out the adult desire to class and compare children and by
encouraging a true valuation of individuality, one could realize a democratic version of
Plato’s vision that celebrated all individuals.
Put another way, for Dewey, Plato’s model of education in the Republic was
basically correct; its key mistake was in its failure to properly value and conceive of the
individual. The rejection of the individual as a fundamental and agential unit of society
led Plato to unacceptably subordinate the individual to a hierarchical, class-based system.
What Plato’s Republic needed was democratic liberalism, as Dewey understood it. By
making individuals partners in the activity of their education, by refusing to accept
“economic conditions and standards” as final, and by taking a democratic approach, one
could embrace education for society without being subordinated by society to fulfil a
predetermined role. Rather than use education to decide for the child what she should
become, Dewey thought education could be used to “develop capacity to the point of
competency to choose” one’s role and career.349 Instead of training children to fit into
narrow, preset roles, society could provide a general education flexible enough to
accommodate a society and an economy subject to rapid change.
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If Plato’s Republic described a planned, pre-arranged society aimed at stability
and composed of fixed groups, Dewey envisioned a planning, ever-changing society
aimed at growth and composed of unique individuals. For Dewey, the distinction between
a “planned” society and a “planning” society separated the autocratic from the
democratic.350 It is only when ends—be they political or economic—are viewed as fixed
and predetermined that the individual is lost. This is because one’s unique capacities are
of no consequence to a system that has already decided in advance what it needs from
individuals. As Dewey affirmed much later in Individualism Old and New (1930), he was
deeply opposed to any arrangement which would use education as a means of providing
“efficient industrial fodder and citizenship fodder in a state controlled by pecuniary
industry.”351 Not only does this eliminate individual agency in his view, it works against
progress and results in stagnation.
Notably, Dewey did not think of Plato as being intentionally stagnant or opposed
to progress. Quite the opposite: He read progressive, experimentalist, and even pragmatist
elements into Plato. Dewey’s Plato was a political one, and he criticized his
contemporaries for casting Plato as systematic and unconcerned with the real world. In
“From Absolutism to Experimentalism” (1930), he wrote:
Nothing could be more helpful to present philosophizing than a ‘Back to Plato’
movement; but it would have to be back to the dramatic, restless, cooperatively
inquiring Plato of the Dialogues, trying one mode of attack after another to see
what it might yield; back to the Plato whose highest flight of metaphysics always
terminated with a social and practical turn, and not to the artificial Plato
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constructed by unimaginative commentators who treat him as the original
university professor.”352
For Dewey, the ancient skeptic interpretation of Plato was closer to the “true” Plato, even
if it also overstated certain aspects of his thought. According to Dewey, Plato always
turned back to the political and the pragmatic; he sought to experiment with ideas and did
not adhere to a complete and rigid system.
On Dewey’s reading, Plato was not a conservative, but a misguided progressive
who had wrongly assumed that “reason” and “experience” were fundamentally at odds
and that only one offered a path to progress. According to Dewey in Democracy and
Education, because for Plato experience meant “custom and tradition,” only reason could
provide a new standard that would bring “unity, order, and law.”353 If experience was
“habituation, or the conservation of the net product of a lot of past chance trials,” reason
was “the principle of reform, of progress, of increase of control.”354 Reason allowed one
to break free from convention. It offered the way to a new and better future unrestrained
by the dictates of the past. The society ruled by reason would be rigid, disciplined, and
planned, but it would also be, in Plato’s view, progressive.
Dewey notes that as with other dualisms, Western thinking on this dualism of
reason and experience then reversed: later “reason, universal principles, prior notions,
meant either blank forms which had to be filled in by experience, by sense observations,
in order to gain significance and validity; or else were inundated prejudices, dogmas
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imposed by authority, which masquerade and found protection under august names.”355
Experience, not reason, came to be valued as the source of meaning and the force of
progress. Reason was viewed as a restrictive and conservative force used to maintain the
status quo. For Dewey, the proper next step was to soundly reject the supposed division
between reason and experience and to realize that neither is inherently conservative nor
progressive. As a living, evolving organism, society needed both reason and experience
to grow.

A Hegelian Synthesis
A persistent theme in Dewey’s work is the Hegelian-inspired conviction that
overcoming dualisms is the key to all progress. Although, as I have demonstrated, Dewey
clearly had more sophisticated readings of Plato and Rousseau, he often presented a more
simplistic picture of them. Casting them as representatives of competing and apparently
incompatible traditions suited his argument: Whereas the Platonic model of education
privileged society too much, the Rousseauian one privileged the individual too much, and
so what was needed was a new, democratic and Deweyian conception of education. As he
suggested in Democracy and Education, the divide between Plato and Rousseau was
reflected in contemporary debates by those who called for “social efficiency” in
education on the one hand and those who argued for “personal culture” on the other.
What both sides failed to realize, Dewey insisted, was that the assumed tradeoff to be
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made between privileging society or privileging the individual was a false one, and this
was especially true in the context of a democracy.
Dewey’s insistence on the unity of society and the individual was rooted in his
Hegelianism, an influence he first encountered in graduate school. Dewey described his
encounter with Hegel as a “liberation” from the “sense of divisions and separations” that
the “heritage of a New England culture” had given him.356 In recounting his intellectual
history, Dewey wrote:
[Hegel’s] synthesis of subject and object, matter and spirit, the divine and the
human, was, however, no mere intellectual formula; it operated as an immense
release, a liberation. Hegel's treatment of human culture, of institutions and the
arts, involved the same dissolution of hard-and-fast dividing walls, and had a
special attraction for me.357
Although he described a gradual distancing from Hegel and German idealism in the
fifteen years following, he also admitted that Hegel “left a permanent deposit in [his]
thinking.”358 I argue that this is particularly evident not only in Dewey’s constant calls for
unity and his critiques of dualistic thought, but in his basic understanding of education
and its relationship to politics.
Scholars have long puzzled over the extent of Dewey’s Hegelianism. As John
Shook and James A. Good detail, Morton White’s 1943 “The Origins of Dewey’s
Instrumentalism” led many to accept a distinct division in Dewey’s thought, with a total
transition away from Hegel and toward pragmatism occurring sometime between 1894
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and 1903.359 Focusing on his later works and finding Hegel therein, both Good and Shook
argue that Dewey demonstrates a “gradual and naturalistic modification of his
Hegelianism” rather than a sharp break.360 A consensus has not been reached: Melvin
Rogers, for example, continues to emphasize Dewey’s break from Hegel.361 Arguing for
sharper divisions and contextualized readings of Dewey’s work, Raymond D. Boisvert
identifies idealism, experimentalism, and naturalism as three distinct stages in Dewey’s
intellectual development.362 Conversely, Richard M. Gale has gone as far as to suggest
that Dewey was “formulating a mystical doctrine,” and that when he moved from
“absolute idealism to what he called alternatively pragmatism, instrumentalism, or
experimentalism,” he was merely “pouring old wine into new bottles” by replacing
‘experience’ with ‘universal consciousness’ in his work.363Although Eric MacGilvray,364
Blake Emerson,365 and Rahel Jaeggi366 have all offered readings of the different ways in

359

Shook and Good, American Philosophy.

360

Shook and Good, vii. See also Good, A Search for Unity in Diversity and Good, “John
Dewey’s ‘Permanent Hegelian Deposit’ and the Exigencies of War.”
361

Rogers, “The Undiscovered Dewey.”

362

Boisvert, Dewey’s Metaphysics.

363

Gale, “The Naturalism of John Dewey,” 60–62.

364

MacGilvray, Reconstructing Public Reason.

365

Emerson, “The Democratic Reconstruction of the Hegelian State in American
Progressive Political Thought.”
366

Jaeggi, Critique of Forms of Life.
174

which Dewey remained influenced by Hegel, the similarities and differences the two
thinkers shared on questions of political education have been largely overlooked.367
Dewey shared with Hegel the assumption that the ultimate ends of education and
individual development are social. As German philosopher Karl Löwith wrote, Hegel
“thought it obvious that ‘humanistic’ education was just what educated the individual for
his life in the polis.”368 He regarded society as a positive contributor to human
development and rejected theories of education that insisted otherwise. Like Dewey,
Hegel criticized Rousseau’s idealization of the state of nature against the corruption of
society. Society is not the source of corruption but that which allows the self to be
realized and which gives it meaning. Moreover, in his Philosophy of Right, Hegel is clear
that even if education and culture were rightly understood as unnatural and corrupt, an
education away from society was impossible. Hegel criticized as “futile” those
“pedagogical experiments” which sought to educate by “removing people from the
ordinary life of the present and bringing them up in the country (cf. Rousseau's
Emile).”369 For Hegel and for Dewey, it is simply impossible to escape society, and
education should not only accept this fact, but celebrate it.
Dewey took from Hegel and German idealism more broadly a notion of
education, or Bildung, as “the absolute transition to the infinitely subjective substantiality
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of ethical life, which is no longer immediate and natural, but spiritual and at the same
time raised to the shape of universality.”370 Beyond mere training or the transmission of
knowledge, education as Bildung is the process of harmonizing the particular and the
universal. For Dewey as for Hegel, “in its absolute determination,” education is
“liberation and work towards a higher liberation.”371 Not restricted to an individual,
Bildung could apply to an entire people or culture, and it would always involve a process
of shaping, formation, and development.
Hegel’s understanding of Bildung had two key components that Dewey took to be
fundamental to his own vision of education. First, it was an ongoing, lifelong process.
While education would begin with childhood and the family, it did not end with
adulthood. Civil society would continue to foster and enable Bildung in the ultimate
interest of freedom by instructing its members in universality and interdependence
through the system of needs. This was achieved through rational social institutions, and
the school had a special mediating role to play between the family and society. As Hegel
put it in his 1811 address at Nuremburg, the school is one of the most important modern
institutions, an institution that is crucial to the cultivation of Bildung because it teaches
children to become self-forming individuals that are independent of their families.372
While the process toward socialization and Bildung begins with the ethical upbringing
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provided by parents and continues afterward through civil society, it is schools that help
youths make this shift.
Second, Bildung was not simply a matter of training and instruction. As Terry
Pinkard emphasizes, Bildung demands “self-activity, self-development, and selfdirection,” even as it requires an educator. In other words, Bildung requires the student to
take an active role. Unlike the German Erziehung, which Raymond Guess describes as a
kind of education that may be acquired more passively, Bildung describes both the
process of learning and an attribute possessed by those that have worked to attain selfcultivation. 373 That is, Bildung is both an activity and the result of that activity. It is a
quality that one may achieve and possess. One is not endowed with Bildung simply by
virtue of being born into a particular class; Bildung is instead the result of a process of
self-cultivation that can be achieved by individuals regardless of their family origin.
But while in theory Bildung was available to all individuals, in practice Hegel
took for granted that not everyone would be capable of achieving it at the highest level.
Here, some of the cracks between Dewey and Hegel do become apparent. Dewey rejected
Bildung as a potential some had and others did not. For Dewey, education was not the
unfolding of a fixed and pre-determined potential. While Hegel wholeheartedly supported
public education, he believed that higher education would be reserved for men of Bildung
who would go on to selflessly administer society. His political vision—more similar to
Plato’s in its acceptance of intellectual inequality and hierarchy—was ultimately not
quite egalitarian enough for Dewey’s democratic society. As Seyla Benhabib put it,
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Hegel imagined that while most citizens would go on “sink to the moment of mere
‘representation’ in the estates,” a highly educated, universal class of bureaucrats would
ensure that the “rationality of the universal” is preserved in “a realm of professional
expertise immune to the whims and mere opinion of the ‘rabble’.”374 Men of Bildung
would, like Plato’s philosopher-kings, comprehend and protect the universal against the
subjective passions of citizens. 375 But while Dewey saw value in expertise, he insisted on
a classless society. As with Plato, he criticized Hegel for an attachment to ends and for
abstracting away from the individual to the point of erasing tangible distinctions between
persons.
Although especially in his earlier work Dewey tended to underscore the social
against the excessive individualism he attributed to American culture, he rejected any
theory which did not also insist on what he termed “the complete development of
personality” for all.376 That is, while Dewey fully accepted a ‘social efficiency’ view of
education which tied it to fostering good citizenship and ensuring individuals participated
in the economy, he insisted that in a democracy, social efficiency did not have to come at
the cost of ‘personal culture,’ or the development of individuality. For Dewey, “if
democracy has a moral and ideal meaning, it is that a social return can be demanded for
all and that opportunity for development of distinctive capacities be afforded all.”377 But
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more than that, Dewey insisted that true social efficiency in a democracy actually
requires the cultivation of the individuality of every one of its members.
Just as Dewey reconceived of individuality as fundamentally tied to the social, he
offered a conception of social efficiency that was inextricably tied to the individual. In its
broadest sense, Deweyian social efficiency is “neither more nor less than capacity to
share in a given and take of experience” and “covers all that makes one’s own experience
more worthwhile to others, and all that enables one to participate more richly in the
worthwhile experiences of others.”378 By defining social efficiency in this way, Dewey
was able to maintain that a society’s worth is tied to the worth it gives to every
individual. Therefore, social efficiency is not achieved through the “negative constraint”
of individuals, but by the “positive use of native individual capacities in occupations
having a social meaning.”379 The fact that society is comprised of unique individuals is
precisely what makes it “worth serving” in the first place.380 Society derives its meaning
from the individuals that comprise it. In turn, individuals derive their meaning from their
society.

Education as Growth
I have argued that Dewey was greatly inspired by Hegel, but he did have a
critique of him. Dewey accused Hegel of excessively abstracting away from the actually
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existing self. This was not merely a pragmatic concern for Dewey: He was deeply
concerned with how abstraction inevitably overlooks concrete individualities and
particulars. Dewey criticized Hegel—and Plato and Rousseau before him—for positing a
general, abstract ideal as the goal of an individual’s education and self-development. As
Dewey wrote in “Self-Realization as the Moral Ideal” (1893), when the self is conceived
in the abstract, this inevitably leads one to “set up a rigid self, and conceive of realization
as filling up its empty framework.”381 This results in an idea of education as the means
by which the ideal, imagined self becomes a ‘real’ self. Dewey adamantly spurned this
view. Instead, he advocated a new, non-teleological understanding of education as
‘growth’ that would always view the student as an actually existing person rather than a
potential one. Although education as growth would always be present-oriented, it would
still be intentional and progressive in its direction. Dewey claimed that his education as
growth would have no purpose beyond itself, but as I will argue, this is misleading:
Deweyian education exists to serve a progressive, democratic society.
Dewey criticized past traditions for insisting on an idea of education as
development, wherein to develop is to work toward an abstract ideal. In these theories,
the ‘real’ self is not what is but what might be. In contrast, for Dewey, the self is always
“a concrete and specific activity,” and “any theory which makes the self a something to
be realized, which makes the process of moral experience a process of gradually attaining
this ideal self” should be rejected.382 Self-realization does not consist in fulfilling “a
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presupposed fixed schema or outline.”383 Rather, self-realization is found in the present
exercise of existing capacity. The self must always be thought of in tangible and specific
terms.
According to Dewey, the self should be understood as that which is and acts in the
present moment. In one of his most remembered lines, he wrote, “If I were asked to name
the most needed of all reforms in the spirit of education, I should say: ‘Cease conceiving
of education as mere preparation for later life, and make of it the full meaning of the
present life.’”384 For Dewey, this meant that there is no general, ideal, and abstract
capacity to be realized in the future through education, but only the capacities of a
specific child in a given moment that must be exercised in the here and now. A child
should not be educated toward an abstract ideal, but through the use of whatever
capacities are actually manifest.
Put another way, Dewey thought a child’s supposed general capacity does not
determine her end. Rather, her specific and concrete activities do. Capacity is “definite
activity and not simply possibility of activity.” 385 To take an example, Dewey defines
“artistic capacity” not as the potential to be an artist, but as already observable abilities:
“a certain quickness, vividness, and plasticity of vision, a certain deftness of hand, and a
certain motor co-ordination by which his hand is stimulated to work in harmony with his
eye.” 386 In recognizing the child’s “artistic capacity,” he wrote, “we are not primarily
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finding out what he may be, but what he is.”387 We are not seeing him move closer
toward some ideal of an artist, but seeing him act artistically in the here and now.
While Dewey agreed that education is necessarily “a fostering, a nurturing, a
cultivating, process,”388 he insisted that the traditional view of development which views
its end as the realization of potentiality must be rejected. As he clarified in Democracy
and Education:
When it is said that education is development, everything depends upon how
development is conceived. Our net conclusion is that life is development, and that
developing, growing, is life. Translated into its educational equivalents, that
means (i) that the educational process has no end beyond itself; it is its own end;
and that (ii) the educational process is one of continual reorganizing,
reconstructing, transforming.389
In Plato’s Republic, the goal of education was to form producers, guardians, and—
ideally—philosopher kings. For Rousseau, education would cultivate the child’s natural
goodness, allowing what was good and implicit to develop without corruption.390 Even
Bildung offered itself as a potential to be achieved through education, aided in Hegel’s
view by institutions. Against these ends-oriented traditions, Dewey’s philosophy posited
education as ‘growth’ for growth’s sake.
For Dewey, the purpose of all human beings is life, and life is growth. He writes,
“the dominant vocation of all human beings at all times is living—intellectual and moral
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growth.”391 Growth is not “about unity and conforming” or “bringing children up into
adulthood.”392 Rather, it is always occurring, even in adults, and the role of education is
to enable continued growth for all. This meant that the self would never be finished, but
in “continuous formation through choice of action.”393 Dewey saw this as the core insight
provided by the modern discovery of evolution. But as he wrote in Human Nature and
Conduct (1922), his contemporaries had twisted evolution’s meaning and wrongly
applied its lesson. Rather than understand evolution as furthering the “gospel of present
growth,” evolution had been used “to teach a futile dogma of approximation,” as though
the present must be made to serve a predetermined future point of development.394
As Dewey made clear in Democracy and Education, “Education as such has no
aims. Only persons, parents, and teachers, etc., have aims, not an abstract idea like
education.”395 To insist on a predetermined goal for education is to force education to
serve an external goal. This particular claim led many critics, such as R. Hutchins, to
accuse Dewey of lacking a vision of what it meant to be an ‘educated’ person.396
Dewey’s education was painted as directionless, offering no account of what does and
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does not count as education. But to claim that Dewey simply valued directionless activity
or change for its own sake is not a fair reading of him. Dewey not only critiqued fellow
progressives for their excessive aversion to organization and structure, he made clear that
what he valued was not mere change or experience, but educative experience, by which
he meant something more specific. Dewey did not claim that all activity counted as
education because his understanding of growth was more exclusive than his critics
appreciated.
While Dewey did think that education could be either incidental or formal (it need
not be deliberate in order to qualify as education), he insisted that in order to be “truly
educative” an experience must be one in which “instruction is conveyed and ability
increased” and where there is an “added power of subsequent direction or control.”397
Striking at both conservative and progressive models of education, he wrote that true
education is neither “routine” nor “capricious.”398 Something like “spontaneous selfexpression” did not count as real education.399 Rather, true education is “that
reconstruction or reorganization of experience which adds to the meaning of experience,
and which increases ability to direct the course of subsequent experience.”400 We can
recognize education because it contributes meaning to experience and because it opens
the learner up to more experiences.
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As Dewey much later clarified in Experience and Education (1938), ‘education as
growth’ can only be recognized as such through a holistic assessment that takes into
account not simply whether a person is growing in their ability to carry out a particular
activity but whether their capacity for growth in general is being increased as well:
“That a man may grow in efficiency as a burglar, as a gangster, or as a corrupt
politician, cannot be doubted. But from the standpoint of growth as education and
education as growth the question is whether growth in this direction promotes or
retards growth in general. Does this form of growth create conditions for further
growth, or does it set up conditions that shut off the person who has grown in this
particular direction from the occasions, stimuli, and opportunities for continuing
growth in new directions?”401
Dewey did not simply want to say that all change is growth and that all growth is
educative. He wanted to retain an idea of “true” education. As such, all experience is not
educative: “The belief that all genuine education comes about through experience does
not mean that all experiences are genuinely or equally educative.”402 For Dewey, some
experiences can in fact be ‘miseducative’ not because they fail to bring one closer to a
specific educational goal but also because they restrict the possibilities for future growth.
That is, Dewey insisted that “good” growth and “bad” growth could be distinguished
according to whether or not they increased the possibilities for future growth beyond the
narrow confines of the activity in question. If an experience made a person less open to
new meaningful experiences by, for example, numbing her to life or leading him to a
dead end, the experience could be classed as miseducative.
Whether Dewey’s definition of miseducative experiences encompasses all forms
of narrow specialization in education is unclear. For Dewey, the psychological effect the
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experience has on the person and their future openness to experience is key, but one
would expect this to vary from person to person. What is clear is that Dewey had an
interest in maintaining a non-teleological vision of education that nevertheless maintained
some distinction between ‘better’ and ‘worse.’ To give up this distinction would be to
give up on the notion of progress that was so fundamental to his politics. But while
Dewey was correct that evolution provides a model for non-teleological development,
notions of ‘progress’ are imputed by humans to evolution. Humans might perceive
evolution as always progressive, but this is a question of perception, not fact.
Dewey claimed that no eternal ideal or tradition can or should be the binding
guide for future action, but he clearly provided one in the form of his ideal of education
as growth. While Dewey asserted that there are no fixed and final ends to his education,
he insisted on its progressivity: Dewey was quite clear in Democracy and Education that
societies advance, progressing from the barbarian to the civilized. Education is integral to
guarding and transmitting the science and technology that feed societal progress; it is
selectively conservative but always progressive.
The fact that Dewey insisted that one must focus on the present in education and
that one must teach not towards a future goal or with an idea of potential capacity in mind
did not mean that his idea of education would not serve future progress. While seemingly
oriented toward the present alone, Dewey thought that it is precisely by focusing on the
present that preparation for the future is ensured. In other words, the future is served by
the focus on the present: education must “progressively realize present possibilities, and
thus make individuals better fitted to cope with latter requirements.”403 Education is the
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realization of present capacities so that they become cultivated and therefore better able
to meet the future present. Deweyian education is a kind of progress without end, it is
forward movement toward a better state of ever-expanding opportunities at both the
individual and social level. Ultimately, it is the progressive growth of the social
organism.
For Dewey, faith in progressive education was synonymous with faith in
democracy. As he admitted in Democracy and Education, only in a democratic society
can education’s aim be to “enable individuals to continue their education.”404 Democratic
society makes Deweyian education possible. Conversely, Dewey’s particular vision of
liberal-democratic society requires education in order to be realized. Dewey desired a
democratic society that prizes continuous learning and social engagement, and for all of
his criticisms of philosophies that presuppose an ideal to be educated toward, he could
not avoid doing the same. Dewey presupposed the ideal of the ever-learning social and
democratic citizen. A Deweyian education is not mere preparation for life, but it is
preparation for democratic life as Dewey understood it.
The ultimate end of Deweyian education is the social and political progress of a
democratic order. He admitted as much in “The Economic Situation: A Challenge to
Education” (1932) when he wrote, “For the primary social duty of education is not to
perpetuate the existing social order—economic, legal, and political—but to contribute to
its betterment. This work is constructive and positive.”405 While Dewey saw change as
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inevitable, he knew that progress is never guaranteed. He thought that one must use
education to ensure that change is as synonymous with growth as possible. The site of
this work, the key institution for realizing Dewey’s vision, was the school.

School as Panacea
It was because Dewey maintained an idea of what counts as ‘good’ or ‘true’
education that he needed institutions to direct and channel the education as socialization
that would otherwise occur organically. Dewey’s idea of education was not aimless; it
needed to serve a particular political vision. Like Plato and Rousseau, Dewey understood
that “association is inherently educative,” and like Plato and Rousseau, Dewey sought to
control the terms of association.406 Rather than leave incidental education to chance, he
believed an ideal environment could be intentionally designed in order to “produce” in
the student “a certain system of behavior.”407 Rather than focus on law or the family,
Dewey saw institutionalized education as the ideal mechanism for realizing his
educational-political vision through socialization. School reform would be the means of
social reform. Dewey thought that by reimaging the school and its function in society one
could ensure ‘real’ learning and a continuously progressive democratic order. If life is the
only real teacher, Dewey concluded, one had to make the school “part of the life
experience of the child” in order to be “truly educative” and effective.408
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Dewey’s writings on schooling reveal both the Dewey so often criticized for his
engineering approach to social life as well as the Dewey who thought education could
harmonize entrenched differences. As Alan Ryan notes with respect to Dewey on
education, “One might unkindly call it a form of magical thinking, as though control over
a symbolic representation of the outside world inside the classroom will give us control
over the world itself.”409 While Melvin Rogers is right to stress the Darwinism in Dewey,
his portrait of him as a humble pluralist deeply sensitive to contingency and uncertainty is
perhaps overstated.410 While it’s true that Dewey certainly thought that human agency
was critical for ensuring progress, he clearly believed that a scientific approach to social
life and schooling could result in progress and harmonize difference.
According to Dewey, schools are both the product of and the key to social
progress. As he argued in Democracy and Education, schools are the necessary result of a
society that has become so complex it cannot rely on oral transmission and association
alone to preserve its collective experience. They arise when “social traditions are so
complex that a considerable part of the social store is committed to writing and
transmitted through written symbols.”411 Schools emerge in order to preserve and pass on
a society’s accumulated knowledge, and this is primarily done through books. One
problem with this, Dewey thought, is that schools have a tendency to make education

409

Ryan, Dewey, and Child, John Dewey and the High Tide of American Liberalism,
330.
410

Rogers, “The People, Rhetoric, and Affect.”

411

Dewey, Democracy and Education, 22.

189

“remote and dead” as well as “abstract and bookish.”412 That is, schools typically rely on
impressions made by words and language to educate, but real (i.e., democratic) education
must be a shared activity. For Dewey, true learning was the result of an internal change in
the student that could only occur when she actively participated in the educational
activity. In order to achieve true learning, then, the school should mirror the dynamic and
associative world beyond its walls. The best school would be modeled after the “best”
kind of home.413
Therefore, the modern school should not cling to a narrow view of education as
transmission, but employ education as socialization. Dewey thought this would not only
make the education provided by schools more genuine and more effective, it would also
socialize students and contribute to their civic formation. Students would become ideal
democratic citizens not by learning lessons that could be found in books, but by partaking
in “a community life” with their classmates and sharing “a common experience.”414
Rather than encourage a “bookish” and “pseudointellectual spirit,” schools should enable
and foster a “social spirit” instead.415 For Dewey, democratic citizenship is not simply
about voting, law-making, or governing, but also how individuals relate to each other in a
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holistic way. Citizenship is not a narrow political relationship, but “all the relationships
of all sorts that are involved in membership in a community.”416 Therefore, social
activities in schools should not be considered distractions from “real” learning, but
constitutive of a truly democratic education.
Although Dewey thought that the school should model itself on social life, he did
not think it should be an exact replica of it. While the school should certainly be more
contiguous with society, Dewey thought it could and should serve as a site of intentional
socialization. That is, unlike the “real” world, Dewey imagined that the ideal school
could be a “special environment” where adults could “consciously control the kind of
education which the immature gets” by “controlling the information in which they act,
and hence, think and feel.”417 Unlike society-at-large, the mini-society of the school
could be more easily designed and controlled to produce a generation better than the one
before it. Through the use of testing and examination, it could further “test the child’s
fitness for social life and reveal the place in which he can be of the most service and
where he can receive the most help.”418
Dewey saw the school as the ideal solution to Rousseau’s puzzle. How could one
make a virtuous citizen when society is corrupt? One could redesign the school as an
ideal mini-society for children who have not yet been corrupted. Dewey thought the
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school could help children transition into society by providing a “simplified
environment” that becomes progressively more complicated as the child ages while
taking an active role in deciding what should be filtered out of society in order to aid its
progress.419 School would be a gradual introduction to society, but not an exact mirror.
Rather than preserve every element of society and tradition, the school should be
selective about what is transmitted, keeping only what is worthy of being saved and
purging that which does not contribute to a “better future society.”420 Moreover, the
school should harmonize all of the diverse elements of society and thereby create a “new
and broader environment” that is “homogenous and balanced for the young.”421 The
school should provide children with a means to escape the parochialism of their homes.
In short, it should provide an experience of society not quite as it is, but as it could be in a
more ideal form. As Dewey put it on his “Educational Ethics” syllabus at the University
of Chicago, “society reflects itself in purified form in the school.”422
While the notion of a school as an ideal environment might imply a necessary
degree of isolation from society, Dewey argued for just the opposite. Society, Dewey
thought, should put its best self into its schools and keep those schools at its center. Like
Plato and Rousseau, Dewey knew that true civic education would have to be continuous,
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and he often lamented that most students left school by fourteen or fifteen. One could not
simply socialize a child into a “complete” adult and then send him into society without
further education. Dewey thought this idea of civic formation was especially misguided
because it assumed an unchanging environment. The world according to Dewey was
ever-changing, demanding constant adaptability from adults. The ideal mini-society of
the school could therefore not only impact children; it had to be positioned to impact
adults and thereby continue its influence. By placing schools at their center and not at
their periphery, communities could hope to provide “a continuous education for all
classes at whatever age.”423 Instead of being kept in a protected space away from society,
schools should be for all members of society at all ages.
Beyond this rationale, Dewey thought it increasingly obvious that there were no
truly separate spheres of life. Something was needed to tie the whole together and give it
meaning, especially as traditional forms of authority were increasingly challenged. As he
wrote in “The School as Social Centre” (1902), enforcing divisions between social
institutions was neither possible nor desirable, as “different modes of social life” share in
an “organic unity.” 424 Rather than try to separate the school from politics and society,
which were themselves intimately connected, it must infuse every aspect of life; it must
“be related more widely,” “receive from more quarters,” and “give in more directions”
than previously imagined.425 Dewey saw in the school a new and better means of
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community than other socializing institutions such as the family or the church. The
school could provide a new and better model for society. It could even educate people to
appreciate “higher forms” of entertainment and provide alternatives to “cheap and easy
amusements.”426 In his most utopic renderings, Dewey imagines the school as integrating
and supplementing every aspect of an individual’s life, helping her to continually find
meaning in her place in the world.
While Dewey also acknowledged that schools “are only one among many factors,
and that their shaping influence will be most helpful when it falls in line with social
forces operating outside the schools,” he insisted that one could no longer rely on those
forces to train individuals for social life.427 The school must “give the young the things
they need in order to develop in an orderly, sequential way into members of society,” and
it must, in “its forms and methods, be an outgrowth of the needs of the society in which it
exists.”428 It is in Dewey’s writings on schooling that one can fully appreciate the extent
to which education’s end is social and political for him. Although Dewey insisted that
education and schooling were not synonymous, he meant that the meaning of education is
not encompassed by traditional notions of schooling, that it is always ongoing and really
a product of association. Dewey thought schools should be reimagined to reflect and
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perfect this kind of learning through socialization, and he firmly rejected the idea of
schools as ivory towers or insular communities.
The role Dewey envisioned for schools meant that schools could not and should
not shy away from politics. In pieces like “Education as Politics” (1922) and “The School
as Means of Developing a Social Consciousness and Social Ideals in Children” (1923),
Dewey wrote about how the school should use relevant materials, deal with the real
world, and seek to cultivate a “genuine patriotism” that would combat anti-immigrant
sentiment. Dewey was clear that in envisioning a political role for schools he was not
suggesting that they indoctrinate students or provide a nationalistic education on the
model of Japan, Italy, the U.S.S.R. or Germany. Dewey distinguished his call for a
national education from a nationalistic education by insisting that the former is “an
outgrowth from the people” that “develops from below” and not forced upon the people
from above by the government.429 Angered by accusations in the 1930s that schools had
become breeding grounds for socialism, Dewey insisted that there were more worrisome
sources of indoctrination and propaganda, such as the Hearst press and the radio.430
While schools would certainly “form attitudes,” he thought, “the tendency to form
attitudes which will express themselves in intelligent social action is something very
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different from indoctrination.”431 Dewey thought he could draw a clear distinction
between helping students become intelligent political actors and inculcating them with
political beliefs.
In Democratic Education, Amy Gutmann questions how Dewey understood the
relationship between the structures of the school and the society beyond it. Pointing to the
practices of Dewey’s Laboratory School at the University of Chicago for insight, she
notes some of its decidedly undemocratic elements: Students did not rule the school and
teachers were a clear authority who decided curriculum together and with Dewey.
Gutmann concludes, “It was an embryonic democratic society because it elicited a
commitment to learning and cultivated the prototypically democratic virtues among its
students, not because it treated them as the political or intellectual equals of its
teachers.”432
Similarly interested in how schools might be structured to model democratic
society, Jason Kosnoski notes that Dewey “never explicitly equates classroom discussion
with deliberative association.”433 As I read him, Dewey was most interested in cultivating
a certain sociability in students and a disposition that would make them good democratic
citizens. Dewey saw democracy as more than structures and institutions designed to
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channel individual agents. As Alan Ryan put it, he wanted a society “permeated by a
certain kind of character, by a mutual regard of all citizens for all other citizens.”434
While structures certainly influence agents, and while Dewey certainly advocated for
structural changes in how the classroom was arranged, he thought schools could and
should socialize students through other, less formal mechanisms inside and outside the
classroom.
Moreover, he wanted teachers to operate as expert professionals realizing a
progressive vision and would not have thought it appropriate to treat students as though
they were equal authorities. Dewey claimed that schools simply cannot be politically
neutral and will always influence society. This inescapable fact presented educators with
three choices: (1) to “perpetuate the present confusion and possibly increase it,” (2) to
“select the new scientific, technological, and cultural forces that are producing change in
the old order,” or (3) to “become intelligently conservative and strive to make the schools
a force in painting the old order intact against the impact of new forces.”435 Deeming the
first option indefensible and the third understandable, Dewey insisted that schools should
be a progressive force in society and that they should herald scientific, technological, and
cultural change.
Dewey thought that by embracing ‘intelligent’ change, schools could fulfill their
unique capacity as the most fundamental and meaningful way to bring about social
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reform. As he put it in Human Nature and Conduct: An Introduction to Social
Psychology (1922), “The cold fact of the situation is that the chief means of continuous,
graded, economical improvement and social rectification lies in utilizing the
opportunities of educating the young to modify prevailing types of thought and desire.”436
Rather than focus on gaining and storing knowledge, education could and should be
focused on “creating attitudes by shaping desires and developing the needs that are
significant in the process of living.”437 For Dewey, education offered a slow but steady
means of achieving social and economic progress by reshaping the thoughts and desires
of society via its youth.
While Dewey did not think that schools could “in any literal sense be the builders
of a new social order,” he did think they would “share in the building of the social order
of the future” by aligning with “this or that movement of existing social forces.” 438
Against Marxist critiques which insisted that schools could not be sources of change and
progress, that they could only ever perpetuate the ideology of the ruling class, and that
proper school reform could only follow a true revolution, Dewey argued that “there is no
basis whatever, save doctrinaire absolutism, for the belief that a complete economic
change will produce of itself the mental, moral, and cultural changes that are necessary
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for its enduring success.”439 While Alison Kadlec roots Dewey’s problems with Marxism
in its rigidity, it was fundamentally Marxism’s theory of change that Dewey thought
problematic.440 A real revolution would require a more fundamental and internal change,
and while schools could not be “a sufficient condition” for achieving this, they were
certainly necessary.441
While James Campbell is right to note that Dewey was more aware of “the
practical limits of the educational process” than critics tend to realize, it is nevertheless
where Dewey placed his greatest hope for social change.442 As Cornell West put it,
“Dewey adopts a gradualist view of social change and remains a reformer rather than a
revolutionary.”443 On his reading, Dewey’s emphasis on discussion and education is
problematic because it leads him away from “confrontational politics and agitational
struggle.”444 Relatedly, R.W. Hildreth sees in Dewey’s pragmatism a failure to deal with
conflict and power, avoiding “the question of the necessary political leverage for social
change unaddressed.”445 But for Dewey, schools offered a real possibility of changing the
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fundamental dispositions needed to make any revolution a lasting one. By building and
modeling community and interdependence, he thought, the right social changes would
follow with time.
Ironically, as Dewey mused in an address published in The New York Times in
1933, in a perfect world, he thought there would be no schools at all.446 If society were
perfect, there would be no need for schools as everyone would be continuously educated
through their direct participation in society. But an imperfect society requires schools to
harmonize it, purify it, and show the way toward a better future. Dewey saw the school as
society’s most powerful instrument for intelligently directing and controlling education.
His vision of schooling exposes the lie that in a Deweyian vision education serves no end
beyond itself. For Dewey, education is always for becoming, and more specifically, for
social and political progress.

Rejection of Solitude
While Plato was deeply interested in education as a social question, he also
portrayed and honored a Socrates who would lose himself in thought and disappear to a
place within himself. For his part, Rousseau increasingly retreated to solitude throughout
his life and determined that “true” philosophers and scientists were incompatible with
society. In sharp contrast to these thinkers, for Dewey, education was always linked to
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social utility and never exemplified by solitary contemplation. There was no truth to be
sought apart from becoming or in isolation. Both Dewey’s philosophy of education and
his philosophy of selfhood foreclose the possibility of education as a purely private, truthseeking activity. While Plato and Rousseau understood a kind of education apart from
becoming and perhaps best pursued in solitude, Dewey disavowed this inward turn. He
rejected any suggestion that true education is what happens apart from the social world,
be it outside a cave or alone in nature.
Dewey rejected solitary education by definition. For Dewey, education in all its
forms simply cannot exist apart from society, and what I have called truth-seeking
inquiry was no exception. It too is fundamentally and inescapably social, occurring only
in relation to society. Education as truth-seeking inquiry is neither a threat to democracy
nor threatened by it in part because there is no necessary tension between the pursuit of
truth and living a social or political life. There is no choice to be made between the
private student and the public servant. Dewey thought that in a democracy it is especially
imperative to do away with isolationism. Democracies must make thought a guide for
action and view leisure time an opportunity for serving others, not an opportunity for
escape.447 As Westbrook correctly summarized, Dewey’s liberalism was “liberalism that
had to meet the demands of democracy, not democracy that had to answer to liberalism.”
Dewey’s own conception of education as truth-seeking inquiry drew heavily on
the scientific method and assumed a problem-solving approach to the world. For him,
inquiry always had to have a social dimension and ultimately link back to becoming.
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Long-critiqued for being excessively optimistic and leading, ultimately, to a vision of
social engineering, scholars have defended it as more open and complex than it appears.
Pointing to Dewey’s Darwinism, Jim Garrison insists that Dewey’s pragmatist
instrumentalism should not be confused with logical positivism.448 Similarly, for Melvin
Rogers, Dewey’s inquiry is not about what is, but always what might be; it is therefore
experimental and contingent.449 One must consider, though, whether Dewey’s conception
of inquiry truly leaves enough space for the parts of science and education that are less
about method or problem solving and more about dreaming and imagination.450 In any
case, my own concern with Dewey’s conception of inquiry is not that it is too rigid or
positivistic, but that it has no place for truth apart from becoming, and relatedly, for
solitude. As Alan Ryan quipped, “The introspective non-joiner gets rather short shrift in
Dewey’s universe.”451
In emphasizing the social, utilitarian nature of education, Dewey was in part
reacting against a tradition he attributed to the “leisure class”—the idea that “the most
valuable teaching is that which is furthest from any useful application, even when that
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application consists of serving the state."452 For Dewey, the insistence on a division
between “pure knowledge” and “applied or professional knowledge” was yet another
false dichotomy. He maintained that a practical education can also be intellectual. As
such, curriculum design should reject the idea that some subjects are inherently practical
and others merely ornamental. All subjects should have both instrumental and aesthetic
value for the student at some point in the course of study. Importantly, Dewey was not
advocating a view of education as a private, instrumental good for private, economic
advancement. Rather, he stressed the instrumental and social character of all education.
As I have already suggested, in emphasizing the social utility of education,
Dewey was not merely objecting to an emphasis on selfish materialism in education, but
to the fundamental understanding of the individual that this common view presupposed.
As Dewey wrote in “Ethical Principles Underlying Education” (1897), “Society is a
society of individuals and the individual is always a social individual. He has no
existence by himself. He lives in, for, and by society, just as society has no existence
excepting in and through the individuals who constitute it.”453 This is why Dewey was
also critical of those who stressed education as a means of character formation in the
traditional sense, writing that those who claimed that education is about the “harmonious
development of all the powers of the individual” failed to see that these terms have no
meaning apart from society.454 To speak of “character” is to speak of “a vague and
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abstract concept with no real content.”455 Dewey insisted that character only has meaning
as concrete social capacities. It could not, therefore, be developed in isolation, but only in
association with others.
Although in his later works Dewey did come to emphasize the importance of
individualism more, as I will demonstrate, his underlying view of the individual as
fundamentally social never wavered. In his Psychology (1887), Dewey concluded that
“No individual can realize himself in impersonal relations—relations of things to each
other or to an ideal. He can truly develop himself only in self-conscious activity, in
personality, and this is impossible without relations to other persons.”456 Dewey’s point
in this early work was not simply that society offers the only means to self-realization; he
was suggesting a radical blurring of any boundaries between inner and outer existence.
Insensitive to the value of cultivating a rich inner life, Dewey saw the cultivation of an
inward, private self apart from society as undesirable and even harmful. “Emotion turned
inward” rather than outward “upon objects” was especially dangerous, as it led one to
become either “jaded” or “restless.”457 While Dewey admitted that the self necessarily
has “private states,” he insisted they “exist not for their own sake, but as the medium
through which the universe makes its significance and value apparent.”458
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For Dewey, whether one is turned inward or outward marks a crucial distinction
between wonder and curiosity. Wonder, Dewey thought, is when one is attuned to
external objects. In that case, the activity is “for the sake of the object” and not “for the
sake of satisfying the personal emotion of wonder,” which is best defined as curiosity.459
Put differently, “wonder,” for Dewey, is “the emotional outing of the mind toward the
universe” and therefore “utterly incomprehensible as a purely personal or selfish feeling.”
460

As he later wrote in How We Think (1910), teachers are tasked with preserving and

directing childhood curiosity toward the higher, proper ends of wonder.461 Offering a
moving description of how great minds are marked by their ability to wonder at the
familiar, Dewey credits wonder with the genesis and continuation of science.462 He roots
the desire to know the “universe of objects” in the desire to know our “true” selves. In
other words, the true self is found outside itself.
This is why in his “Pedagogic Creed” (1897), Dewey insisted that “the social and
the psychological are the two ‘sides’ of the ‘educational process’” and that “neither can
be subordinated to the other or neglected without evil results following. For Dewey,
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‘individuality’ meant that no one could be substituted for another and that each had
something to contribute to society. To develop one’s individuality was to develop one’s
unique contribution to society. In the same text, Dewey goes so far as to claim:
The only true education comes through the stimulation of the child's powers by
the demands of the social situations in which he finds himself. Through these
demands he is stimulated to act as a member of a unity, to emerge from his
original narrowness of action and feeling and to conceive of himself from the
standpoint of the welfare of the group to which he belongs.463
As Ivan Illich read Dewey, his “idea of individuality [does not] preclude the selfconscious reflectiveness one associates with personal autonomy,” but it does “insist that
whatever individuality is will depend ultimately on the social context in which
individuality comes to be.”464
As Dewey wrote in a later essay, one cannot know oneself in the clouds, in “the
world to which philosophy was brought: a world which was the heavy and sunken centre
of hierarchic heavens located in their purity and refinement as remotely as possible from
the gross and muddy vesture of earth.”465 On his reading, Aristotle is especially guilty of
placing thought on a pedestal apart from action. Unlike Aristotle, the “conservative” who
“gloried in the exaltation of intelligence in man above civic excellence and social need;
and thereby isolated the life of truest knowledge from contact with social experience and
from responsibility for discrimination of values in the course of life,” Plato, the
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“reformer” and “radical” insisted that those with insight return to and serve society.466
Philosopher kings had to resist the temptation to see themselves as separate from society
and capable of existing outside the cave.
In later works, Dewey continued to express his ire for Aristotle’s identification of
contemplation as the highest good.467 In Democracy and Education (1916), Dewey
rejected the elevation of mind above all else, insisting that it is only “one factor partaking
along with others in the production of consequences.”468 The mind is an agent of change
that responds to the environment with a view to action.469 It acts as a kind of axis. It is
very much a part of the world of existing ideas and beliefs, and it finds new connections
and conceptions that deviate from what exists. The individual is the agent through which
existing beliefs are transformed, and progress occurs because of the great variation
between individuals in their “observation, imagination, judgment, and invention.”470 That
is, ideas are able to evolve and change into new ones because they transform through
individuals who are always themselves a part of existing knowledge and society. The
individual is a medium, not a wholly independent being who exists in isolation and
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creates knowledge. To source knowledge in the individual, Dewey thought, was to
threaten “the ties which bind the mental life of one to that of his fellows.” 471 This denial
could only lead to division and a failure to recognize that all individuals are part of a
whole of knowledge that they jointly influence and are influenced by.
It was not just a matter of consequences, but it a matter of fact for Dewey: The
private student does not really exist because the mind is in the world and of the world,
and all knowledge is in the interest of society. Thinking is fundamentally linked to
experience and action: “The material of thinking is not thoughts, but actions, facts,
events, and the relations of things.”472 Learning should never be locked “into a purely
individual consciousness” but directed back toward the social.473 Any understanding of
education which allows individuals to become separate or, as he puts it, “isolated” was
false and should be avoided at all costs. Departing starkly from Rousseau’s image of the
true philosopher in exile, he remained much closer to Plato’s philosopher king in service
of society.
Although in his much later works, Dewey did begin to stress the individual more,
he admitted in “I Believe” (1939) that this shift did not reflect any fundamental change in
his belief or conception of individuality. Rather, Dewey adjusted his emphasis because he
witnessed how “the rise of dictatorships and totalitarian states and the decline of
democracy [were] accompanied with loud proclamation of the idea that only the state, the
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political organization of society, can give security to individuals.”474 Growing calls for
total, unthinking allegiance led Dewey to stress the role of individual agency in shaping
the social conditions so integral to self-development and self-realization.
At the same time, the changing political climate only further proved his
conviction that “democratic institutions are no guarantee for the existence of democratic
individuals.”475 In the end, education always remained central to the realization of
Dewey’s liberal-democratic political vision. Education was for becoming and for truthseeking in service of becoming. He stood by the importance of educating unique
individuals for a democratic society through community and association, and he insisted
that schools offered the key to progress. For Dewey, it was imperative that education in
all its forms always ultimately serve society and its interests. It could never be and should
never be a refuge from it.
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V
Realizing the Revolution: Freire’s Critical Pedagogy
Despite their differences, Plato, Rousseau, and Dewey all recognized socialization
as the most promising mode of education for shaping children into adults who suited their
politics. Each focused on the best way to structure social environments to form children
through the right experiences. In this chapter, I turn to the work of Brazilian thinker
Paulo Freire who offered this challenge to their approach: What if the most decisive
factor in a person’s formation is not experience itself, but their understanding of that
experience? What if, instead of turning children into ideal citizens through the right law,
culture, home, or school, one could begin with non-ideal adults instead? Known primarily
for his teaching methods and for his role as a founder of critical pedagogy, Freire is not
typically recognized as a political theorist. However, as I will argue in this chapter,
Freire’s thought does offer a political theory of education that belongs in the tradition of
Plato, Rousseau, and Dewey.
As I will also argue in this chapter, Freire represents the most extreme version of
the position that there is no distinction to be made between an education as the activity of
searching for truth and education as an instrument for becoming an ideal self or society.
Taking adult education as his starting point, Freire turned away from the idea that
children must be slowly shaped and socialized into ideal citizens, men, or liberal
democrats. Instead, he insisted that education as inquiry can transform those who have
already been socialized under non-ideal conditions. Instead of beginning with the
unsocialized child, Freire began with the socialized adult. He suggested that a theory of
unlearning or reeducation for adults may be more effective than the alternative,
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particularly if the goal is not gradual social change and progress but revolution and
transformation. Unlike Dewey, who still stressed socialization and believed that truthseeking inquiry could be made compatible with, even essential to, a dynamic and everprogressing democratic order, Freire took inquiry to be central to his theory precisely
because of its fundamentally disruptive quality. Because Freire’s understanding of
becoming and the achievement of an ideal self and society hinged on the exposure of
ideology, on the realization of truth in order to achieve justice, he wrongly collapsed
education for truth into education for becoming, rendering theme synonymous.
For Freire, “authentic” education is found in resisting the forces of both
socialization and transmission through constant critique and action via inquiry. It is
education in the mode of inquiry, but an inquiry that must always be self-consciously
political and unapologetic about the threat it poses to the status quo. Denouncing the
traditional school and its “banking” model of teaching and learning, Freire sought to
redefine education as a praxis that prompts critical consciousness and radical political
action. Like Rousseau, Freire was worried about the negative effects of being socialized
by and for a corrupt society. But rather than use education to protect and cultivate
independent judgment and goodness at the level of the individual, Freire sought to
weaponize education to transform the dominant culture and its structures. In Freire’s
view, a true education based in inquiry could prompt students to investigate the “why” of
their experiences. This would turn them into ideal political actors who could not only
reread their reality, but rewrite it.
According to Freire, forming citizens is therefore neither a question of
transmitting knowledge, nor a question of socializing them in the right way. True citizens
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are not created through correct formation from childhood, but by challenging how people
of every age understand the world and themselves in it. Freire maintained that much of
life is experienced on a kind of automatic setting, and he insisted that the task of
education is to problematize reality and to draw attention to causes in a way that spurs
political transformation. Whereas Dewey sought active participants in a progressive,
liberal-democratic order, Freire wanted radicals and revolutionaries who would always
struggle against order in the name of justice.
Influenced by Marxism, the Frankfurt School and liberation theology, Freire
articulated a vision of political education aimed at cultivating the class consciousness and
political action required for “permanent” revolution. His vision was not one of
intellectuals liberating the masses, but one of joint inquiry between teacher-students and
student-teachers that would result in what he termed the “mutual humanization” of all.
For Freire, education is not merely a prerequisite for revolution, but an ongoing and
integral part of what it means to be free and human. One cannot really exist in any
meaningful way, Freire thought, if one is not educated to social and political
consciousness.
Like Dewey, Freire asserted the fundamentally social nature of both education
and the human self. He held that education is always political and only ever possible in
community with others, and he charged all who say otherwise with deception or naivete.
For him, education can never be neutral and inquiry always has political consequences.
Of all the thinkers, Freire was the most adamant that education is not so much an
instrument of politics but politics itself. Because educational activity always serves a
political interest, he claimed, one must choose between serving those in power and
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serving those oppressed by that power. He thought it neither possible nor desirable to
separate education from politics, concluding that one must always decide whether to use
education to maintain an unjust status quo that enables and endorses oppression or to
continuously fight for justice and liberation.
Rejecting any “purist” understanding of education beyond politics, Freire
revealed how inquiry could connect us to others and spur political action. What he could
not understand was inquiry’s equally powerful ability to drive us to wonder in stillness or
solitude. Inquiry was always about becoming for Freire, and never about simply being
with truth. Freire claimed to care for openness, doubt, and uncertainty, but he insisted on
sharp dichotomies and self-definitions. He constantly stressed tensions but had no
patience for aporias, wrongly limiting what questions and knowledge are worthy of
pursuit by insisting that all questions must have answers and all knowledge must imply
action toward becoming. Like Dewey, he foreclosed the possibility of a kind of education
that does not already implicate and serve the interests of becoming a better self or society.
In forcing a necessarily interdependent relationship between truth-seeking and becoming,
Freire wrongly assumes that what is true will always lead to the ideal and that
understanding truth never has independent value or meaning of its own. In denying the
possibility of their separation, he embedded in the activity of truth-seeking an imperative
to act along with the assumption that such action will serve progress by realizing more
ideal selves and societies. In so doing, his theory not only jeopardizes learning the truth
he claimed to want, but ultimately sacrifices it to becoming.

A Teacher-Politician
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Before his heart attack and death on May 2, 1997, Freire was increasingly
disturbed by the post-Cold War “neoliberal” vision of education as a “neutral” means to a
good life. He was further troubled by the trend toward “scientific” approaches to the
study and practice of teaching and learning.476 One of the core tenets of Freire’s theory is
that education can never be neutral and that all education is political. Although Freire was
often criticized for being a politician rather than a teacher, he never took this as an insult.
For him, all politicians are teachers and all teachers are politicians. Variously dismissed
as both an elitist and a populist, Freire was above all, I argue, a political theorist, and the
failure to read him as such has distorted his reception in North America.
Paulo Reglus Neves Freire was born in Recife, Brazil in 1921 to a middle-class
family that fell into poverty during the Great Depression. Freire, who lost his father when
he was thirteen, described himself and his siblings as “connective” children who were
between two social classes. As he wrote in letters to his niece:
We participated in the world of those who ate well, even though we had very little
to eat ourselves, and in the world of kids from very poor neighborhoods on the
outskirts of town. We were linked to the former by our middle-class position; we
were connected to the latter by our hunger, even though our hardships were less
than theirs.477
Through the efforts of his mother, Freire was still able to pursue education, and
eventually his family’s financial situation recovered. But this experience as an
“intermediate” or “conjunction” child affected him deeply, and he often noted how it
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caused him to question what accounts for the difference between classes and why it is
that some people have plenty to eat while others starve.478
In his twenties Freire went on to study law, but he never practiced. Instead, he
taught Portuguese in secondary school and went on to work in government. By then, he
was already married to his first wife, Elza Maia Costa de Oliveira, whom he frequently
and lovingly credited with first drawing his attention to questions of pedagogy.479 In
1959, he earned his doctorate and became a tenured professor in the history and
philosophy of education.480 A teacher, scholar, and public servant, Freire’s work and
study centered around adult education and literacy campaigns. What set him apart from
others engaged in this work was his method. Rather than use ready-made primers to teach
the rural poor to read, Freire insisted on locally-developed materials grounded in the
everyday experiences of learners. In his “culture circles,” students would not simply learn
how to read and write, but engage in discussions about their reality. Put another way, he
connected the act of reading and writing words to that of rereading and rewriting the
world.
Freire’s methods drew the unwelcome attention of the authorities who took over
Brazil in its 1964 military coup. Labelled a communist, he was jailed twice and
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interrogated, and when it became clear that he would be arrested once again, he fled into
exile, first to Bolivia and then to Chile. It was not Freire’s imprisonment—which lasted a
total of 75 days—but his exile that most profoundly influenced his thought.481 His most
famous work, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, was written in Chile and published in 1968.
Appearing in English in 1970, it would not be published in its original Portuguese until
1974. By then, Freire had become internationally recognized and read.482 Offered a
visiting professorship at Harvard, Freire spent some time in the United States before
moving to Geneva. There, he became involved in a number of projects, including
advising education reform in former colonies in Africa. In total, he spent sixteen years in
exile before returning to Brazil and continuing his work in government and education.483
A prolific writer, Freire was unapologetically as political as he was theoretical,
and his theory was always rooted in his practice.484 But despite the fact that he embodied
every sense of the term “political theorist,” Freire remains relatively unknown as such.
Instead, he is mainly known and read by educators and education scholars as a founder of
“critical pedagogy,” a philosophy of education and approach to teaching known for its
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emphasis on dialogue and critique.485 In effect, Freire is known more for his teaching
methods than for his political theory. The reason why, I argue, has more to do with his
intellectual trajectory and reception abroad than it does with the substance of his thought.
Freire began as a linguist before turning to pedagogy and politics, but political
philosophy was always of interest to him. Although one cannot be certain that he read all
of the books he purchased, Freire kept a handwritten book record until 1955 that offers
some insight into his earliest influences.486 Works by Plato, Rousseau, and Dewey are
listed among the 572 entries, and his own work explicitly cites Plato and Dewey.487
Mostly, however, Freire preferred to be in conversation with Marxists, critical theorists,
and post-colonial thinkers. He frequently cited Karl Marx, Antonio Gramsci, and Frantz
Fanon—none of whom, curiously, are listed in his early book record.488 Freire was
especially drawn to those figures who, like him, straddled the realms of thought and
action, and he frequently praised Che Guevara and Amílcar Cabral.
In addition to Marxism, the other great influence on Freire’s thought was Catholic
liberation theology. Of Pedagogy of the Oppressed, he wrote, “I am certain that
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Christians and Marxists, though they may disagree with me in part or in whole, will
continue reading to the end.”489 Once, when Freire was asked about the “great educators”
and “great philosophers” who influenced his work and thought, the first person he spoke
of was Christ, whom he regarded as “a simple educator” who gives “fantastic testimony”
of his conception of history and education.490 Although Freire admitted to never feeling
fully comfortable discussing his faith, he always readily acknowledged the influence of
Christianity.491 For him, to be Christian was to seek to struggle on behalf of the
oppressed.
As Freire’s thought spread, the number of his influences and interlocuters grew,
and his theory continued to evolve. Freire often noted, for example, how his encounters
with North American feminists made him ensure that his subsequent work was more
inclusive of women and also more explicitly attentive to questions of racial and ethnic
diversity.492 But the most consequential encounter Freire had with North America and the
interlocutor that most influenced the trajectory of his reception was scholar Henry A.
Giroux. It was with Giroux that Freire went on to found the field of critical pedagogy.493
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As Giroux wrote in his introduction to Freire’s The Politics of Education:
Culture, Power, and Liberation, Freire’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed appeared when
radical education scholars were developing critiques of formal education as sites for the
reproduction of capitalist ideology.494 These critiques tended to give the impression that
schools could only ever serve the dominant order and therefore offered no hope for those
seeking social change. What Freire did, in Giroux’s words, was to combine the “language
of critique” with the “language of possibility,” thereby showing that there is always
hope.495 Against a more fatalistic view, critical pedagogy suggests that the proper
approach to teaching can result in an education that challenges rather than perpetuates
structures of domination. While Freire never advocated the total erasure of the distinction
between teacher and student, he stressed the importance of a democratic, dialogic
approach to education that takes seriously the student’s already-existing knowledge and
experiences.496
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As Clarissa Hayword, one of the few political theorists to draw on Freire notes,
critical pedagogy tends to take a “faced view of power,” meaning that it always sees
power as the tool of specific actors (i.e. teachers) and fails to recognize the ways in which
power operates “in boundaries to social action that no actor ‘has’ or ‘uses.’”497 In other
words, it tends to assume that with the proper method, powerful teachers can “empower”
students.498 Hayword goes on to critique critical pedagogy for its limited account of
power and for its failure to appreciate the strategic ways in which teachers are forced to
adopt seemingly disempowering pedagogies. As I will show, however, Freire never
advocated the simplistic idea of powerful teachers empowering students. He rejected the
one-directional view that the faced view of power model endorses and he further worried
about its implications. As Freire once said to his collaborator Ira Shor:
It is interesting to me how people in the United States are so preoccupied in using
this word and concept 'empowerment.' There is some reason in this, some
meaning to it. My fear in using the expression 'empowerment' is that some people
may think that such a practice simply empowers the students, and then everything
is finished, our work is done, over! I wish I could better express the feeling deep
inside me about this desire to use the word 'empowerment’.499
As I read him, what essentially drew Freire’s discomfort with the language of
empowerment in association with his thought was that it missed the political point. It
took what is really a theory of radical political action and turned it into a toothless
teaching technique that offers, at best, empty critiques. As I will demonstrate, Freire was
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a deeply dialectical thinker who denounced both “verbalism” and “activism” in favor of a
“praxis” that would be both active and theoretical.
Freire never sought to “empower” individual students to succeed in the status quo,
and the way in which Freire is often narrowly invoked as an advocate for mere dialogue
and “giving voice” in the classroom is especially irritating to his translator and
collaborator, Donaldo Macedo. In his forward to Teachers as Cultural Workers: Letters
to those Who Teach, Macedo censures those “pseudocritical” educators who “invoke a
romantic pedagogical model that isolates lived experiences as a process of coming to
voice” and thereby “reduce their pedagogy to a form of middle-class narcissism.” 500 He
accuses them of using Freire’s dialogic method to provide students with a “group-therapy
space for stating their grievances” and the teacher with a “safe pedagogical zone to deal
with his or her class guilt.”501 What Macedo fails to stress is that the root of their mistake
is not so much a misapplication of Freire’s methods as it is a failure appreciate Freire’s
larger political philosophy. As his closest readers well know, while Freire certainly had
much to say about classroom spaces, his view of teaching and learning in schools was
only a part of a much broader political theory of power, justice, social change, human
nature, and freedom.
In his own time, Freire was also frustrated by bad readings of his work and
critiques that he perceived to be unfair. He often attributed these to a lack of reading,

500

Paulo Freire, Teachers As Cultural Workers: Letters to Those Who Dare Teach With
New Commentary by Peter McLaren, Joe L. Kincheloe, and Shirley Steinberg Expanded
Edition (Avalon Publishing, 2005), vii–viii.
501

Freire, vii–viii.
221

lamenting that he was either known only for Pedagogy of the Oppressed or second-hand
through the work and criticism of others. 502 At first glance, Freire’s frustration may
appear puzzling given that he so often claimed that he had no desire to “be transplanted”
and that the best way to follow him was to reinvent him.503 Reflecting on Pedagogy of the
Oppressed, Freire wrote, “For me, whatever universality there is in [it] derives from the
vigor and force of its locales. I had no pretentions or dreams of developing a universal
theory with this book.”504 Freire was always adamant that context is paramount and that
theory and practice must always inform one another. But while he never endorsed a
universal application of his pedagogic theory, he and those closest to him were clearly
unhappy with how some chose to “reinvent” him.
Was Freire being hypocritical or dishonest in calling for reinvention while
insisting on a right way to be read? I maintain that this apparent disconnect is explained
by the fact that while Freire does not advocate a universal teaching method, he does
aspire to something universal, in so far as he offers a political theory. Any reading of
Freire that adopts his practice without his political thought is almost surely a misreading,
and their “domestication” of Freire stands in sharp contrast to those who censored him
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precisely because they read him as a dangerous political theorist.505 If educators wish to
“correctly” adapt and implement his methods, they must have a proper appreciation of his
political theory.

Against Socialization
A study of Freire’s body of work reveals that Pedagogy of the Oppressed, in part
a response to Fanon’s Wretched of the Earth, contains the seeds of the larger political
philosophy that should guide any reading and practice of Freire. While the text grew out
of his particular experience running and developing literacy programs for the rural poor
of Brazil, it reveals a generalizable critique of traditional teaching methods and of a key
portion of his intended audience: the segment of the intellectual left that presumes itself
to be the liberators of the lower classes.506 Far more skeptical of formal schooling than
Dewey, Freire came to occupy a position on schooling somewhere between the
pragmatist progressive and his Marxist critics. Rejecting both transmission and
socialization, he advanced a new theory of education as inquiry toward political activism.
Freire insisted that existing educational practice served a politics of domination
and oppression. In Pedagogy of the Oppressed, he critiqued what he called “banking”
models of education, which he described as follows: “In the banking concept of
505
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education, knowledge is a gift bestowed by those who consider themselves
knowledgeable upon those whom they consider to know nothing.”507 This model, Freire
thought, is popular not only with oppressors seeking to dominate the oppressed, but also
with their would-be liberators. Freire sought to prevent the hypocritical adoption of the
banking model by those who claimed to fight oppression.
In rejecting traditional approaches to education where students are treated like
empty containers that teachers must fill with “deposits” of their knowledge, Freire was
very much in line with Plato, Rousseau, and Dewey. His critique of “banking education,”
for example, was very similar to Dewey’s critique of the “monastery education” model
that treats students like “a phonographic disc upon which certain impressions were made
by the teacher, so that when the disc was put on the machine and the movement started
(which, again, would be during the examination period), it might reveal what had been
inscribed upon it.”508 But while Plato, Rousseau, and Dewey largely dismissed education
as transmission, they did not explicitly emphasize its oppressive quality and the politics
of it in the way that Freire did. Moreover, unlike their dismissal of transmission in favor
of socialization, Freire’s rejection of education’s “narration sickness” was based more on
its effectiveness than its ineffectiveness.509
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Freire scorned the banking model not only because it falsely “regards men as
adaptable, manageable beings,” but because of the indirect, yet real and detrimental
effects he thought it had on society.510 He revealed that the widely-accepted model of
education as transmission can serve as a powerful myth that socializes the uneducated to
defer to authority in part by rewarding students for their passivity. In other words, Freire
highlighted that one’s beliefs about education—including the attitudes around education
as transmission—can themselves be part of socialization. As it is usually practiced,
education as transmission tends to socialize people to be passive and uncritical.
Crucially, it is not transmission or narration itself that was the problem for Freire,
but the attitudes and beliefs that usually underlie its use. While many assume Freire was
simply rejecting the lecture as a teaching method, as he later clarified, this is not the case:
“It is also important to say that by criticizing banking education we have to recognize that
not all kinds of lecturing is banking education. You can still be very critical while
lecturing.”511 The content of the lecture as well as the manner in which it is presented
mattered to Freire. If the lecture is being given as a “deposit” the listener must simply
accept, then it is contributing to problematic socialization. But the lecture may also be a
means of posing a problem for students to critique, investigate, and discuss rather than
simply absorb.
Having critiqued transmission, Frere turned his attention not to getting
socialization right in the way that Plato, Rousseau, and Dewey did, but to making the
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critique of socialization the center of a “true” political education. Freire thought the goal
of education as socialization was necessarily the “adapted person” who is “better ‘fit’ for
the world.”512 To socialize people for society is to educate them in the interest of those in
power. Such an education only really helps those who benefit from the existing political
system. As Freire put it in The Politics of Education:
Generally speaking, the good student is not one who is restless or intractable, or
one who reveals one’s doubts or wants to know the reason behind facts, or one
who breaks with reestablished models, or one who denounces a mediocre
bureaucracy, or one who refuses to be an object. To the contrary, the so-called
good student is one who repeats, who renounces critical thinking, who adjusts to
models.513
For Freire, education as socialization works hand-in-hand with domination. When the
oppressed are educated, it is in order to adapt to their domination. Those who fail to adapt
are treated as deviations and as the “pathology of the healthy society” that is assumed
just.514 This is convenient for those invested in the status quo: Rather than fundamentally
change the system, they use schooling to change children into adults who will accept it.
Such a critique applies even to Dewey, who simply stressed a less oppressive and more
democratic ideal of a well-adjusted adult.
For Freire, it is a universal truth that all education is inherently political. Freire
was very clear that “education worldwide is political by nature,” and that in
“metaphysical terms,” “politics is the soul of education” everywhere.515 This is true at
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every level and at every age. For Freire, education always involves “directives,”
“objectives,” and “dreams,” and these make it impossible for education to escape its
“policity.”516 The question for Freire is never whether education should serve politics, but
how. As he was fond of repeating, “The question before us is to know what type of
politics it is, in favor of what and of whom, and against what and for whom it is
realized.”517 Importantly, the politics of education is not merely a question of its content
or goals, but of the manner in which it is carried out, as the pedagogic practice itself is
always political too.
At times Freire sounded very similar to those on the left who challenged Dewey’s
hopeful and optimistic vision of social reform through schooling. Like those who, against
Dewey, suggested that schools could only ever perpetuate the dominant ideology of a
given society, Freire maintained, “It is not education that molds society to certain
standards, but society that forms itself by its own standards and molds education to
conform with those values that sustain it.”518 Whereas Dewey appeared to give more
power and autonomy to education, Freire argued that even the very meaning of
intellectualism is determined by those in power.519 Generally speaking, schooling offers
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“an efficient mechanism for social control,” and so formal education could never be the
driver of real change, much less revolution.520
But in the end, Freire’s critique of traditional schooling never led him to join the
ranks of his friend Ivan Illich, whose Deschooling Society was published shortly after
Pedagogy of the Oppressed.521 While thinkers like Illich asserted that formal schooling
inevitably reproduced bourgeois ideology and capitalism, Freire dismissed this view of
the school as totalizing and mechanical.522 As he wrote in Literacy: Reading and Writing
the World, “Education, it is true, reproduces the dominant ideology, but this is not the
only thing it does.”523 First, it was important to distinguish between “systematic
education” and “educational projects.”524 And while the first was always ultimately
controlled by elites, the second could be used to subvert them. It was important, then, not
to conflate education with schooling and thereby dismiss its promise prematurely.
Second, Freire was convinced that there are always conflicting “subsystems” and
relationships that produce tensions in the world. Reality is not made up of static and
mechanical relationships, but of contradictory and dynamic ones. These “contradictions”
in society “penetrate the intimacy of the pedagogical institutions in which systematic
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education is working and alter its a role or its replicating work of the dominant
ideology.”525 This means that even within schools, there would always be spaces of
resistance and questioning students. Traditional schools might treat students like passive
receptacles, but that did not make them necessarily so in fact.
As Freire clarified, he did not think that schools “really create subjectivity,” even
though they might “repress the development of subjectivity” by, for example, repressing
originality.526 Freire therefore diverged from the more pessimistic view which said that
nothing could be done with schooling until after the desired revolution had arrived. For
those who believed schooling could do nothing more than replicate the dominant
ideology, there were only two options: Either one should aim to abandon the school
altogether, or one’s favored ideology had to come to power in order to make any use of
schooling. But Freire insisted that education is “a permanent process” that precedes,
accompanies, and follows any political organizing or social change.527 Education was not
a panacea, but it was always an integral part of the solution.
Therefore, one certainly needed to think outside of schools, but that did not render
the abolition of schools necessary or desirable. The formal education of the school should
work together with—not be replaced by—the kind of education that happens in
organizing and social movements. Freire certainly recognized the educative potential of
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sites like workplaces and unions, but he maintained that schools were also promising sites
of education for political change.
For Freire, we are conditioned by institutions but not determined by them. He
fully appreciated the power of education as socialization, but he argued that authentic
education would have to mean confronting and combatting this power, not attempting to
destroy or coopt it. The desirable outcome was neither a world without schools nor one in
which his preferred leftist government simply took them over and used the schools to
socialize students and transmit new ideas. Rather, Freire claimed that a truly
revolutionary education would mean becoming conscious of the shaping effects of
culture and society, interrogating them, and realizing one’s ability to shape them in turn.
This realization had to manifest as political action. As much as Freire rejected the
“mechanistic comprehension of history” presupposed by those who viewed persons as the
mere products of institutions, he also rejected the “subjective idealism” inherent in the
opposite view which thought that changing minds was enough to change the world.528 For
this reason, he viewed schools as a necessary but insufficient condition for social and
political change.529
Freire ultimately sided closer to Dewey, then, in deeming schools necessary for
society as well as social change. At the same time, he insisted that schools would never
be at the forefront of a revolution, a fact which did not worry Dewey, as he was more
interested in reform. The most liberating education, Freire thought, could “only be put
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into practice outside the ordinary system” because the ruling elites would always control
the schools and never allow them to be an instrument of their demise.530 If for Dewey the
school could act as a kind of rational arbiter working intentionally in the name of
progress, for Freire any kind of scientism, even in the name of progress, should be
rejected. Whereas Dewey sought harmonization and generally deemphasized power and
contestation, Freire found the most hope in contradiction and struggle.
What Freire ultimately wanted was a liberatory education for and with those
oppressed by a given society. Such an education would both investigate the causes of
oppression and spur concrete political action that would “reinvent” rather than simply
“take” power.531 Again, education was fundamentally political for Freire, but that did not
mean that it should simply be weaponized by the party in charge. A real revolution, he
thought, demanded a truly revolutionary education with a practice and politics consistent
with it. One could not be radically democratic only to embrace an authoritarian
conception of education.
Successfully implementing and achieving such an education would depend on the
context at hand, but there would always be some common features. First, a Freirian
education would have to be with the oppressed, meaning that the oppressed would have
to participate in their own liberation in order for it to be truly liberating. No one could
ever free another through education. As Freire put it, the oppressed must “contribute to
the midwifery of their liberating pedagogy.”532This meant that the student would have to
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be respected as a knowing student-teacher and the instructor would have to understand
themselves as a learning teacher-student. Together, through a process of joint inquiry and
dialogue, they would arrive at a new understanding.
Second, a Freirian education would always be grounded in real content, meaning
that Freire rejected the idea that one could teach a politically neutral kind of “critical
thinking” as though it were a kind of technical skill. One doesn’t simply learn to be
critical, but to be critical about a concrete reality and in a way that is necessarily political.
Freire further mandated that the content should be tied directly to the student’s
experience of the world and never understood as a “gift” from the teacher.
Finally, a Freirian education would always contain a moment of action. Especially
as Freire’s thought developed, he was adamant that critiques and consciousness-raising
were insufficient. While education should change how the oppressed see themselves and
their reality, this was not separate from or a mere pre-cursor to political action for Freire.
Like Dewey, Freire insisted on both thought and action. For Freire, every practice
presumes a theory and every theory urges a practice, and each implicates the other.
“True” education requires both reflection as well as action.
The idea is to begin with the student’s real-world experience and selfunderstanding in order to interrogate it and challenge it through dialogue. While the
teacher must respect the knowledge of the student, they are not to defer to it entirely, in
part because dominant ideologies might be affecting the student’s thought. Because
oppression is often internalized, oppressed students must recognize themselves as the
“hosts” of their oppressor, who like a demon must be exorcised in order for the “mutual
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humanization” of both the oppressor and the oppressed to become possible. Having
achieved greater clarity, they are able to proceed to the second moment of education:
political action.
In practice, Freire’s adult literacy programs involved the formation of “culture
circles” in peasant communities. First, a team of coordinators would conduct extensive
research about the area and the everyday life of the peasants they would be teaching.
Rather than rely on prepackaged lesson plans, they would design the content for the
course around their observations. This way, the content of the lessons was always based
on the actual day-to-day experience of the learner. The students would be presented with
everyday scenes, and these would generate the words that would themselves become
themes for discussion. As part of becoming literate, then, the learners would also be
discussing their everyday life. Through these discussions, the students would dive into
the “why” of things, namely the systemic reasons behind their status quo.
Freire recounted how initially, many of the peasants accepted the stories told
about themselves by their oppressors. Many also rationalized the status quo as the will of
God. Oftentimes, they would be very engaged in the conversation, only to abruptly
chastise themselves and say, “Excuse us, we ought to keep quiet and let you talk. You are
the one who knows, we don’t know anything.”533 Through continued discussions and
challenges offered by the teachers, however, the peasants came to a new understanding if
not of their oppression, then of the reasons for it and their capacity for political action.
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As Freire described it, in becoming literate, his students not only learned to read
words but to reread the world; they not only learned to write words but to see themselves
as authors of the world. That is, they gained a sense of agency and a new understanding
of culture as human action upon the world. Culture was no longer some privileged
knowledge or something above them and out of reach. Culture was something they
already had and that they could shape by acting in and on the given, natural world. As
crucial as this new understanding was, it was only the first step in a “permanent”
revolution. Once started, the work of education would never be finished.

Education as Mutual Humanization
For Freire, the work of education could never be finished because human beings
are both always unfinished and aware of their incompleteness. Educability itself is
“grounded in the radical unfinishedness of the human condition and in our consciousness
of this unfinished state.”534 Unlike animals, who are also unfinished, human beings can
be conscious of their unfinished nature, causing them to constantly seek to become more
than they are and thereby changing their relationship to the world. To be fully human for
Freire is to be aware of ourselves as unfinished beings in a “permanent relationship” with
an unfinished, “historical-cultural” world: Humans both “transform the world and
undergo the effects of their transformation.”535 The heart of Freire’s political theory of
education is not democratic classrooms filled with dialogue or consciousness-raising, but
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a belief in education as the embodiment of the attempt to become more human through
what we might call “world-self” transformation. Put another way, education is the means
by which people become more political beings and therefore more human.
According to Freire, “True education incarnates the permanent search of people
together with others for their becoming more fully human in the world in which they
exist.”536 “True” education insists on both the capacity of human beings to transform the
world and the role of the world in transforming humans. This is why Freire argued that
education could never simply be a mechanism for reproduction any more than it could
fundamentally change the world through ideas and critique alone. Freire could not accept
any theory of education that viewed the relationships between the student and the world
or the student and the teacher as one-directional.537 Authentic education, for Freire,
validates the unfinished quality of both humans and the world as well as their relationship
to each other. In doing this, it is also liberatory: freedom is “the indispensable condition
for the quest for human completion.”538 Without freedom, there can be no humanization.
Freire thought that to lose a sense of one’s capacity to act on the world is to lose
not only freedom but the defining quality of being human. All humans, but especially
“the people,” have a calling to become more human, but this “vocation” can suffer a
“distortion” in history, leading to “dehumanization.”539 This distortion is the hallmark of
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oppression, which Freire defines as “any situation in which ‘A’ objectively exploits ‘B’
or hinders his and her pursuit of self-affirmation as a responsible person.”540 Oppression
makes impotence seem normal, even fated. When humanity is “taken” in this way, it
harms both the people it was taken from as well as those who took it. The remedy Freire
offered is a political-educational project of “mutual humanization” that confirms human
agency and sustains the struggle toward a new world free of the oppression, alienation,
and meaninglessness that cause and characterize dehumanization.
Because the goal of education is to enable students to become more fully human
and because for Freire to be human is to see oneself as an author in the world, true
education will not see the student as the product of a teacher’s efforts but as an agent
capable of self-world transformation. True education will not train people in skills, but
help students “assume the true role incumbent upon them as people […] the role of being
Subjects in the transformation of the world.”541 Again, this should lead students to both
question their reality and inspire them to change it. In his earlier work, Freire named this
process “conscientização,” but finding it frequently misinterpreted, he abandoned it after
1987.542
The consciousness Freire described demands a new understanding of history and
one’s role in it. As Freire described it, there are three different types of consciousness:
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naïve, critical, and magical.543 While the first leads people to think the world is fully in
their control, the latter leads people to think they have no recourse but to adapt to it. Only
critical consciousness correctly perceives the dialectical relationship between the self and
the world. Despite the implications of his earliest works, Freire did not maintain that
conscientização is the linear movement of individuals through discrete stages. As both
Peter Roberts and Antonia Darder have stressed in their scholarship on Freire, the
relationship between these types of consciousness is overlapping and dialectical.544 This
tendency to think of conscientização as a process of moving through stages was one of
many misunderstandings that led Freire to abandon the term.
Correctly understood, conscientização is a collective, social process, not one of
gradual, individual enlightenment. One does not arrive at a completed state of critical
consciousness, rather, it is an ongoing process that is always unfinished and always
demands engagement with the world and others. Critical consciousness cannot be
achieved alone, nor can it be given to a student by teacher. Rather, it is the result of a
mutual process between teachers and students. Although the teacher respects the
knowledge of the student and begins with it, they must not idealize it. As he described it
in his letters to Guineau-Bissau, this means “returning to them, in an organized form,
what they have themselves offered in a disorganized form.”545 The teacher helps the
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student make sense of their knowledge and experience with the world in a deeper way,
helping them to be more critical of their reality. Distinguishable from persuasion,
manipulation, and propaganda, education as humanization can only occur through
dialogue that interrogates how knowledge relates to the world, thereby exposing how the
world might be transformed.
As I have already stressed, the point of a Freirian education is not merely to
emphasize dialogue or give voice to the oppressed, but to generate a rereading and a
rewriting of the world. This is clear not only in Freire’s work in Brazil, but through his
work in post-colonial Africa as well. In Guinea-Bissau, where the challenge was to
totally remake the school system against the model left by the colonizers and suitable to
the new society, Freire suggested restructuring education around key themes like “rice”
and offering a truly comprehensive education. Instead of simply learning about rice
production, for example, students would learn about history, politics, health, and
geography through this common and relevant theme. As with Freire’s approach to
literacy education in Brazil, the students would never learn only technical skills, but
always be gaining a deeper understanding of their reality and their capacity to transform
it through their education.
Because conscientização is always grounded in social and material conditions,
one cannot simply be or become “critically conscious” without reference to and
immersion within a concrete reality. That is, in calling for critical thought, Freire was not
calling for a mental capacity devoid of content or for a distanced, intellectual critique of
the world. Freire dismissed the claims of teachers who say they teach students “how to
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think” because one must always be thinking about some concrete thing.546 As Freire
insisted, “In so far as this type of education is reduced to methods and techniques by
which students and educators look at social reality–when they do look at it—only to
describe it, this education becomes as domesticating as any other.”547 To divorce critical
thought from content or action in this way is to “mythologize” and depoliticize it.548
Against this understanding of critical thought, conscientização is a political-educational
process both grounded in reality and always tied to action. It understands that
consciousness is neither capable of changing reality on its own nor a “mere reflection of
reality.”549 Rather, it emerges from the endless interplay of these tensions. Put another
way, conscientização involves “constant clarification of what remains hidden within us
while we move about in the world” and is therefore “as permanent as any real
revolution.”550 It is always ongoing as new thought demands new action which demands
new thought which demands new action.
Freire’s model of education as humanization held that we are most human when
we are self-consciously engaged in political action. To be human is to not only be aware
of one’s unfinished nature in an unfinished world, but to seek to become “more” through
self-world understanding and transformation. Therefore, Freire’s political-educational
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goal was not to organize and mobilize oppressed classes by enlightening them with
knowing teachers, but to remind them of their humanity so that they might participate in
the never-ending struggle to create a new and better world. Freire’s hope was that his
model of education would allow the oppressed to liberate themselves, not by imitating or
becoming their oppressors, but by creating a new world that affirmed the freedom and
humanity of all. Only through the creation of something truly new could today’s
revolutionaries avoid becoming tomorrow’s oppressors.

Dialogics toward Liberation
Instead of focusing on institutions, Freire’s model of education as humanization
centered the teacher as a political agent. In Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Freire presumed
an unjust order by default sustained by teachers who were most likely from the oppressor
class. He contended that those who wish to teach the oppressed must understand that they
themselves are in need of liberation and that only their students can liberate them both:
“Only the power that springs from the weakness of the oppressed will be sufficiently
strong to free both.”551 Any attempt to defer to that weakness will most likely result in a
“false generosity” that feeds itself on the status quo rather than a “true generosity” that
turns “supplicating” hands into “human hands which work and, working, transform the
world.”552 In order to truly join the oppressed, the teacher must be reborn and adopt a
new pedagogy.
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Freire aligned the ideal teacher with the ideal revolutionary leader who emerges
from the contradiction between the dominant and the dominated in society. Both must
identify themselves with the oppressed and engage in a process of mutual humanization
with them. To truly educate is to make students see the world and themselves more
clearly so that they can transform both. This means that as radicals, Freirian educators
must have a “correct” view of history and reality as ever-changing and in constant need
of reassessment. Critical and creative, they can never see the world as fixed because they
understand the “dialectical unity” of subjectivity and objectivity.553 This differentiates
them from “rightist sectarians” who “attempt to domesticate the present so that (he or she
hopes) the future will reproduce this domesticated present” as well as “leftist sectarians”
who “consider the future pre-established [as] a kind of inevitable fate, fortune, or
destiny.”554 While sectarians insist on the truths they construct, the radical embraces
uncertainty and knows that history is made with the people, not for them or in spite of
them. Radical educators must always be prepared to relearn what they think they know,
and for this reason, Freire saw no dichotomy between teaching and research.555
As has already been made clear, Freire’s educator cannot simply transmit
knowledge or “liberate” students. Open to the possibility of his or her own
transformation, the Freirian teacher must first join the oppressed by undergoing a quasi-
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religious death and resurrection.556 They must completely renounce the oppressor class to
enter in communion with their pupils. This means engaging in constant self-criticism and
self-examination, and above all, trusting their students, the people. The teacher must be
patient, humble, hopeful, and secure in the knowledge that true education is both a
cooperative activity and political one. It is always a process of mutual shaping: Teachers
do not form students and students do not form themselves, but each participates in the
process through dialogue. Educators must be willing to listen to their students and engage
in meaningful discussion with them.
Although there is something Socratic in Freire’s stress on inquiry and dialogue, he
never associated himself with Socrates and only made reference to him in order to
distance himself. On Freire’s reading, Plato understood dialogue as a way of
remembering what was already known, whereas for Freire, “For dialogue to be a method
of true knowledge, the knowing subjects must approach reality scientifically in order to
seek the dialectical connections which explain the form of reality.”557 The Freirian
teacher is not a Socrates but a “cultural worker” who possesses several qualities,
including “humility,” “lovingness,” “courage,” “tolerance,” “decisiveness,” “security,”
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“verbal parsimony,” and “the joy of living.”558 Unlike Socrates’ questioning, Freire’s
inquiry must always be linked to social action and transformation.559
While Freire called for a more democratic relationship between the teacher and
the student, he always insisted on their distinction. Freire dismissed the notion that
teachers should be mere facilitators, asserting that the educator must maintain authority
without ever becoming authoritarian.560 For Freire, there is a difference between
imposing and proposing.561 If teachers were to abdicate their directive role, he thought,
students could never know freedom, which can only be developed in relation to
authority.562 That is, Freire insisted that freedom cannot exist without limits, and so the
teacher must provide the authority needed to enable the student’s freedom to be realized.
Teachers must therefore avoid anything like indifference or what he termed “laissez-faire
education,” and instead be an “active and curious presence” without overshadowing the
students.563 Freire dismissed progressive models of education that allowed students to
simply play or learn whatever they wanted, as though the teacher were only a neutral
midwife and had nothing to offer the student.
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In Freire’s view, the directive teacher sees their role as a “politician” and has a
clear understanding of themselves politically.564 They should therefore be clear and open
about their politics and encourage students to challenge their position. Freire rejected the
idea that the teacher could ever transcend their time or place, which was yet another
reason why he was so dismayed at the tendency to reduce him to a methodology.
According to him, teaching should never be viewed as a science or a set of universal
techniques, but as a self-consciously political and localized act. The teacher who does not
know their politics risks becoming a “bureaucratized” follower engaged in meaningless
day-to-day activity.565
Therefore, the teacher must always know in whose interest they educate, and this
interest must be specific. No teacher can be for “everyone and anything” or for “vague
phrases” like “people” or “humanity.”566 For Freire, neutrality is a “colorless, tasteless
thing,” “a comfortable and perhaps hypocritical way of avoiding any choice or even
hiding [one’s] fear of denouncing injustice.”567 Teachers must have concrete political
dreams and be in touch with their political goals, and they cannot be afraid to criticize the
dreams of their students. As Freire once said to Ira Shor:
We must say to the students how we think and why. My role is not to be silent. I
have to convince students of my dreams but not conquer them for my own plans.
Even if students have the right to bad dreams, I have the right to say their dreams
are bad, reactionary or capitalist or authoritarian.”568
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Freire thought teachers must, with openness and with the knowledge that they themselves
are always unfinished, attempt to convince students of what they think is just. To do
otherwise is to be like a Pontius Pilate amidst oppression.569

Inquiry as Politics
Freire thought teachers must reveal their politics, but he also thought that they
have a responsibility to inform students of other positions. Somewhat surprisingly, he
stressed the importance of intellectual diversity, particularly in his later writings.
Institutionally, Freire thought that the university needed both progressives and
reactionaries and that a university with just one or the other type would be a “disaster”
since:
What youths need is precisely the testimony of the difference and the right to
discuss the difference. This is what should happen. How beautiful it is for the
students who finished listening to a progressive teacher speaking about utopia,
criticizing, for example, a neoliberal discourse, which is spreading now the
terrible ideology of fatalism around the world, [and then] to listen, after that
teacher leaves, to another teacher defending the neoliberal thought.570
But although Freire spoke about the importance of ideological diversity in the university,
he offered no explanation of how to guarantee that students would be exposed to that
diversity instead of simply choosing classes with the teachers and students whose
reputations align with their preconceptions. Freire wrongly assumed that the teacher who
pronounces themselves a politician hasn’t already undercut their ability to make a real
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connection with all of their students and already closed off the possibility of the kind of
learning Freire said he wanted. Such a teacher might sooner see a classroom either filled
with students that already agree with him or her, or, if the students cannot choose their
teacher, a classroom with alienated students who know they have no real hope of
changing their teacher’s mind.
Freire further assumed that a teacher can only have one message to all students.
He could not account for the teacher who can take the time to defer their “dreams” and
their politics in order to help students better understand their own at an individual level.
Freire may have been correct in pointing out that who to teach, what to teach about, and
even how to teach is always political, but that does not mean that the goals of the
teaching must always be explicitly political and seeking to form students as a group to
think and act in one direction. For Freire, the teacher must always be the steward of
becoming and can never be one who inspires, models, or guides a student’s search for
truth apart from politics.
Freire made these assumptions because he could not accept those who claimed to
be apolitical or politically neutral, associating them with those who supported the
technocratic view of education supported by neoliberalism. Later in life, Freire was
especially dismayed by the growing consensus that education could be a neutral
instrument for empowering students to succeed without revolt. He thought his peers too
willing to submit to global capitalism and to abandon education’s revolutionary potential.
For Freire, education is a solution to social, political, and economic problems in so far as
it works to dismantle and resist those structures and institutions that are at the root of
those problems. But for most, Freire realized, education was seen as a solution in a
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different way: Everything from economic disadvantage to social division is caused not by
existing institutions, but by a lack of education, and so what is needed is simply more and
better education, not systemic, political change.
More and more, Freire thought, people were more interested in using education to
help individual students succeed in a rotten system. While he understood the pragmatism
behind the position that what people need is food and not philosophy, he insisted that
they could have both. Like Dewey, Freire thought that technical training could and never
should be merely technical. In learning how to do a job, one could also learn about the
history and politics of that job. Rather than concede that education was better off
empowering individuals to succeed, Freire never abandoned the idea that it should
empower classes to remake the system altogether. He saw individualistic notions of
freedom as false and limited, and he maintained that the liberation of any one student
only matters in so far as it contributes to social liberation.
Like Dewey, Freire insisted on the inherently social and political character of
education. He rejected solitary contemplation as well as any idea of education as truth
seeking for its own sake. Freire insisted that truth and knowledge are never neutral; that
this is a lie told by those in power. For Freire, education is always for the sake of
something and someone; it always either serves those in power or works against them.
There is something irresponsible if not unethical about trying to pry education away from
politics. To educate or not to educate is itself a political choice, what to teach and study is
also a political choice, and the results of educational activity have political consequences.
Freire argued that this was the case for every subject, be it history, science, math or
reading. By choosing not to teach math using problems that force students to confront
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economic injustice, for example, teachers were making a political choice that helped
support injustice. Education is inescapably political, regardless of the level or age of the
persons involved and regardless of their conscious awareness of the politics involved.
Freire denied that education could ever offer an escape from its policity. He
believed that anyone who claims to learn for the sake of learning truth is simply hiding
their politics, which are complicit in the existing power structure and its injustices. Like
Dewey, Freire assumed that social and political change can always be directed for the
better, and that the only meaningful life is a social and political one. But what if, for some
people, fulfillment is found in the quiet moments—however fleeting—that one can stand
apart from the world in contemplation of something beyond politics and beyond the
immediate concerns of becoming?
Freire could not appreciate the value of understanding or solitude untethered to
action. Even as a writer, Freire claimed to never write for pleasure but because he felt
“politically committed” and wanted to persuade.571 For Freire, solitude only obviated the
need for sociality and had to be overcome.572 For him, “full humanity” cannot be
achieved “in isolation or individualism, but only in fellowship and solidarity.”573 At
sixty-two, Freire spoke of how he felt his “incompleteness” within himself at every level,
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an incompleteness that pushed him “constantly, curiously, and lovingly toward other
people in the world, searching for solidarity and transcendence of solitude.”574
As with Dewey, education was always about becoming for Freire. Although both
shared a democratic commitment that made them deeply uncomfortable with any
authoritarian or paternalistic view of education as subject formation, Freire’s theory is
fundamentally tied to self and world formation. Putting aside the fact that he does have a
human “product” of education in mind (the critically conscious radical), Freire grounded
education in the human need to “become” ideal, completely ignoring the need to simply
“be” in truth as an equally human one. Ultimately, Freire rejected the desire to
understand, accept, or find peace in what is without trying to control what will be,
deeming a state of constant, endless struggle as the only defensible one.
Although in Pedagogy of the Oppressed Freire appears to allow room for
“profound meditation” as a state “in which men only apparently leave the world,
withdrawing from it in order to consider it in its totality, and thus remaining with it.”575
But this “retreat” is not “authentic” if it “signifies contempt from the world and flight
from it.”576 According to Freire, a person seeking refuge from the world in this way—
perhaps a Rousseau of The Reveries, for example—was a political illiterate, characterized
by the inclination to “escape [and reject] concrete reality […] by losing himself or herself
in abstract visions of the world.”577 Freire associated this desire with an inability to
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comprehend that reality is never fixed, that transformation is always possible, and that the
human, permanent search for completion is always necessarily a social one. Freire
insisted that an “I” could never stand on its own, that it must always be an immediate and
historical “We” to have meaning.
In the end, Freire could only understand the desire to dream alone as an act of
pessimistic resignation or of profound selfishness and greed. In The Politics of Education,
Freire associated solitude and withdrawal with moving through life on a kind of autopilot
with no sense of the “dramatic meaning” of one’s existence.578 He maintained that the
only way to avoid this “empty intellectualism,” which is “alienating” and pessimistic was
through social action, as though living constantly outside oneself in communion with
others isn’t its own kind of automatic mode.579 Later, in Pedagogy of the Heart, Freire
claimed that those who seek solace in being by themselves “selfishly require that
everything revolves around them so as to meet their needs” and “can only see themselves,
their class, or their group due to their greed, which suffocates the rights of others.”580
Even in his criticism he was only capable of understanding the solitary person in social
terms.
Naturally, Freire despised the very idea of an “ivory tower,” insisting that all
“authentic” thought is both rooted in the world and only possible in “communication.”581
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Freire mocked the idea of the university as a “temple of pure knowledge” that must “soar
above earthly preoccupations.”582 He condemned those who “want a humanistic
education” at the same time that they want to “maintain the social reality in which many
people find themselves dehumanized.”583 It didn’t matter to Freire whether or how such
an ideal reality could ever be possible, only that one is always actively engaged in
transforming the world.
Freire calls into question whether any educational institution ever could or should
put politics aside. He failed to see that while all people may be political, that is not the
only quality that makes one human, and the choice to put politics before and above all
else, the choice to see and experience life always through the lens of politics, is exactly
that: a choice. It is not, as Freire would have all people believe, a necessary one. Against
Freire, one could imagine an individual who wishes to study the world without an agenda
to change it; who wishes to immerse themselves in a world apart from everyday politics:
a world of numbers, of nature, of other times or places, of ideas that transcend their
moment. Imagining a community of such individuals is more difficult: Such a place is
certainly not in the obvious interest of society to support, and it’s not clear how such an
institution could sustain itself. Freire often thought that his political-educational agenda
would have to be pursued in the margins; perhaps it is the same for solitary dreamers,
thinkers, writers, and questioners as well.
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VI
Living to Learn: An Alternative
On April 21, 1934, The Saturday Evening Post published its hundred and fiftieth
cover image by Norman Rockwell. The image depicts a child crowned with a laurel
wreath. Wearing a white toga and golden sandals, the boy holds a heavy red tome under
his right arm and a wooden torch with a wooden flame in his left hand. Behind him, a
woman leans forward in her chair. With her right hand on his right shoulder, she
positions a sash across his body. Next to them, a wooden crate balances a sewing box,
spools of thread, pin cushions, and cloth. The woman does not stoop down to dress him;
she tenderly wills him into the future. The hope and pride on her face is comically
checked by the dread over his. While her enthusiastic grin expresses hope, the boy’s
frown conveys a mixture of annoyance, puzzlement, fear, and determination. The
prominent gold lettering on his sash completes and captions the illustration. It reads: “The
Spirit of Education.”
Rockwell’s painting is open to interpretation: Does the image simply reflect the
honest mix of emotions that students will inevitably have about their educations? Or are
the boy’s feelings about learning a problem to be fixed, perhaps with a new curriculum or
new methods? Is the boy appropriately dressed to fulfill his duty to carry on tradition, to
guard and pass the torch of knowledge he has received? Or is he being forced into the
irrelevant clothing of the past when he could and should be dressed and ready for a new
future?
In this dissertation, I have called attention to a different question, asking not what
the boy should wear or how he should look, but what it means for the spirit of education
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to be staked on the figure of a child. I have suggested that while conservatives and
progressives may disagree on the proper content, methods, and attitudes one should bring
to education, they share an understanding about the meaning of their fight: Their
disagreement is ultimately about the kind of adult they want education to produce and, in
turn, the kind of society they want to produce. They are an older generation projecting its
dreams onto a younger generation.
Through the work of Plato, Rousseau, Dewey, and Freire, I have shown how
political thinkers have long looked to education as a tool for managing individual and
collective projects of becoming. In this final chapter, I assess their arguments in light of
current conversations around civic education. Even as I urge a rethinking of what
effective education for subject formation should look like, I insist that education is not
synonymous with formation. Although education can be pursued out of a desire to shape
and control the future, I maintain that education has another root: the desire to know why
and how and what if, even if that knowledge serves no purpose. Understood in this way,
education is neither a possession nor a means to becoming a better self or society; it is a
practice. It is the activity of pursuing truth and understanding for its own sake. Against
narrow and elitist conceptions of the pursuit of truth, I defend and illustrate this
alternative spirit of education.

Rethinking Civic Education
I began this dissertation by arguing that education is primarily understood as a
means for realizing individual and collective projects of becoming and not for
participating in the activity of truth seeking as such. I further theorized that there are three
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modes of learning: transmission, socialization, and inquiry. Next, I showed how Plato,
Rousseau, Dewey, and Freire, all of whom made education central to their political
theories, also shared this conception of education as a mechanism for forming ideal
selves and societies. I further demonstrated how, against the view that good citizenship
can be inculcated in youth through instruction, each thinker called attention to the power
of socialization and the subconscious ways in which citizens are formed.
In chapters two and three, I revealed how both Plato and Rousseau believed that
laws, institutions, and cultures can generate good citizenship in ways that direct
instruction cannot. In other words, they argued that the ideal learning mode for shaping
citizens is socialization, not transmission. They further agreed that by this logic,
education as socialization is only as “good” as the society in question—the wrong laws,
weak institutions, and a culture of bad citizenship will inevitably prevent the formation of
good citizens. Both thinkers found their own societies to be deeply flawed: Plato implied
that Athenian society, not Socrates, was to blame for the corruption of its youth, and
Rousseau thought Parisian society increasingly incompatible with good citizenship. Each
theorized new laws and institutions that would form the right civic habits, and both
attacked their contemporary cultures, advocating censorship or reform.
Rousseau went further. Having judged the corruption of society and the
development of individuality to be facts of modernity that were fundamentally at odds
with the kind of virtuous citizenship that demands subsuming the self to the whole, he
experimented with reimagining private education to counteract the effects of
socialization. Although he imagined raising a child away from society, his method still
relied on the mode of education as socialization, and so rather than use direct teachings to
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form an ideal adult, Rousseau focused on curating the child’s environment and limiting
his social influences. His model set a new standard for education: the creation of a good
and authentic individual whose virtue is in his self-sufficiency and relative independence
from civil society. Rational, fair, and generous, Rousseau’s ideally-formed adult would
not seek to dominate others or compete with them, nor would he be controlled by their
opinions.
In chapter four, I detailed how Rousseau’s break from Plato would prove
especially generative for Dewey, whose work has offered the most sustained account of
the role of education in American democracy. Following Hegel, Dewey maintained that
educators need not choose between prioritizing the individual or society in education
because each can be perfected through the other. Analyzing his conception of education
as growth, I showed how Dewey rethought the school as a site of socialization. Rejecting
the traditional model in which teachers transmit information to passive students, he
insisted that the school could instead serve as a controlled and ideal setting for learning
through association with others. He further imagined that the school could not only
educate young students but serve as the guiding center of social and political life for its
community.
In chapter five, I introduced Paulo Freire and showed how he also rejected
education as transmission. Denouncing the traditional school and its “banking” model of
teaching and learning, Freire sought to redefine education as a collective praxis that
prompts critical consciousness and radical political action. For Freire, true education was
always found in association with others, but rather than theorize how children might be
socialized toward his ideal from youth, he considered how adults could become critics of
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their socialization and work to transform its terms through political action. Freire made
education as inquiry central to his vision of individual and collective becoming, turning
not only outward but also inward-directed inquiry into a political and moral virtue. Like
Dewey, he not only saw education as an instrument of becoming, but as becoming itself.
Despite their differences, each thinker agreed that citizens are formed less through
lessons learned and more through their experience or interpretation of everyday social
and civic life. The implication that even the school-focused Dewey recognized was that
the key to ideal individuals and societies was not in deliberate instruction but in the
cultures and other institutions that educate children and adults. If true, this means that
praise, blame, and hope for the adult “outcomes” of education cannot be squarely placed
on teachers or curriculum. Whatever power a school has to form persons competes with
many other associations and institutions, including families and churches as well as the
media and the internet. The laws, norms, and traditions of communities all play a role in
guiding and forming the beliefs and behaviors of citizens. And, because socialization is
always ongoing, it is important to keep in mind that one is always becoming throughout
life: Whatever influence the classroom may have, it can be unlearned and forgotten
outside of school or in the years that follow it. People will always be more than what their
formal and formative educations intend.
Although the importance of knowledge and skills cannot be discounted, “ideal”
citizenship requires “ideal” socialization which requires attention to law, culture, and
institutions. Although for many contemporary thinkers the school is seen as the key
instrument for affecting change in these areas, their attention may be misdirected. As
Peter Levine argues in We Are the Ones We Have Been Waiting For: The Promise of
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Civic Renewal in America, “We must prepare citizens for politics, but also improve
politics for citizens.”584 This realization appears to have informed the approach taken in
the recent report by the national and bipartisan Commission on the Practice of
Democratic Citizenship convened by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. In
“Our Common Purpose: Reinventing American Democracy for the 21st Century,” rather
than stress how schools must be reformed to promote citizenship, the Tocquevillianinspired authors count schools as just one of many institutions where civic virtue is
fostered, a list that includes “libraries, houses of worship, parks, businesses, sports teams,
fan clubs, [and] philanthropic organizations” as well as “museums and performance
spaces.”585 These are institutions that do not create citizens so much as enable and
encourage the ongoing practice of good habits of citizenship. Critically, the vast majority
of their recommendations are not directed at shaping youth for a better future, but at
impacting the lives of adults. Investing in “civic educators and civic education” is just
one of thirty-one recommendations, and rather than emphasize youth, the authors stress
the need for “lifelong (K–12 and adult) civic-learning experiences with the full
community in mind.”586
None of this is to suggest that schooling and teachable knowledge is unimportant
or unnecessary for citizenship and for democratic citizenship in particular. The content of
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school curricula does matter, but the rhetoric around schools today often takes them to be
all-powerful sites of brainwashing or oppression, as though students have no agency and
no influences outside the walls of their classrooms. Admittedly, students do spend many
hours in school. Compelled into them for their own good, children are told what to learn
and when and with whom and how until they are deemed “educated” enough to leave.
But whatever number of hours are spent in school, the classroom is never totalizing in its
influence. This is obvious but often ignored because the school is one of the few places in
a liberal democratic society where it is acceptable to speak of intentionally shaping other
persons towards an ideal. That is, in America, families cannot be told how to educate
their kids, but public schools can be told what to teach. The underlying hope is that
through the school the process of becoming can be democratically contained, directed,
and controlled through a planned curriculum.
This hope in the power of a planned curriculum has resulted in an educational
landscape where much is staked on the content of education, as though the only real
learning that happens in schools is that which is measurable and testable. Vast amounts of
time and resources are spent on forcing children to prove that education as transmission
has been successful, despite the fact that what is learned for an exam in the short term
offers no proof of what will be remembered years or even days later. Students are ranked,
sorted, and afforded privileges based on their performance on these tests to the point that
their self-worth is confused with these metrics, often leading to overinvestment or total
disengagement with formal education.587
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This is a natural reaction for students who sense that their becoming—or at least
their employment opportunities and social status—is staked on their schooling. To some
extent, it is: As Michael Sandel argues in The Tyranny of Merit: What’s Become of the
Common Good, credentialism is “the last acceptable prejudice,” elevating those with
credentials and demeaning the significant contributions of the uncredentialed to the
common good.588 This occurs despite the fact that, as sociologist Randall Collins argues,
degrees are more often not about job skills or the technological needs of society, but
about “a type of currency of social respectability, which are traded in for access to
jobs.”589 It is not just an overvaluation of credentials that feeds this, however: When
education is only for becoming, and when becoming is understood as both progressive
and developmental, the implication is that those with more education are in fact better
and more developed. The underlying issue is not just that transmissible knowledge and
credentials are taken to be the whole of education, but that education is understood only
in terms of becoming, and that both education and becoming are confused with
schooling.
Unfortunately, the only major alternative to those who overemphasize content and
curriculum in schools are those who stress “critical thinking” and other content-neutral
skills. Critical thinking is mistakenly compared to the kind of knowledge one learns
through transmission, as though one simply enters school not knowing how to think and
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then magically leaves school knowing how to think. One does not become a critical
thinker, but one can practice critical thinking. Teachers can and should help people
practice their thinking by prompting, informing, and criticizing it, but this is not the same
as “creating” critical thinkers. Schools and teachers do not create people, but they can
teach knowledge and offer to help them practice and improve their skills, many of which
can be lost without continued practice.
As I have been arguing, the same is true of democratic citizenship more broadly.
To quote education scholar Gert Biesta, “individuals might have democratic knowledge,
skills and dispositions, but it is only in action—which means action that is taken up by
others in unpredictable and uncontrollable ways—that the individual can be a democratic
subject.”590 Relatedly, to the extent that schools do form subjects, it is mainly through the
active experiences of socialization that they provide. That is, school culture, not exam
scores, will be most important for determining whether good citizenship is being fostered.
At the level of higher education, this suggests that the education one experiences at a
small and relatively isolated residential liberal arts college will be very different from the
one received at a large, non-residential research university, even if the professors and
curricula were the same.591
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At the same time, as Wilson Carey McWilliams noted, socialization has its limits,
and “in the American tradition, this emphasis on malleability has often been exaggerated
into a brief in the almost limitless power of ‘socialization.’”592 Nevertheless, if the role
education plays in subject formation is primarily a matter of socialization and social
experience, then it is clear that, while curriculum does matter, more attention must be
given to how schools are structured to actively work against the interests of good
democratic citizenship. The majority of schools are not only undemocratic, valuing
neither the equality, judgment, or liberty of their students, but tend to stress competition
over cooperation. Students are rigidly divided into batches and expected to follow a strict
timeline of learning and development, emerging by class year into society as though
learning is always progressive and always correlated with age. Teachers are pressured to
engage in social promotion and to pass students through the education system even when
those students lack the basic skills they need to learn and engage with more advanced
material.
And, rather than integrate children and young adults into the community, schools
are designed to cordon off youth so that, with the exception of teachers, children and
adolescents spend the majority of their days with others in their age group when they
could be learning from and with others of all ages, especially the elderly. This has
repercussions not only for the dominant civic culture fostered, but also for the way in
which schools and education are understood and the role that they play in adult life.
School is not a place where students of all ages can learn together and from one another
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according to need and interest. Instead, it is more often treated as a place one must go
through in order to reach adulthood and in order to meet an artificial demand for
credentialism. Only later in life, if ever, do some adults come to miss and value the
experience of education for its own sake.593 Unfortunately, by then, the school is no
longer for them.
Above all, young students are encouraged to value learning content as a
precondition for their becoming and for the extrinsic rewards it can deliver. Learning is
treated as a necessity for passing a test, or for getting a job one day, or for getting into
college which is itself a prerequisite for getting a job. Learning is presented as what is
necessary for living and not as a goal of living itself, and schools position themselves as
places that teach what everyone “needs” to know, despite the fact that this is an
impossible task. As Dewey might argue, they hope to make students learned rather than
offer guidance and practice in how to live a life of constant learning.

Beyond Becoming
Plato, Rousseau, Dewey, and Freire were all principally interested in education as
the art of becoming, as a way to form the ideal subjects and societies they envisioned. But
while today much if not most of education is pursued in the name of becoming a better
self or a better society, there is, I suggest, an alternative. Best captured in the mode of
education as inquiry, this idea of learning is not grounded in the desire to shape selves
and remake the world, but in the desire to understand some truth about ourselves and the
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world.594 While truth and becoming may certainly inform one another, there is an
important distinction between them that the thinkers studied in this dissertation either
grappled with or ignored.
As I have argued, Plato was acutely aware of the dangers of education for truth
seeking and its delicate relationship to political order because he watched as the very
inquiry made possible by democracy resulted in mutual destruction: Socrates’ young
followers turned on democracy and democracy turned on Socrates. This is why in the
Republic Socrates famously suggests that only those proven selfless and devoted enough
to the city should pursue inquiry. Inquiry could only be safe for society and saved from
society, he thought, if it were kept in the hands of those who could be trusted enough to
always put the public good first.
If Plato posited a world where inquiry would no longer be scorned or ridiculed but
held in the highest position of privilege in society, by the time Rousseau wrote, inquiry
was, in his view, exalted for all the wrong reasons. Trampling over moral truths and
common sense, its institutionalization and proximity to power had corrupted both it and
the people practicing it, people who were neither interested in the public good nor in
understanding for its own sake, but in their vanity and social status. There was no need,
he reasoned, to encourage this kind of education in either the people or the elite; those
who had a true desire to seek truth would be called to it regardless and could act on it in
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private. Whereas Plato thought politics and inquiry would have to limit one another in
order to save one another, Rousseau saw their marriage as mutually corrupting.
Against Rousseau’s pessimism, Dewey and Freire both deemed inquiry essential
to politics and especially to liberal democracy. For Rousseau, education as truth seeking
found its purest form in solitude, but neither Dewey nor Freire could recognize the
possibility of education as a private activity. For them, there was no such thing as
education that did not ultimately serve the ends of becoming: The pursuit of truth was not
an end in itself but a means for individuals and societies to become better versions of
themselves. For Dewey, inquiry was fundamentally about solving problems; for Freire, it
was about rereading and rewriting the world.
Inquiry’s promises to fix and transform the world has made education more
supported and widely available than ever before, but it has also meant that access to
formal education is conditioned on the assumption that it will result in productive
benefits to society. Education is celebrated in the United States, but on the condition that
it serves the social, political, and economic order by resulting in tangible benefits. All
educational activity is expected to justify itself in terms of its contribution to individual
and collective projects of becoming, be it in the form of a gainfully employed adult or
social progress.
One could argue that the fact that schools are required to justify themselves is not
merely the result of their expense but a tacit acknowledgement of society’s need to
control and restrain inquiry even when it celebrates the human desire to understand and
the impulse to question. The consequences of human curiosity are often unintended,
unpredictable, and unwelcome—particularly when they are aimed at the very foundations
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of justice or order. Ensuring that education has clear and measurable goals and outcomes
is a way of restricting it and of holding teachers and students accountable. And often with
good reason, the terms, ethics, and limits of inquiry are set and debated every day by
governments, universities, foundations, and ethics boards.
But when the pursuit of education is forced to justify itself in terms of utility
alone, there is a cost to the pursuit itself. To determine the moral, social, political, or
economic end of education in advance is to presume to already know the proper content
and bounds of education. Such limits can not only preclude the fortunate accidents that
arise from truly open-ended inquiry, but direct it away from its first goal: truth. This is
not to say that education should be pursued irresponsibly, but rather to assert that there is
an important difference between accepting or acting on the personal, social, political, and
economic implications of a discovered truth and allowing personal, social, political, and
economic ends to determine the inquiry itself. The risk is that rather than invest based on
truth, truth is manipulated to serve investments; rather than allow politics to follow from
understanding, understanding is clouded by politics.
Education is undeniably a useful though not all-powerful tool for achieving
personal, social, political, and economic goals. And whenever it costs money, and
wherever its intrinsic value remains unfelt, it will be forced to justify itself. But while
there is no question that education can contribute to individual and collective projects of
becoming, as Michael Oakeshott wrote, “while an educational engagement is not
designed to produce performers of ‘social’ functions (this is what is meant by saying it
has no extrinsic ‘purpose’), neither is it designed to produce ‘socially’ valueless
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persons.”595 The same is true of the knowledge it reveals. To insist that education must
always aim at individual or social becoming in advance is to confuse the desire to
understand with the desire to control; it is to confuse knowledge with power.

The Lifelong Learner
In conclusion, I offer an alternative portrait of the spirit of education. I ask what it
would look like to pursue education not for the sake of a future self or for its perceived
social, political, or economic utility, but for the pleasure and challenge of engaging in the
activity of truth seeking itself. Addressing critiques, I argue that there is a satisfaction that
comes from engaging in the challenge to understand that is separate from whatever use
might result from it, and I illustrate how this experience of education can be recognized,
valued, and cultivated in everyday life.
In this dissertation, I already offered two illustrations of what education for truth
seeking as opposed to education for becoming might look like. The first was Socrates the
student. Against common readings, I suggested that one should interpret Socrates as
neither as a typical teacher nor as a model democratic citizen, but as a special kind of
permanent student devoted to pursuing the truth long after his prime. Uninterested in
shaping or forming others, Socrates the student wanted to understand himself and the
world, asking questions not in order to instruct, but because he was called to a life of
truth seeking. Socrates pursued truth in public and with others, but also in quiet, private
moments of solitude. His activity was thought to be useless at best and dangerous at
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worst, and the city wanted Socrates to account for himself. Forced to justify his activities,
he tried to explain his practice as a compulsion. Convicted, he went on to claim that he
was performing a service for the city that merited compensation. Yet this service was
hardly his primary motive: It was, after all, precisely the fact that he would not pay or be
paid to deliver on a promise of education that distinguished him from the sophists.
The second model of education for truth seeking was Rousseau the solitary
botanist. Resentful of his patrons and of all educational institutions, Rousseau knew well
that education for compensation was also education at a price. Unlike the Rousseau who
sought to educate and intervene in dominant culture, the solitary Rousseau was simply a
man pursuing his desire to study nature. He wanted to study plants not to make new
medicines or because he thought it would make him a better person, but because he
wanted to understand plants.
These versions of Socrates and Rousseau are two models of education for truth
seeking, but one need not look to philosophers, and here I offer a third: Gregor Johann
Mendel. The intellectually curious son of two peasants, Mendel was born in Czechia in
1822 and decided to join an Augustinian abbey when he was twenty-one. The 14th
century monastery he joined was a cold medieval building with one-room cells, but it
also had a library with more than 10,000 books and a garden with an alley for solitary
walks. As part of his preparation to become a priest, Mendel took classes as Brno’s
Theological College, where he studied theology, history, and the natural sciences. He was
“disciplined, plodding, [and] deferential—a man of habits in habits,” and his biggest
offense was sometimes neglecting to wear his scholar’s cap to class.596 In the summer of
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1847, he was ordained, and by the next summer he was an exceptionally timid parish
priest in Brno.
Failing in his job, Mendel decided he would try to teach at Znaim High School,
and although he was selected, the school wanted him to obtain certification in the natural
sciences. Mendel traveled twice to complete the exam which had a written and oral
component. He took both and failed both spectacularly, and so the high school decided he
would need more education at a proper university if he were to teach. Mendel studied at
the University of Vienna for two years before returning to the abbey, and in 1853 he
began working at the Brno Modern school as a substitute teacher. At the urging of those
school administrators, he once again sought certification.
Six years had passed since Mendel had first failed his exams. Equipped with more
schooling and more experience, he once again failed spectacularly, this time managing to
argue with his botany examiner and not even finishing the three-day exam. Having given
up on obtaining certification, Mendel resigned himself to substitute teaching. By then, he
already had a garden of pea plants, and he also had a question: “If he crossed a tall plant,
with a short one, would there be a plant of intermediate size? Would the two alleles—
shortness and tallness—blend?”597
Mendel’s question was really about how traits are passed from one generation to
the next. It was an old question whose answer had already been theorized, but Mendel set
about trying to answer it anyway. At first, he secretly bred field mice in his room. When
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the abbot discovered this, Mendel moved his experiments outside and turned to pea plants
instead. He spent eight years observing and breeding hybrid plants in his garden, working
in solitude and recording results in his notebook. From 1857 to 1864, he spent his time
with 28,000 plants, 40,000 flowers, and almost 400,000 seeds. The results of his inquiry
were astonishing, and they contradicted everything that was believed about heredity at
the time.
Mendel presented his findings to a group of about forty farmers, botanists, and
biologists—the members of his local natural science society. The results were also
published in the obscure Proceedings of the Brno Natural Science Society, and he
requested forty copies so that he could send them to professional scientists. Mendel also
wrote to Carl von Nägeli, a Swiss plant physiologist in Munich he respected and whose
respect he hoped to earn. But from 1866 to 1900, Mendel’s paper was only cited four
times. Although he had tried to share the truth he had learned, the gardener and amateur
was emphatically ignored.
Nägeli did deign to reply to Mendel, and they corresponded, but Nägeli was cold,
terse, and patronizing, someone who “could hardly be bothered with the progressively
lunatic ramblings of a self-taught monk in Brno.”598 On his advice, Mendel spent years
pursuing a dead end, trying to reproduce his results in hawkweed plants, which were of
interest to Nägeli. What neither realized then was that these plants could reproduce
asexually, and so Mendel’s experiments with them were destined to fail.
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Gregor Mendel, now known as the father of genetics, died of kidney failure in
1884 at the age of sixty-one. With his health suffering in the last few years of his life, he
worked less and less, but he never gave up on his gardening. Incredibly, his studies and
experiments were not even noted in his obituary, but a fellow monk did write, “Gentle,
free-handed, and kindly… Flowers he loved.”599 Mendel loved his garden and loved the
pursuit of truth even though he had no followers, no recognition, and no reason to expect
that anything would come of his studies. Like Socrates wandering the streets of his city
and Rousseau wandering the woods, Mendel was neither young, wealthy, nor in school as
he pursued truth. He was a man in his garden guided not by a social, political, or
economic agenda, but by his own desire to understand.
A perfect contrast to Mendel is found in another man who was born in the same
year. A child prodigy and Charles Darwin’s cousin, Francis Galton also wanted to
understand heredity. But unlike the biologists who were excited to pursue the vast array
of questions opened up by Mendel’s inquiry after it was rediscovered nearly forty years
later, Galton was less interested in how genetics worked and more interested in how they
could be applied. Galton, the father of eugenics and the man who gave us the phrase
“nature vs. nurture,” was not interested in truth seeking but rather in becoming; he was
not interested in knowledge itself but in how that knowledge could be used to create
perfect individuals and societies.600
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Today, Americans tend to believe the following: that education is principally for
youth and for those trying to better themselves, that education should be pursued only
with a greater, extrinsic purpose, and that “real” education only happens in schools where
it can be directed and certified. In short, that education is for becoming and that schools
are to be the instruments of that becoming. But the portraits I offer of Socrates, Rousseau,
and Mendel are case studies that suggest just the opposite. Education need not be
centered on youth or self-improvement; education need not be pursued with a purpose
beyond the desire to understand; and “real” education does not require schools.
This does not negate the fact that institutional support for the pursuit of truth is
important and necessary. In fact, as Stanley Fish insists, rather than aim to shape students
into moral or civic ideals, teachers can try to guide and introduce students to the pleasure
of the activity of education itself.601 And rather than try to be “a machine for achieving
particular purpose or producing a particular result,” as Oakeshott wrote, schools can be
sites for supporting and embracing truth seeking as “a manner of human activity.”602
Rather, the point is that the pleasure of the pursuit of truth is neither relegated to
institutions nor the exclusive province of those who attend them. To take science as an
example, while doing cutting-edge research demands more institutional resources than
ever before, cutting-edge science is not the only reason to do science. First, at the
individual level, a discovery is always new. Second, newness or usefulness is not the only
measure of the value of an inquiry. More importantly, science can be done in the
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everyday, by any child or adult curious enough to ask why, how, and what if. Formal
training in the scientific method may help one do better science, but humans have been
observing the world and devising experiments to understand it long before the practice
was standardized. Relatedly, there is no question that sufficient time and space to think or
write alone is a privilege. And yet, one need not be a well-funded genius, much less a
schooled one, to think and wonder about the world. One need not even be literate; recall
that Socrates never wrote anything down.
The mistake of those who both promote and reject truth seeking on the grounds of
its elitism and intellectualism is that they forget that education is an activity and not a
permanent state of being. One can certainly lead a life that seeks to maximize the amount
of time spent learning and pursuing the truth, but, as Aristotle reflected, a life spent in
total contemplation is not for the human.603 The world is not neatly divided intro truth
seekers and the rest, but this is the flawed assumption of scholars like Allan Bloom who
conclude that the number of truth seekers is necessarily very small and who stress the
necessity of the proper teachers and models. 604
Like many advocates of the humanities, Bloom also caricatures modern science
and glorifies the truth seeking of a particular and relatively closed community in the
humanities. But just because the modern scientific search for truth is easier to justify in
instrumental terms and follows a different method does not mean that all modern
scientific searches are necessarily instrumental or even all that different in spirit from
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humanistic ones. Science and the modern research ideal may stress “new” truths over
“old” ones and present themselves as creators of new knowledge, but to discover is really
to uncover what is already there. Education for truth seeking in all disciplines can be an
activity of working and wondering to understand for its own sake. Moreover, as Michael
Crawford reminds us, even working on a motorcycle or building something can be a
deeply contemplative, truth seeking, and educational activity.605 There are many ways of
truth seeking and many questions worth pursuing, and reading old books with teachers as
guides is only one of them.
Furthermore, one’s capacity for wonder and desire to understand oneself and the
world is not necessarily determined by one’s work, income, or status in society. Barring
severe cognitive challenges, inquiry is accessible to everyone even if not everyone has
the same amount of time to devote to it. The professionalization of education may have
led to a devaluation of self-education, but self-education is always possible and ongoing.
Serious inquiry is conducted in conversations with friends, in places of worship, in jails,
and in the quiet moments before sleep. Ultimately, whether or not education occurs in the
spirit of truth seeking or becoming cannot really be known by anyone except those
engaged in the activity itself.
That said, it may be true that today it is increasingly difficult to maintain a taste
for the kind of education I am advocating. The search for truth is sometimes futile, and
understanding is never guaranteed. Especially in a world where finding quick answers is
easier than ever before, the pleasure of truly discovering an answer for yourself is neither
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necessary nor efficient, and continuing the search requires a patience and persistence that
can be difficult to maintain. With answers to any question available at our fingertips, one
can spend less time than ever in a state of wonder about the unknown, instead knowing
just enough to be dangerously overconfident in how much one knows. And in a world of
constant interaction, reachability, and distraction, the moments of solitude that might
spark the deepest reflections are ever more rare and ever less valued. Nevertheless, as I
have suggested, the true spirit of education is everywhere. It waits for anyone willing to
wonder enough to find it.
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